In the preceding Dissertation we have abundantly shewn, that the Diction of Poetry is very different from that of Prose; but between the Thought of the one and the other (excepting only Fiction) the Difference is not so great. What, therefore, I shall say upon this Head, will, for the most part, be in common both to the Poet and the Orator; for the Beauty of Thought is generally the same, whether it is express'd in Verse or Prose. But because Poetry is our Province, I judged it proper to produce the Examples that illustrate my Subject, from the Writings of the best Poets.
Writers have taken much Pains to give us a complete Definition of Thought; and some have openly declar'd, that it is not capable of a Definition. Among these, our Countryman Cowley bears the first Place, who directly asserts, that Wit (for that is the Word we often use for those Expressions that are the Effect of it) can only be defin'd in negative Terms. But (with the Leave of the Learned) this Word, and the Idea affix'd to it, is as capable of a positive and adequate a Definition, as many others which we define the most logically, and boast of having the clearest Notion of. Wit, then, in the largest Sense of the Word, seems to be nothing else, but a Thought formed so agreeably to Nature and right Reason, and impressed upon the Mind with such Clearness, Vivacity, and Dignity, as excites Pleasure or Admiration.
Wit we take, as we said, in its largest Extent. For it is not here understood in that vulgar and narrow Sense by which it denotes only Jokes and pointed Turns; but contains every Conception of the Mind that is beautiful; whatever Elegance or Sublimity the Imagination is capable of.
A Thought formed agreeably to Nature and right Reason, is, in this Definition, the Genus; what follows contains the Difference. By the former Part of the Definition we understand a Thought that is founded upon solid and just Principles, which is twofold, either a Thought simply consider'd, or a beautiful Thought. Every ingenious Thought, then, is well founded, but every Thought that is well founded, is not an ingenious one.
It was necessary to make this the Genus of the Definition, that true Wit might be distinguish'd from false. Thoughts of real Beauty are always form'd upon Truth, Nature, and right Reason. If they are not built upon this Foundation, or flow from a less noble Spring, they are to be rank'd among those false Brillants, as they are term'd by our modern, and especially the French, Writers, which may serve to please Boys, and some others of as little Judgment, but will always be despis'd by Men of Taste, and of Understanding, who adhere to the infallible Maxim laid down by Horace:
[138] Scribendi recte sapere est & principium & fons.
Sound Judgment is the Ground of writing well. Roscom.
Thoughts are the Images of Things, as Words are of Thoughts; and we all know that Images and Pictures are only so far true, as they are true Representations of Men and Things. Those Passages in Virgil, Terræque, urbesque recedunt, and the like, where Things are represented not as they are, but as they seem to be, are no Objection to what I advance. For Poets, as well as Painters, think it their Business to take the Likeness of Things from their Appearance. When they do this, their Thoughts are just, according to the strictest Rules of Reason; for in Description or Painting that is truly express'd, which is express'd as the Thing appears to be. Neither Metaphors, Hyperboles, Ironies, nor even equivocal Expressions, when properly used, nor Fiction or Fable, are any Deviation from this Rule of right Thinking: For there is a wide Difference between Falseness and Fiction, between that which is truly false, (if I may so speak) and that which is only so in Appearance. Tropes and Fictions are raised, as it were, upon the Foundation of right Reason. Truth is the Basis of them, and receives new Lustre from such airy Disguises. All this will be sufficiently plain in the Sequel of this Dissertation, and from the Examples to be produced in it. But, in the first Place, it may not be improper to give one or two Instances of false Wit; that so we may settle the Difference between what is true, and counterfeit.
We frequently meet with Passages that want even common Sense, and yet have somewhat of a ridiculous Brightness in them. A certain Poet gives us a miserable Description of the Fate of Pyramus and Thisbe, and tells us, that the Sword, when died with the Blood of the unhappy Lover, blush'd, from a Consciousness of its Crime. No,[139] rather let the unhappy Writer blush, from a deep Sense of that Elegance which Boys would be asham'd to own. Another of the same Form, I know not his Name, tells us, that Lovers always abound with Wit, because Venus sprung from the salt Ocean. It would be endless to mention all the Turns of this sort, which take their Rise from the feign'd Names or Adjuncts of the Heathen Deities.
Modern Writers, all over Europe, are many of them wonderfully fond of these sort of Trifles, especially in their Epigrams and Love-Verses. And some cannot refrain from them even in their larger Compositions. Several of our Top Poets of the former Age, (for in the present these kind of Witticisms are in less Request) abound much with these shining Spots: Nor are the Ancients, (I instance in Ovid) wholly free from them. I can't help here observing, what an inexhaustible Fund of Conceits our modern Poets are supplied with from the Eyes of the Fair Sex; which, as they are the fruitful Parents of various Mischiefs, so are they, likewise, it seems, of spurious Wit.