Examine how your Humour is inclin'd,
And which the ruling Passion of your Mind;
Then seek a Poet who that way does bend,
And chuse an Author, as you chuse a Friend.

And as this is One Circumstance, which is like to make a Man succeed, as a Translator; so it is like to make him err, as a Judge. For this Sort of Friendship (like all others) will certainly incline us to be partial in favour of the Person whom we praise, or defend. It is in This, as in every thing else; the Affections will be apt to biass the Understanding; and doubtless a Man in a great measure judges This, or That way of Writing to be best, because it is most agreeable to his own natural Temper. Thus, for Example; One Man judges (as he calls it) Horace's Satyrs to be the best; Another is for Juvenal's: When, all this while, strictly speaking, they may not so much differ in Judgment, as Inclination: For each of them perhaps will allow Both to be best in their Kind; but the one is chiefly delighted with this Kind, and the other with that; and there is all the real Difference between them. And tho' this does not exactly parallel the present Case; the Poems of Homer and Virgil being more of the same Species, than the Satyrs of Horace and Juvenal; yet it comes very near it: and the Word Species will admit of more Distinction than is commonly imagined: These two Heroic Poets being very different in their Turn, and Manner of Thinking, and Writing. But after all, there are in Nature and Reason certain Rules by which we are to judge in these Matters, as well as in others; and there are still such things as Truth and Falshood, notwithstanding Partiality and Prepossession. And this I can assure my Reader, I am not prejudiced in Behalf of my Author, by attempting to be his Translator; for I was of the same Opinion, before I had the least Thought of this daring Enterprize. However, I do not pretend to decide as a Judge, but only to argue as an Advocate; and a Man may be allowed to plead with Prejudice, tho' he always ought to determine without it: For it may do no Mischief at the Bar, tho it be intolerable upon the Bench. But that my Reader may not be misguided by it, upon a Supposition that I am; I desire him to consider, that as I differ from some great Criticks, so I have the Authority of others to support my Opinion. I need not insist upon Scaliger, Rapin, and the incomparable Earl of Roscommon, whose Judgments upon this Point are very well known; but I will produce the Words of Macrobius, as collected by la Cerda,[6] because he is commonly supposed to be in the other Interest. It is true, in the Comparison of particular Passages, he generally prefers Homer; yet he says, Virgilius Homero ditior, locupletior, cultior, purior, clarior, fortior vi argumentorum, diligentior, observantior, uberior, pulchrior. "Virgil is richer, and fuller than Homer, neater, purer, clearer, stronger in the Force of his Arguments, more diligent, more observing, more copious, more beautiful." Thus, I say, he speaks, as he is represented by the above-mentioned Commentator; who only pretends to have picked up those Words from several scattered Passages in his Writings: Whether they are faithfully collected, or no (for he does not quote the particular Places) I have not had the Patience to examine, nor am I at all solicitous to know. It would be endless to cite Scaliger upon this Subject; and besides, when I agree with him, it is rather in his Praise of Virgil, than in his Dispraise of Homer. I am far from being of his Opinion in some Particulars, and farther from approving of his Way and Manner of Proceeding. He inveighs against Homer with as much Bitterness, as if he had a personal Quarrel with him; prosecutes him with all the Malice of Criticism, and that too sometimes false Criticism; and is upon the whole highly injurious to the Character of that wonderful Poet. Yet I cannot on the other side agree with Madam Dacier, who is at least even with Scaliger, by calling him the worst Critick in the World: Le plus mechant Critique du Monde, are the very Words she uses. On the contrary, I think, he is generally upon these Occasions rather Hyperbolical in his Expressions, than Erroneous in his Judgment. I am indeed amazed at the Confidence of Monsieur de la Motte, who treats Homer with the greatest Freedom, and almost with Contempt, when at the same time he acknowledges he does not understand one Word of his Language. For my self, I have nothing to say, but that I have a Right to deliver my Sentiments, as well as another; and, to use the Words of that noble Poet and Critick above-mentioned,

I speak my private, but impartial Sense,
With Freedom, and I hope without Offence.

And here I cannot but observe, that tho' I am charmed with that fine Turn of his, after having remarked upon some supposed Faults in Homer;

But I offend; Virgil begins to frown,
And Horace looks with Indignation down;
My blushing Muse with conscious Fear retires,
And whom they like implicitly admires:

Tho', I say, I am charmed with the Elegancy of the Poet, the Modesty of the Critick, and the courtly Politeness of the Nobleman; and tho', as I shall observe hereafter, I am not of his Opinion, as to the Particulars he takes notice of, in the Verses preceding: yet I do not understand why, for disapproving of some things in Homer, he should apprehend either the Frowns of Virgil, or the Indignation of Horace. As Virgil saw the Beauties of Homer, while he imitated them; he no less saw his Errours, while he avoided them. And as to Horace, that Nil molitur inepte, in one Place, and——Quandoque bonus dormitat Homerus, in another, must be regarded as Hyperboles; the one as an Auxesis, the other as a Meiôsis. Not but that upon the whole, he certainly admired Homer; nor would he have been the good Judge he was, if he had not. But as he was acquainted with the Iliad, and the Odyssee, so had he lived to have been as well acquainted with the Æneis; would he not have preferred the last, before both the first? Those who differ from me will say he would not; and 'tis altogether as easy for me to say he would. The same, and more, may be remarked of Aristotle; who was perfectly acquainted with Homer, but not at all with Virgil.

Invention, Fire, and Judgment, will, I think, include all the Requisites of an Epic Poem. The Action, the Fable, the Manners, the Compass, and Variety of Matter, seem to be properly comprehended under the First of these; yet not so as to exclude the Two last. For the particular Disposition of them all is an Act of the Judgment, as the first Creating of them is an Act of Invention; and Fire, tho' distinct from Invention, and Judgment, has a near Relation to them Both, as it assists the one, and is to be regulated by the other.

By those who commonly discourse of Heroic, and Dramatic Poetry, the Action, and the Fable seem not to be sufficiently distinguished. The Action is a great Achievement of some illustrious Person, attended with an important and memorable Event. The Fable is that Complication of Incidents, Episodes, and other Circumstances, which tend to the carrying on of the Action, or give Reasons for it, or at least embellish and adorn it. I make this Distinction; because Episodes are such, as are either absolutely necessary, or very requisite. Of the former sort is that long Narration of Æneas, I mean in the main Substance of it, which is the entire Subject of the Second, and Third Books. This perhaps will not by some be allowed to be an Episode; because, I think, it is not commonly called so: For that Word is generally appropriated to Actions, and therefore will be supposed not applicable to a Narration. But I think we shall speak more clearly; if by that Word we mean (as indeed the [7]Etymology of it imports) whatsoever is adventitious to the grand Action of the Poem, connected to it, or inserted in it; whether it be it self an Action, or no. And there is Ground enough to distinguish This from the immediate, and direct Train, or Course of the main Action it self; and to shew what may, and may not, be called an Episode. For Example; The Sailing of the Trojan Fleet from Sicily in the First Book, it's Arrival there again at the Beginning of the Fifth, and it's Sailing from thence at the End of that Book; The Landing at Cumæ in the Beginning of the Sixth; and in another Part of Italy, at the Beginning of the Seventh; The whole Operations of that Book, and so of all the rest, wherever the Heroe himself, or his Armies for him, either with or without his Presence, are directly engaged in the great Affair to be carry'd on, are, all of them, so many successive Parts of one, and the same Action (the great Action of the Poem) continued in a direct Line, and flowing in it's proper Channel. But where any Part comes under any one of the Bye-Characters above-mentioned, it is properly an Episode, whether it be an Action, or a Narration. The long Recital of Adventures in the Second and Third Books is not an Action, but it is Necessary: The Expedition of Nisus and Euryalus in the Ninth is not Necessary, but it is an Action: And Both are Episodes. Which brings us back to the Distinction before taken notice of, between Incidents and Episodes, and the several Kinds of the latter. All Episodes are Incidents; but it is not so on the Reverse. The Storm in the First Book, driving the Fleet on the Coast of Carthage, is an Incident, but not an Episode; because the Heroe himself, and the whole Body of his Forces, are concerned in it; and so it is a direct, not a collateral Part of the main Action. But even Episodes (as I said) must carry on the main Action, or give Reasons for it, or at least embellish it: And therefore I said they are either absolutely necessary, or very requisite. The Narration in the Second and Third Books is not a Part of the Action; but it gives Reasons for it, and so is Necessary: The Adventures of Nisus and Euryalus in the Ninth Book, of Mezentius in the Tenth, and of Camilla in the Eleventh, are all requisite, but not absolutely necessary; and yet they are properly Parts of the main Action, tho' collateral, not direct. The Loves of Dido and Æneas in the Fourth Book, the Sports at the Tomb of Anchises in the Fifth, the Description of Hell in the Sixth, the Story of Cacus, and the Decorations of the Shield in the Eighth, are all supposed by some to be entirely ornamental, and no Parts of the main Action. And This perhaps they may imagine to be a great Point yielded to the Disadvantage of Virgil. Admitting it were so, Homer would gain nothing by it; most of them being taken from him, and he having more of such Excrescencies, if they must be so called. But This in Reality is no reasonable Objection against either. The Episode of Dido and Æneas shall be considered in my Remarks upon the Fourth Book. The Descent into Hell is a direct Part of the Action; the Heroe going thither to consult his Father's Ghost concerning the Operations of the War, and the future Fate of Himself, and his Posterity (for all Action, even in an Heroic Poem, does not consist in Fighting:) And it would be very strange, if, in a Work of such a Length, the Poet might not be allowed to take that Occasion, to describe the Regions thro' which his Heroe passed, and to make the noblest, and most surprizing Description that ever the World saw. The same may be said of the Casting, and Engraving of the Shield, which contains a considerable Part of the Roman History; as does the Speech of Anchises in the foregoing Division; both introduced with exquisite Art, and Judgment. For the rest; granting that they are purely ornamental; and that while the Poet is describing them, the Action stands still, as the Criticks express themselves: There let it stand, with all my heart, 'till Virgil thinks fit to set it a going again. If the Action stands still, I am sure the Poem does not; and the Reader, I think, must be very phlegmatick, if his Spirits do. What if those Episodes are not Parts of the Action? They are Parts of the Poem, and with the greatest Skill inferred in it. What if they are not absolutely necessary? They are very convenient; and that is sufficient. For if we allow that they are entirely ornamental, we deny that they are impertinent, or superfluous; no Things in the World being more uniform, or more naturally and elegantly connected. Nor does Virgil ever commit the Fault of those whom Horace justly condemns; by whom

Purpureus, late qui splendeat, unus & alter
Assuitur pannus——

But the Foundation of all this wrong Criticism, is the Errour of reducing an Heroic Poem to the narrow Rules of the Stage. For tho' the Drama be, in some Respects, more perfect than the Epopée, in others it is inferiour. And it is not Virgil's Fault, if we will not distinguish between the Building of a House, and of a City; or between that of a City, and of the Universe. In a Work of such an Extent as an Epic Poem, and all delivered in Narration, not represented by Action, these Interruptions of the main Business (especially when they are some of the most beautiful Parts of the Poem, as they always are in Virgil's) are so far from being Improprieties, that they are Excellencies. This Variety is a Relief to the Mind of the Reader; who is more diverted by the alternate Rest, and Rapidity of the Action, than he would be by it's perpetual Motion. Nay the Mind is therefore the more in perpetual Motion, (tho' in several kinds of it) than if the Action really were so. For the Poem, as I observed, does not stand still, tho' the Action may.