(22) Letter to Greeley, August 22, 1862, Lincoln's Com. Works, vol. ii., p. 227; also same sentiment, letter to Robinson, August 17, 1864, p. 563.
(23) General Benjamin Lincoln, of the Revolution, affords a striking example. He was brave, skillful, often held high command, and always possessed Washington's confidence, yet he never won a battle. To compensate him somewhat for his misfortunes Washington designated him to receive the surrender at Yorktown, October 19, 1781.— Washington and His Generals (Headley), vol. ii., pp. 104, 121.
(24) Euripides said, more than two thousand years ago: "Cowards do no count in battle; they are there, but not in it."
(25) Hist. of Rebellion (McPherson), pp. 114, 115.
(26) Ordnance and inspecting officers during the War of the Rebellion contended that the .58 calibre rifle was the smallest practicable. In 1863 I purchased for special use a small number of Martini-Henry repeating rifles, calibre .44, and on applying for ammunition, the ordnance officer protested against supplying it on the ground that the ball used was too small for effective use. This, I demonstrated at the time, was a mistake. And now (1896), after years of most careful experiments and tests by the most skilled boards of officers, English, German, French, Austrian, Swedish, United States, etc., it has been ascertained that a steel- jacket, leaden ball fired from a rifle of .30 calibre has the highest velocity and greatest penetrating power.
The armies of all these countries are now, or are fast being, armed with this superior, small-calibre rifle.
(27) As late as April, 1862, Jeff. Davis, though a soldier by training and experience, attached importance to "pikes and knives" as war-weapons.—War Records, vol. x., pt. 2., p. 413.
CHAPTER III Personal Mention—Occupancy of Western Virginia under McClellan (1861)—Campaign and Battle of Rich Mountain, and Incidents
Events leading, as we have seen, to the secession of States; to the organization of the Confederate States of America; to the assembling of Confederate forces in large numbers; to the firing on Fort Sumter and its subsequent capitulation, and to the summons to arms of seventy-five thousand volunteer United States troops, ended all thoughts of peace through means other than war.
President Lincoln and his advisers did not delude themselves with the notion that three months would end the war. He and they knew too well how deep-seated the purpose was to consummate secession, hence before the war had progressed far the first three years' call was made.