For reasons already stated, Pegram entertained no fear of an attack on his left and rear, but was somewhat apprehensive that his right was not equally secure, and hence, early on the 11th, he had sent a small picket to near Hart's house and taken the further precaution to have his right vigilantly watched. The message found on the captured orderly informed Pegram that Rosecrans was leading a column to his rear.( 5) The latter thereupon sent a strong reinforcement under Captain Julius A. De Lagnel to the picket already on the mountain summit. By reason of the expected approach of a force around the right, breastworks were hastily thrown up and two pieces of artillery put in position to repel an attack from that direction. Pegram, in his uncertainty, concluded that Rosecrans might take a still wider circuit around his right and thus pass over the mountain by a pathway or road leading into the turnpike one and a half miles from Beverly; and to guard against this he ordered Col. Wm. C. Scott, with the 44th Virginia, then at Beverly, to take position with two pieces of artillery at the junction of the roads mentioned, and to scout well the flanking road.( 6)
The unexpected presence of the enemy at the summit of the mountain is thus explained, and the reliability and faithfulness of the guide vindicated. Captain De Lagnel, as well as Rosecrans, was doomed also to a surprise.
Rosecrans' command debouched from the wooded mountain and along its crest upon the rear of De Lagnel's position, and new dispositions of the Confederate force had to be made to meet the attack.
The position of De Lagnel's force was on and near the line of the turnpike as it passed over the mountain, and hence Rosecrans' column, in its approach from the southward, having gained the heights some distance from the road, was from a greater elevation.
The 10th Indiana, under Colonel Manson, was in advance and received the first fire of the enemy.
After a delay of some forty minutes, during which time the enemy was receiving reinforcements, and both sides rectifying their positions to the real situation, the order to advance and attack was given by Rosecrans, and though the troops were new and little drilled, they were well led and responded gallantly. The battle proper did not last beyond fifteen minutes. The Confederates made a brave resistance, but they were not exceeding 800 strong, and though they had the advantage of artillery, they were not advantageously posted, consequently were soon overthrown, their commander being shot down, and 21 prisoners, about 50 stand of arms, 2 pieces of artillery, and some supplies taken. The Union loss was 12 killed and 69 wounded, and the Confederate loss probably about the same.
Captain De Lagnel was, by both sides, reported killed, and his gallantry was highly lauded.( 7) General McClellan and others of the regular army officers assumed next day to recognize his body and to know him, and to deplore his early death. He had been shortly before, as we have seen, captured as a Union officer at Fayetteville, N. C., and had at a still later date resigned from the U.S.A. His alleged death, being generally reported through the Confederacy, was made the occasion of many funeral sermons and orations, eulogizing his Southern loyalty and glorious sacrifice of life "on the heights of Rich Mountain" in the cause of human slavery, called Southern rights, or Southern freedom.
But we shall hear of De Lagnel again.
Pegram, learning of the disaster on the mountain in his rear, called his best troops around him and in person started to attack and dislodge Rosecrans. He reached the proximity of the battlefield about 6 P.M., but being advised by his officers that his men were demoralized, and could not be relied on, desisted from attacking, and returned to his main camp and position.( 8)
Of the dispersed Confederate forces some escaped towards Beverly, joining Scott's 44th Virginia on the way, and some were driven back to the fortified camp and to join Pegram.