Early the next morning I received an order to report with my regiment near Union Mills on the Strasburg pike, and to move upon the Cedar Creek road, located west of and extending, in general, parallel with the Strasburg pike. It was soon ascertained that the enemy had massed a heavy force upon that road about three miles south of Winchester. A section of Carlin's battery under Lieutenant Theaker reported to me, and with it my regiment moved about a mile southward, keeping well on the ridge between the pike and the Cedar Creek road. The enemy kept under cover, and not having orders to bring on an engagement I retired the troops to the junction of the two roads. About 2 P.M. I was informed that Milroy desired me to make a strong reconnoissance and develop the strength and position of the enemy. To strengthen my forces, the 12th Pennsylvania Cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Moss, and a squadron of the 13th Pennsylvania Cavalry, were assigned to me. I moved forward promptly with the 12th on the left on the plain, the infantry and artillery in the centre covering the Strasburg pike, and the squadron on the ridge to my right, which extended parallel with the pike. We proceeded in this order about a mile, when my skirmishers became closely engaged with those of the enemy. It was soon apparent to me that the enemy extended along a wide front, has advance being only a thin cover. But as my orders were to develop the enemy, I brought my whole command into action, drove in his advance line and with the artillery shelled the woods behind this line. We suffered some loss, but pressed forward until the enemy fell back to the woods on the left of Kearnstown. My artillery opened with canister, and for a few moments our front seemed to be cleared. But my flankers now reported the enemy turning my right with at least a brigade of infantry. I therefore withdrew slowly and in good order, embracing every possible opportunity to halt and open fire. Reinforcements were reported on the way. I directed that they should, on their arrival, be posted on the high ground to the right of the pike in front of the bridge at Union (or Barton's) Mills to cover our retreat, which must be made with the artillery and infantry over this bridge.
Colonel Moss, not believing he could cross the tail-race with its embankments and the stream below the Mills, commenced moving his cavalry towards the bridge. I turned him back with imperative orders to cover the left flank as long as necessary or possible, then find a crossing below the Mills. Unfortunately, when the artillery reached the bridge in readiness to cross, it was found occupied by the 123d Ohio, Colonel T. W. Wilson commanding, marching by the flank to my relief under the guidance of Captain W. L. Shaw, a staff officer of General Elliott. This regiment was directed, as soon as it cleared the bridge, to deploy to the right, advance upon the high ground, and engage the enemy then pressing forward in great numbers. Before Colonel Wilson could get his regiment into battle-line it was under a destructive fire and lost heavily. Nevertheless, though the regiment was a comparatively new one, it soon successfully engaged the enemy, and drove back his advance. A more gallant fight, under all the circumstances, was never made. It enabled me to take the artillery over the bridge, and to withdraw to a new position from which we could cover the bridge with our artillery and easily repulse the enemy. Colonels Wilson and Moss were each withdrawn in good order, the former above and the latter below the bridge. Gordon's brigade of Early's division, in an attempt to cross the bridge, was driven back with considerable loss, and night came to end this opening battle of Winchester. A Confederate prisoner was taken to General Milroy (who, with General Elliott, joined me at nightfall), who frankly said he was of Hays' Louisiana brigade, Early's division, Ewell's corps; that Ewell was on the field commanding in person. Milroy until then was unwilling to believe that troops other than cavalry were in his front.
Besides Early's division of Ewell's corps, we fought Maryland troops which had long been operating in the upper Valley, consisting of a battalion of infantry (Colonel Herbert), a battalion of cavalry (Major W. W. Goldsborough), and a battery of artillery.( 9) I was not forced to order a retreat until the object of the advance had been fully attained, and then only when Hays' Louisiana brigade appeared on my right flank, and the cavalry there were broken and driven back. General John B. Gordon (10) (since Senator from Georgia), who confronted me with five infantry regiments, reports of this battle:
"About 4 o'clock in the afternoon I deployed a line of skirmishers, and moved forward to the attack, holding two regiments in reserve. After advancing several hundred yards, I found it necessary to bring into line these two regiments on the right and on the left. The enemy's skirmishers retreated on his battle-line, a portion of which occupied a strong position behind a stone wall, but from which he was driven. A battery which I had hoped to capture was rapidly withdrawn. In this charge my brigade lost seventy-five men, including some efficient officers."(11)
The total loss of the enemy in this engagement must have been at least as many more. The Union loss, of all arms, was not more than one hundred. It was now obvious Milroy's command could not hold Winchester. I assumed a retreat would be undertaken in the night, but in a brief interview with Milroy at the close of the battle he said nothing on the subject, and the reproof of the night before warned me to make no further suggestions to him with respect to his duty in this emergency.
General Elliott, my immediate superior, informed me, as I rode late at night through Winchester to my camp on the heights northwest of the city, that he thought it was too late to retreat on Harper's Ferry. I suggested that the Romney, Pughtown, and Apple-Pie Ridge, or Back Creek roads were open, and that we could safely retire over one or more of them. He said he would call Milroy's attention to my suggestion and recommend these lines of retreat, but if he did the suggestion was not favorably considered. At daybreak on the 14th of June I received a written order to take the 110th Ohio Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. N. Foster, one company of the 116th Ohio Infantry, commanded by Captain Arkenoe, and L Company of the 5th Regular Battery, six guns, commanded by Lieutenant Wallace F. Randolph, and occupy an open, isolated earthwork located three fourths of a mile west of the fortifications on the heights between the Romney and Pughtown roads, but in sight of the main works. The earthwork was barely sufficient for one regiment. The troops assigned me were soon in position, and quiet reigned in my front. The enemy appeared to be inactive. Milroy advised me that the Pughtown and Romney roads were picketed and patrolled by cavalry, and I was not, therefore, charged with the duty of watching them. About 3 P.M. I rode to the main fort, and directed my horse to be unsaddled and fed while I sought an interview with Milroy. I found him in high spirits. He complimented me on the strong fight I put up the previous day, and declared his belief that the enemy were only trying to scare him out of the Valley. He referred to the quiet of the day as evidence that they had no purpose to assail him in his works. He said the cavalry had just reported no enemy in my front on any of the roads.
About 4 P.M. I started leisurely to get my horse to return to the earthwork, when, from the face of Round Mountain, about one mile to the southwest of my command, not less than twenty guns opened fire on it. I dismounted a passing wagon-master, and on his horse in less than five minutes reached the foot of the hill on which the earthwork was situated, and then, hastening on foot through a storm of shot and exploding shell, I was soon in it. Lieutenant Randolph with his six rifle guns replied to the enemy as long as possible, but his battery was soon largely disabled, the horses mostly killed, and most of the ammunition chests exploded. Two of his guns only could be kept in position for the anticipated assault. About 6 P.M., under cover of the cannonade, and protected by some timber and the nature of the ground, Hays' Louisiana brigade of five regiments, supported by Smith and Hoke's brigades, advanced to the assault. My men stood well to their work, and the two guns fired canister into the enemy. Many Confederate officers and men were seen to fall, and the head of the column wavered, but there were no trenches or abattis to obstruct the enemy's advance. There was stubborn fighting over the low breastworks, and some fighting inside of them, but not until our exposed flanks were attacked did I order a retreat. The battery was lost, but most of the command reached the main fortification safely, though exposed to the fire of the enemy for most of the distance. Captain Arkenoe was killed, and Lieutenant Paris Horney of the 110th Ohio was captured. Our loss in killed, wounded, and captured was small. General Milroy, from an observation-stand on a flag-staff at the main fort, witnessed this affair. In his report of it he says:
"The enemy opened upon me with at least four full batteries, some of his guns being of his longest range, under cover of which fire he precipitated a column at least ten thousand strong upon the outer work held by Colonel Keifer, which, after a stubborn resistance, he carried."(12)
General Early, in his report, says twenty guns under Colonel Jones opened fire on this position. General Hays reports his loss, 14 killed, 78 wounded, 13 missing.