On the 13th, while my brigade, with a New York battery temporarily attached to it, was holding "Three Mile Station," near Warrenton, and skirmishing with the enemy, ballot-boxes were opened, and a regular election was held for the Ohio troops, both the boxes and ballots being carried to the voters along the battle-line so they might vote without breaking it.( 2)
The Third Corps was encamped that night at Greenwich. The next morning I was ordered with my brigade and Captain McKnight's battery (N. Y.) to cover, as a rear-guard, the retreat of the Third Corps to Manassas Heights via Bristoe Station. My orders were to avoid anything like a general engagement, but to beat back the advancing enemy whenever possible, prevent captures, and baffle him in his endeavors to delay or reach the main column. The successful conduct of a rear-guard of a retreating army, when pursued by an energetic foe, requires not only bravery but skill and tact. After the main body of my corps had left camp on its march towards Bristoe, and soon after daylight, the head of Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill's corps appeared from the direction of Warrenton. I displayed my troops with as much show of strength as possible, and with a few shots from the battery forced the enemy to halt his head of column and form line of battle. I thereupon retired by column quickly, and resumed the march until the enemy again pushed forward by the flank too near for my safety, when, in a chosen position, my troops were again speedily brought into line and a fire opened, which necessarily compelled him to halt and again make disposition for battle. This movement was frequently repeated. At each such halt the enemy necessarily consumed much time, thus giving the main body of the corps ample opportunity to proceed leisurely towards its destination. The weak or broken-down men of the rear-guard were not required to halt and fight, but were allowed to make such speed as they could. The day was almost spent when a courier reached me from French with the information that the corps had passed Bristoe Station, and was on the north side of Broad Run. Having now no further responsibility than for the safety of my own command, I moved more rapidly, and by 4 P.M. I had safely passed Bristoe Station to the high ground north of Broad Run, from whence I could, from a distance of less than a mile, see Bristoe, and, for a considerable distance, the line of railroad running, in general direction, north and south. The Third Corps had moved on out of sight towards the heights at Manassas. My command was much wearied, and I halted it for a short rest, but I soon ordered it forward where it took position in obedience to an order of General Meade to cover a blind road over which he feared the enemy might march to seize the heights.
General A. P. Hill, in his report of the day, says:
"From this point (Greenwich) to Bristoe we followed close upon the rear of the Third Corps, picking up about 150 [?] stragglers. Upon reaching the hills this side of Broad Run, and overlooking the plain on the north side, the Third Corps was discovered resting, a portion of it just commencing the march toward Manassas. I determined that no time must be lost, and hurried up Heth's division, forming it in line of battle along the crest of the hills and parallel to Broad Run. Poague's battalion was brought to the front and directed to open on the enemy. They were evidently taken by surprise, and retired in the utmost confusion [?]. Seeing this, General Heth was directed to advance his line until he reached the run, and then to move by the left flank, cross at the ford, and press the enemy. This order was being promptly obeyed, when I perceived the enemy's skirmishers making their appearance on this side of Broad Run, and on the right and rear of Heth's division. Word was sent to General Cooke, commanding the right brigade of Heth's division, to look out for his right flank, and he promptly changed front of one of his regiments and drove the enemy back. . . . In the meantime I sent back General Anderson to send McIntosh's battalion to the front, and to take two brigades to the position threatened and protect the right flank of Heth. . . . The three brigades advanced in beautiful order and quite steadily, Cooke's brigade, upon reaching the crest of the hill in their front, came within full view of the enemy's line of battle behind the railroad embankment (the Second Corps), and of whose presence I was unaware."( 3)
Hill was unexpectedly caught in a fatal trap. He was mistaken about seeing any considerable portion of the Third Corps north of Broad Run, or as to any of it being taken by surprise and retiring in confusion. But for my halting my command to rest he would have seen little of it. We had baffled the head of his column all day, and had passed beyond danger for the time, and, according to his report, we had killed and wounded many more than we had lost. The stragglers he reported captured could not have been of my command, as it left no men behind.
The fortuitous circumstance of Warren arriving at Bristoe with the head of the Second Corps moving on a road paralleling the railroad, just at the moment Hill was deploying his forces for an attack on the Third Corps, led to a serious and bloody battle. When the rear- guard of the Third Corps passed Bristoe Station, no part of the Second was in sight. I saw no part of it until after Hill commenced arraying his troops on the crest of the hills south of Broad Run. Seeing a battle was on, and my own command too far on its way and too much exhausted to be recalled in time to participate in it, I dismounted from a tired horse and, with a single staff officer, ate a lunch from my orderly's haversack ( 4) and watched the progress of the engagement. It is a rare occurrence that any person has an opportunity to quietly witness the whole of a considerable battle. From my position I could see between the lines of the opposing forces; I could note the manoeuvres of each separate organization; and I could almost anticipate to a certainty the result of the attacks and counter attacks. It was at first plainly evident that each commander knew little of what he had to meet. Lieutenant- General Hill's formation, as described by him in his report, was arranged with reference to a supposed force north of Broad Run, and was consequently very faulty. Warren had no notice of the presence of an enemy until Hill ran unexpectedly into his line of march. Hill seemed to be eager for a fight with the Third Corps, then far beyond his reach, and found one with the Second Corps, which was quietly marching to a concentration near Centreville. General Warren's command was strung out upon the road, and he had no order of battle. Hill, with two divisions, and others soon to arrive, was better prepared, though his formation was bad, to meet the Second Corps. Warren wisely used the slightly raised railroad bed for a breastwork, and promptly opened the battle without giving the enemy time for a change of position or for new formations. The battle was at first with musketry, but artillery soon arrived on both sides and opened fire at short range. Warren, in his report, after describing the preliminary movements of his command for position, says:
"A more inspiring scene could not be imagined. The enemy's line of battle boldly moving forward, one part of our own steadily awaiting it, and another moving against it at double-quick, while the artillery was taking up a position at a gallop and going into action. . . . Under our fire the repulse of the enemy soon became assured, and Arnold's battery arrived in time to help increase the demoralization and reach the fugitives.
"The enemy was gallantly led, as the wounding of three of his general officers in this attack shows, and even in retiring many retired but sullenly. An advance of a thin line along our front secured 450 prisoners, two stand of colors, and five field pieces."( 5)
The battle was of short duration, but owing to the exposed position of the Confederates their losses were great, and out of proportion to short engagements generally. General Warren and his officers justly won honors for meeting the emergency so handsomely.
Hill's command was so signally defeated that the Second Corps remained in possession of the field until 9 P.M., when it pursued its march unmolested to a junction with the main army. Hill reported his loss, killed, wounded, and missing, at 1378,( 6) but it was claimed on good authority to have been much larger. The loss in the Second Corps at Bristoe is not given separately, but its total losses in two engagements of the day, including Bristoe, were 546.( 6)