Another plan, submitted by Bragg (then "Commander-in-Chief near the President"), received the approval of Davis. By this Johnston was to march to the headwaters of the Little Tennessee River, Longstreet to the east of Knoxville and join Johnston, and, united, they were to march west into Middle Tennessee and break the Union line of supplies about Nashville. Though some orders were issued looking to the execution of this plan, it was not seriously attempted, as Joe Johnston regarded it as impracticable.( 6) Longstreet, with the part of his command that had served in Virginia, was, early in April, transferred to the Rapidan. Grant alone moved his armies to the execution of his campaigns as planned.

Wilderness

Not until May 2d did Meade send orders to his corps for the movement on the 4th across the Rapidan. On the day of starting he issued a stirring and patriotic address to his soldiers.( 7) Grant had determined to attack and turn Lee's right flank.( 8)

As soon in the early morning as engineers could lay pontoons the cavalry crossed the river at Ely and Germanna Fords, and cleared the way for the infantry. Hancock's (Second) corps crossed at Ely's Ford and marched to the vicinity of Chancellorsville. Warren's (Fifth) corps, with Sedgwick's (Sixth) following, crossed at Germanna Ford. Warren proceeded to the Old Wilderness Tavern. Sedgwick bivouacked on the heights south of the river. The reserve artillery crossed at Ely's Ford, and subsistence and other trains at this and Culpeper Mine Ford. All these movements took place as ordered.( 9)

No serious resistance was met with the first day. On the night of the 4th I encamped immediately south of the Rapidan on the height just above the ford. I was ordered to cover the ford and protect the pontoon bridge until the head of Burnside's column should reach it. The whole army slept without tents. On rising in the early morning, and while standing on a bluff overlooking the river, Major Wm. S. McElwain of my regiment, in a quiet but somewhat troubled way, ventured to suggest that unless I was more prudent than usual I would never recross it. I told him the chances of war were hardly lessened by prudence where duty was involved, and that my chances of going North alive were probably as good as his. He seemed to have no concern about himself.

General Grant, his staff, and escort, rode by while we waited. He was on a fine, though small, black horse, which he set well; was plainly dressed, looked the picture of health, and bore no evidence of anxiety about him. His plain hat and clothes were in marked contrast with a somewhat gaily dressed and equipped staff. He saluted and spoke pleasantly, but did not check his horse from a rather rapid gait.

About 10 A.M. Burnside, at the head of his command, reached the ford. His corps, the Ninth, had been recently organized by him at Annapolis, Maryland, and officers and soldiers were, in general, newly equipped and clothed, and all regiments and headquarters had new flags. The long line, as displayed for miles, moving slowly over the lowlands to the crossing, was most imposing, and gave rise to varied reflections. But the time for strong battle had come. The head of the Fifth Corps was pushed forward on the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, the purpose being to avoid the intrenchments of Mine Run, but the enemy appearing on the turnpike running, in general, parallel with the plank road and to the north of it, the Sixth Corps (except the Second Brigade, Third Division) moved to position on the right of the Fifth, save Getty's division, which was sent to the intersection of the Brock and Orange plank roads with instructions to hold it, at all hazards, until the arrival of Hancock's corps from Todd's Tavern. About noon two divisions of Warren's corps had a sharp combat with the head of Ewell's corps on the pike, driving it back some distance when, being outflanked, they were in turn forced back, losing two guns. Wadsworth's division of this corps having been sent to the plank road was withdrawn to a junction with Warren's other divisions. Warren suffered some loss in prisoners taken from Crawford's division. Getty, on his arrival on the plank road, found our cavalry being pressed back by Hill's corps, but he deployed on each side of the road, and opening fire on the enemy checked him. Getty was able to hold his position until Hancock arrived about 2 P.M. Hancock, with his corps and Getty's division, assailed the enemy furiously, and for a time successfully, though meeting with stubborn resistance. General Alexander Hays was killed in this action while repairing a break in our line. The enemy moved troops from the turnpike to Hill's relief, and Meade, seeing this, sent Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the Fifth Corps to Hancock. Night came, and the battle ceased on this part of the field before the reinforcements arrived, both armies holding their positions.

The Sixth Corps (Getty's division absent with Hancock) with much difficulty made its way through the dense low pine thicket, and about 2 P.M. was in position, principally deployed, on the right of the Fifth, Ricketts' division (Second Brigade absent) on the left, and Wright on the right. Soon after the head of Burnside's column reached Germanna Ford, my brigade moved to the battle-ground. As we advanced, firing along the extended front soon told us where serious work had begun. General Truman Seymour (of Olustee fame) was assigned this day to command the brigade, but he did not promptly join it. As we approached the battle, I was ordered by a staff officer of Sedgwick to conduct the brigade to the right of that part of the Sixth Corps already in line and partly engaged. This order being executed, we became the extreme right of the army. The other brigades of the Third Division being in position on the left of the corps, I was not in touch with them, and reported to General H. G. Wright, commanding the First Division.

Heavy firing already extended along the line of the Sixth Corps to the left of us. The brigade, about 2 P.M., was put by me in position in two lines, the 6th Maryland and 110th Ohio, from left to right, in the front, and the 122d and 126th Ohio and the 138th Pennsylvania on the rear line and in reserve. Skirmishers were advanced, who pressed the enemy's skirmishers back a short distance to his main line, and a sharp engagement ensued, lasting until about 5 P.M., when, proper support being promised, an aggressive attack was made.

I quote from my official report, dated November 1, 1864: