"It seems to purposely avoid saying one word as to the forms of proceedings while considering such motions. This is highly significant.
"There is nothing revolutionary in holding that purely dilatory motions cannot be entertained to prevent consideration or action on a proposition to amend the rules of the House, as this right to make or amend the rules is an organic one essential to be exercised preliminary to the orderly transaction of business by the House. It would be more than absurd to hold otherwise.
"Rule XLV undertakes to fasten our present standing rules on the present and all succeeding Congresses. It reads as follows:
'These rules shall be the rules of the House of Representatives of the present and succeeding Congresses, unless otherwise ordered.'
"If this rule is of binding force on succeeding Congresses, and the rules apply and can be invoked to give power to a minority in the House to prevent their abrogation or alteration, they would be made perpetual if only one-fifth of the members of the House so decreed.
"The fallacy of holding that the standing rules can be held to apply to proceedings to amend, etc., the rules will more sharply appear when we look to the case in hand. The proposition is to so amend the rules in contested-election cases as to take away the right to make and repeat dilatory motions, to prevent consideration, etc. And the same obstructive right is appealed to to prevent its consideration. To allow this would be to hold the rules superior not only to the House that made them but to the Constitution of the United States.
"The wise remarks quoted in debate, made long since by the distinguished speaker, Mr. Onslow of the House of Commons, about the wisdom of adhering to fixed rules in legislative proceedings, were made with no reference to the application of rules which it was claimed were made to prevent any proceedings at all by the body acting under them.
"The present occupant of the chair has tried, and will try, to give full effect to all rules wherever applicable, and especially to protect the rights of the minority to the utmost extent the rules will justify.
"The Chair is not called upon to hold that any of the standing rules of the House are in conflict with the Constitution, as it is not necessary to do so. It only holds that there is nothing in the rules which gives them application pending proceedings to amend and rescind them. It also holds that under the first of the resolutions adopted by the House on December 19, 1881, the right was reserved to order the standing rules set aside at any time this House so decided, and without regard to dilatory forms of proceedings provided for in them. The Chair does not hold that pending the question of consideration no motion shall be in order. It is disposed to treat one motion to adjourn as proper at this time, as it is a well-known parliamentary motion, and that such motion may be liable at some stage of the proceedings to be repeated if made for a proper and not a dilatory purpose.
"The Chair feels better satisfied with its ruling in this case, because the rule proposed to be adopted is one which looks to an orderly proceeding in the matter of taking up and disposing of contested-election cases, a duty cast directly on the House by the Constitution of the United States, and an essential one to be performed before it is completely organized.