Our Navy at war

by Josephus Daniels

"The beginning and the declaration of the unrestricted U-boat war," said Holtzendorff, "must follow so quickly one upon the other that there is no time for negotiations, especially between England and the neutrals. The wholesome terror will exercise in this case upon enemy and neutral alike."

The submarines were to begin the general attack not later than February 1, 1917. England was to be starved out in five months, and the Allies forced to surrender by August 1st. This is all stated in that memorandum, and those exact dates are given.

The probable entrance of the United States as a belligerent was discussed, and Holtzendorff took pains to set forth what little influence this country's participation could have upon the "trend of the war," saying:

As regards tonnage this influence would be negligible. It is not to be expected that more than a small fraction of the tonnage of the Central Powers lying in America and many other neutral harbors could then be enlisted for the traffic to England. For the far greatest part of this shipping can be damaged in such a way that it cannot sail in the decisive time of the first months. Preparations to this effect have been made. There would also be no crews to be found for them.

Just as little decisive effect can be ascribed to any considerable extent to American troops, which, in the first place, cannot be brought over through lack of tonnage.

Bernstorff, the German Ambassador at Washington, carried out his part of the plans to the letter. It was not until a few hours before the submarines were to strike, late in the afternoon of Jan. 31, 1917, that he presented the note of the German Government to the Secretary of State. He had that note in his possession twelve days before he presented it. He admits that it reached the German Embassy in Washington on January 19, the same day that Zimmermann, the German Foreign Minister, sent to Mexico his crafty but absurd proposal that Mexico form an alliance with Japan, and make war with the United States to recover the "lost territory" of New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas. That proposal also passed through the Washington embassy, in the Berlin diplomatic code, and was read by the Ambassador.

Before he presented the note declaring submarine warfare, Bernstorff had given the order that "the engines of all German ships lying in American harbors were to be destroyed." "I had already given instructions to this effect at the time of the Sussex crisis, and these instructions had now been repeated from Berlin," he says in his book. "As a matter of fact it was dangerous to allow of any delay, for on the evening of January 31, our ships were already seized by the American police. As far as I know, however, all of them without exception were made unfit for use before this occurred."

The day ruthless U-boat warfare began, new mobilization plans were prepared and sent out to the entire Navy. Formal action had not then been taken by our Government. Its course was still under consideration and the Cabinet was to meet the next day. But the moment I read the German note, I regarded a break as inevitable, and active hostilities almost certain to follow.

As the Cabinet assembled on Friday, February 2d, all of us realized the significance of the occasion. Parley and negotiation were ended. The time had come for decisive action. That was the conviction, I believe, of every man who rose to greet the President when he entered the room. Usually genial and smiling at the gatherings of his official family, he was now grave and serious. The destiny of a hundred million people lay in his hands, perhaps the destiny of the world.

The Cabinet members had, of course, read the text of the German note, whose meaning was plain enough, camouflaged as it was in diplomatic terms and pretended concessions. All had studied it, and were familiar with its provisions. But the President read it to us again. He read it in measured tones, giving weight to every significant syllable.