There was general regret when "Doctor Brecht" announced that he felt compelled within a few weeks to return to Europe. He had found that the German officials were planning to send important dispatches they would not entrust to the mails, and they planned at first to make him their messenger. But before this was arranged, Luxburg's code messages regarding the U-boat warfare were published by the United States. The Count was amazed.
Sent in a complicated code known only to himself and the Berlin Foreign Office, five thousand miles away; cabled by the minister of another country among his own private dispatches, he could not understand how those messages could be captured and deciphered by the Americans. It was evident that they were not so stupid as he and Captain von Papen thought they were.
Luxburg's dispatches, when made public, led to uprisings against the Germans, making it impossible for him to remain in Argentina. The day the Count got his passports, September 12, 1917, "Doctor Brecht" had left the Bismarck restaurant and was on his way home with a German acquaintance when they saw a fire in the distance, and found the German Club was burning. It had been mobbed and set on fire by pro-Ally students and others. Seeing the club half destroyed, the Doctor and his companion returned to the Bismarck to inform their confreres. But they found that the restaurant had been completely gutted by a mob, the tables and dishes smashed, and every portrait of the Kaiser, Hindenburg, and other "heroes" slashed to pieces.
Germany had been astonished a few months before by the publication of Foreign Minister Zimmerman's note to the German Minister in Mexico, proposing an alliance of Germany and Mexico to make war against the United States. There was nothing the Germans guarded more closely than that.
Yet before Bernstorff reached Europe, that secret dispatch was published, and the first thing the German Ambassador to Sweden demanded to know when the Count reached Christiania, was how the Americans ever managed to get hold of it. The Foreign Office was stunned. Not only had its plot been exposed, but the exposure had shown that the Allies could decipher the most secret and puzzling code they could devise.
Captain von Papen, who once called us "those idiotic Yankees," might have told them that we were more alert than he had supposed, for the exposure of his dealings in every detail; of the activities of Wolf von Igel, his aide; of Doctor Albert, of Fritz von Rintelen; of the ship-bomb plots; the plan to blow up the Welland Canal locks, and various other German intrigues, must have by that time convinced him that the Americans had some secret service of their own. When, on December 4, 1915, our Government demanded the recall of Papen, who was military attaché of the German embassy, and Captain Boy-Ed, the naval attaché, it was merely stated that the cause was "improper activity in military matters." Both protested, declaring that they had done nothing illegal. But later we published a full account of Papen's activities, with photographs of his checks, the exact amounts paid to his tools who did the dirty work, to whom they were paid and for what purpose. It was shown that Boy-Ed had transactions amounting to millions with German steamship lines whose officials were, through false manifests, sending out ships laden with coal and other supplies for German raiders.
Boy-Ed, at that, did not seem to be so deeply involved as Papen was. He protested that he had no part in conspiring with Huerta, and had never seen the Mexican "ex-President." But it was known that Rintelen had had dealings with Huerta, and that Rintelen had received from Boy-Ed at least half a million dollars. The dealings of Captain von Papen with Huerta were too thoroughly disclosed to admit of denial.
Germany, beginning years before, had built up in this country an extensive spy system, which kept it informed not only of military developments, but of what was done in every branch of industry. When the European war began they used every possible means of preventing the manufacture of munitions or supplies for the Allies. Nearly every large factory or plant had in its employ workmen who were paid agents of the German Government. That they could secure information of what was going on was not so menacing as what they might do, for one or two men could damage machinery so as to retard work for months. There were explosions in munition plants, machinery was at times mysteriously wrecked, shells were damaged; and while the cause seldom could be definitely determined, it was the general belief that many of these "accidents" were the work of German agents.
The Office of Naval Intelligence, whose function in peace times is to gather naval information from all parts of the world, had a more difficult task to perform when war came. An Investigation Section was formed to seek out and take into custody persons who were, by sabotage, explosion, fomenting strikes or other means, seeking to prevent or retard the manufacture of munitions; to discover and thwart any attempt to damage vessels, shipyards, bases or factories; to counteract German propaganda and, in general, restrain the activities of Germans and German sympathizers.
In each naval district there was an Aide for Information, reporting to Rear Admiral Roger Welles, Director of Naval Intelligence, at Washington. Each district was further sub-divided into sections with representatives working under the district aid. The activity of these aides was tremendous, especially in our large ports of entry, New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Norfolk. Arrests of suspects sent fear into the hearts of any who might be plotting sabotage. In one day I ordered the arrest of more than a score in one plant.