Mr. Balfour has shown me the informal suggestion conveyed by the Navy Department through Gaunt [British naval attaché on duty in Washington] regarding closer relations and his reply. The British Government will heartily fall in with any plan we propose as soon as coöperation can be formally established. It was intimated to me that a submarine base on the coast of Ireland would then be assented to.
The whole subject of active coöperation and the best methods to bring it about have been informally discussed by me with Mr. Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law, the Prime Minister, Admiral Jellicoe, and others at their invitation, and they will most gladly assent to any proposals that we are likely to make. They withhold proposals of their own until the way has formally been opened by us lest they should seem to push themselves upon us, which they, of course, do not wish to do.
I know personally and informally that they hope for the establishment of full and frank naval interchange of information and coöperation. Knowing their spirit and their methods, I can not too strongly recommend that our government send here immediately an admiral of our own navy who will bring our navy's plans and inquiries. The coming of such an officer of high rank would be regarded as a compliment and he would have all doors opened to him and a sort of special staff appointed to give him the results and methods of the whole British naval work since the war began. Every important ally has an officer of such high rank here. In a private conversation with me today at luncheon Mr. Balfour expressed his enthusiastic hope that such a plan would be immediately carried out. Many things of the greatest value would be verbally made known to such an officer which would never be given in a routine way nor reduced to writing.
Admiral Jellicoe has privately expressed the hope to me that our navy may see its way to patrol our coast and possibly relieve the British cruisers now on our side of the Atlantic. He hopes too that in case more German raiders go out we may help capture them in waters where they prey on shipping from Mexico or South America.
If our Navy Department will send an admiral it would be advantageous for me to be informed as soon as possible. The confidential information that he will come by would be of immediate help. Such an officer could further definite plans for full coöperation.
Page.
We had presented the proposition informally through the British naval attaché, as the Ambassador pointed out. Captain McDougall, our naval attaché in London, was given access to all records which were not confidential, and his intimate association with the officers of the Admiralty enabled him to keep the Navy Department in constant touch with the situation and to give us data bearing on many phases of naval effort. But there were, of course, many things kept secret, unrevealed to any neutral. Our break with Germany brought about new conditions, and made possible a more intimate exchange of views between the American and British navies. Ruthless U-boat warfare begun only a few weeks before, the Germans sinking shipping by the million tons, and the British naturally concealing their losses and their plans, made it important for us to secure the fullest information as to the exact situation, and what steps were being taken to meet it. And in case war was declared, to have in London an admiral to aid the Department in putting into immediate effect the coöperation with the Allies which we were planning.
That Saturday afternoon I discussed Ambassador Page's cablegram and the whole matter with the President, and he approved the plan. Then the question arose as to what officer should be selected for this important mission. The choice was Admiral Henry B. Wilson, later commander-in-chief of the Atlantic Fleet, then commanding the battleship Pennsylvania. But we were creating a strong patrol force and Admiral Wilson was regarded as the best man to organize and command it.
Admiral Jellicoe was, as Ambassador Page said, particularly anxious that our Navy might "see its way to patrol our coast and possibly relieve the British cruisers now on our side of the Atlantic," and also, in case more German raiders got out, as was feared, to "help capture them in waters where they prey on shipping from Mexico or South America." This was in line with the policy we had already adopted. Formally organized on March 28, Admiral Wilson was put in command of this force, which accomplished just what Admiral Jellicoe then suggested, and what was one of the first requests made, after war was declared, by Admirals Browning and Grasset.
The Germans, naval officers pointed out, might well conclude as soon as we declared war to send submarines across the Atlantic to attack shipping and cut down the flow of munitions and supplies to Europe. One or two operating in the Gulf might interrupt the shipment of oil from Mexican fields, the largest source of supply for the British Fleet. A strong patrol force would not only protect all shipping on this side of the ocean, but, well organized and equipped, would be ready when called upon, to operate in European waters, as it did later on. So, it was determined to assign Wilson to that duty and Admiral William S. Sims was then chosen for the London mission.