Year.Number of Letters.Annual Increase.Increase per cent.
Millions.Millions.on the No. for 1839.
1839.76[2]
1840.16993123
1841.196-½27-½36
1842.208-½1216
1843.220-½1216
1844.24221-½28
1845.271-½29-½39
1846.299-½2837
1847.32222-½30

The most important of the tables contained in the parliamentary return will be given in the appendix, either entire, or so as to present the material results in their official form. The contents of that document have not, to my knowledge, been in any manner brought before the people of the United States.

It is humiliating to think, that while a system fraught with so many blessings has been so long in operation, and with such signal success as a financial measure, in a country with which our relations are so intimate, I should now begin to prepare the first pamphlet for publication, designed to give the American people full information on the [pg 005] subject; this publication being the first effort of the first regularly organized society, now just formed, for the purpose of securing the same blessings to the citizens of this republic, which the British Parliament enacted, after full investigation, nine years ago. If we look at the various political questions which have already in those eight years grown “obsolete,” after occupying the public mind and engrossed the cares of our statesmen, to the exclusion of the great subject of cheap postage, and consider their comparative importance, we shall be satisfied that it is now high time for a determined effort to satisfy the people of the United States with regard to the utility and practicability of cheap postage.

Prior to the year 1840 the postal systems of Great Britain and the United States were constructed on similar principles, and the rates of postage were nearly alike. Both were administered with a special view to the amount of money that could be realized from postage. In Great Britain, the surplus of receipts above the cost of administration was carried to the general treasury. In the United States, the surplus received in the North was employed in extending mail facilities to the scattered inhabitants of the South and West. In Great Britain, private mails and other facilities had kept the receipts stationary for twenty years, while the population of the country had increased thirty per cent., and the business and intelligence and wealth of the country in a much greater ratio. In the United States, there was a constant increase of postage, although by a less ratio than the increase of population, until the year 1843, when, through the establishment of private mails, the gross receipts actually fell off, and it became apparent that the old system had failed, and could never be reinvigorated so as to make the post-office support itself, without a change of system.

In Great Britain, the government, after full investigation, became satisfied that it was impossible to suppress the private mails except by under-bidding them, which they also ascertained that the government, by its facilities, could afford to do. They also became satisfied that no plan of partial reduction of postage could restore the energy of the system, but the only hope of ultimate success was in the immediate adoption of the lowest rate. And although the public debt presses so heavily as to put every administration to its utmost resources for revenue, they resolved to risk the whole net revenue then realized, equal to above a million and a half sterling, as the best thing that could be done. In the United States, the government, without extensive examination, resolved to do what the British government dared not attempt, that is, to put down the private mails by penal enactments. It also resolved to adopt a partial reduction of the rates of postage; and without regarding the mathematical demonstration of its futility, persevered in regarding distance as the basis of the rates of charge.

A few extracts from the Debates in Parliament, will show several of these points in a striking light:

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Francis Baring, on first introducing the bill, July 5, 1839, declared his conviction that the loss of revenue at the outset would be “very considerable indeed.” He said the committee had considered that “two pence postage could be introduced without any loss to the revenue,” but he differed from them, and found “the whole of the authorities conclusively bearing in favor of [pg 006] a penny postage.” And he “conscientiously believed that the public ran less risk of loss in adopting it.” Referring to the petitions of the people, he said, “The mass of them present the most extraordinary combination I ever saw, of representations to one purpose, from all classes, unswayed by any political motive whatever, from persons of all shades of opinion, political and religious, and from the commercial and trading communities in all parts of the kingdom.”

Mr. Goulburn, then one of the leaders of the opposition, opposed so great a sacrifice of revenue, in the existing state of the country, but admitted that it would “ultimately increase the wealth and prosperity of the country.” And if the experiment was to be tried at all, “it would be best to make it to the extent proposed,” for “the whole evidence went to show that a postage of two pence would fail, but a penny might succeed.”

Mr. Wallace declared it “one of the greatest boons that could be conferred on the human race,” and he begged that, as “England had the honor of the invention,” they might not “lose the honor of being the first to execute” a plan, which he pronounced “essentially necessary to the comforts of the human race.”

Sir Robert Peel, then at the head of the opposition, found much fault with the financial plans of Mr. Baring, but he “would not say one word in disparagement of the plans of Mr. Hill;” and if he wanted popularity, “he would at once give way to the public feeling in favor of the great moral and social advantages” of the plan, “the great stimulus it would afford to industry and commercial enterprise,” and “the boon it presented to the lower classes.”