Up to the commencement of the year 1838, General Jessup appears to have been mostly employed in efforts to obtain peace by negotiation and in directing the movements of various detachments of the army, who did not require his personal attendance, and making arrangements for the delivery of negroes to their supposed former owners; but had found very little time to mingle in the dangers of the field. Brigadier General Taylor had performed a most hazardous service; and it appeared proper that the Commanding General should also strike a blow that would distinguish his administration of the military department of the territory.
1838.
Early in January, he moved south, with about five hundred mounted men, well provided. On the twenty-fourth, at about twelve o’clock, he encountered the “allies,” near the “Locka-Hatchee,” and a short skirmish followed, in which the General was himself wounded somewhat severely in the arm. He lost seven men killed and thirty wounded. The enemy yielded the field to our troops, but left neither dead nor wounded upon the scene of conflict, nor is it known whether they sustained any loss whatever. General Jessup expresses the belief that there were not more than a hundred warriors engaged on the part of the enemy. On the twenty-fifth, he erected a stockade called “Fort Jupiter.” Here he lay until the fifth of February, when he moved forward some twelve miles, where, it is said, some of his officers—General Eaton and others—proposed that General Jessup should make terms with the Indians and their allies, and permit them to remain in the country, confining them to the southern portion of the Territory. He, however, moved forward another day’s march, when, being called on by Colonel Twiggs, and learning that it was the general desire of the officers, he says he determined to send a messenger to the Indians, offering them peace.
The first messenger dispatched on this service was one of the Exiles, or, as General Jessup called him, a “Seminole negro.” This man soon returned with several Indians, among whom was a sub-chief named “Hallec Hajo,” who was willing to hold a conference, and expressed a desire to remain in the country; but said, if compelled, they must go West.
General Jessup insisted that “Toshkogee,” the principal chief in that neighborhood, should attend, and hold a Council the next day; and that the Indians should give up their arms. Hallec Hajo at once refused to comply with such condition. He would meet in Council, but would never surrender his arms.
On the morning of the eighth of February, Toshkogee and Hallec Hajo met General Jessup agreeably to appointment. An interchange of opinions and views took place, and the General agreed to recommend the conclusion of a peace upon the basis of allowing the allies to remain in the country, and occupy a suitable portion of the southern part of the Territory. It was also agreed that a certain territory, near the place of negotiation, should be occupied by the Indians and their families, where they should be safe, and might remain until the views of the Executive should be ascertained.[111]
In pursuance of this arrangement of treating upon the basis of permitting the allies to remain in the country, many of the Seminoles and Exiles collected with the expectation that the agreement was to be carried out in good faith.
On the next day, General Jessup addressed a long communication to the Secretary of War, in which he gives his views upon the policy of immediate emigration somewhat at length, and advises its abandonment in the following language:
“In regard to the Seminoles, we have committed the error of attempting to remove them when their lands were not required for agricultural purposes; when they were not in the way of the white inhabitants, and when the greater portion of their country was an unexplored wilderness, of the interior of which we were as ignorant as of the interior of China. We exhibit in our present contest the first instance, perhaps, since the commencement of authentic history, of a nation employing an army to explore a country, (for we can do little more than explore it,) or attempting to remove a band of savages from one unexplored wilderness to another.”
“As a soldier, it is my duty, I am aware, not to comment upon the policy of the Government, but to carry it out in accordance with my instructions. I have endeavored faithfully to do so; but the prospect of terminating the war in any reasonable time is any thing but flattering. My decided opinion is, that, unless immediate emigration be abandoned, the war will continue for years to come, and at constantly accumulating expense. Is it not, then, well worthy the serious consideration of an enlightened Government whether, even if the wilderness we are traversing could be inhabited by the white man, (which is not the fact,) the object we are contending for would be worth the cost? I do not certainly think it would; indeed, I do not consider the country south of Chickasa-Hatchee worth the medicines we shall expend in driving the Indians from it.”