It seems to have been the opinion of the highest Japanese military authorities that Germany would win the war. Japan’s statesmen, however, believed that Germany was a menace to both China and Japan and had lively recollections of her unfriendly attitude in connection with the Chino-Japanese war and in the period that followed. Germany had been playing the same game in China that she had played in the Mediterranean and which had ultimately brought about the war.
The Chino-Japanese war had been a great Japanese triumph. One of Japan’s greatest victories had been the capture of Port Arthur, but the joy caused in Japan had not ended before it was into mourning because of German interference. Germany had then compelled Japan to quit Port Arthur, and to hand over that great fort to Russia so that she herself might take Kiao-chau without Russia’s objection.
Japan had never forgotten or forgiven. The German seizure of Kiao-chau had led to the Russian occupation of Port Arthur, the British occupation of Wei-hai-wei and French occupation of Kwan-chow Bay. The vultures were swooping down on defenseless China. This had led to the Boxer disturbance of 1910, where again the Kaiser had interfered.
Japan, who recognized that her interests and safety were closely allied with the preservation of the territorial integrity of China, had proposed to the powers that she be permitted to send her troops to the rescue of the beleaguered foreigners, but this proposition was refused on account of German suspicion of Japan’s motives. Later on, during the Russo-Japanese war, Russia was assisted in many ways by the German Government.
Furthermore, the popular sympathy with the Japanese was strongly with the Allies. It was the Kaiser who started the cry of the “yellow peril,” which had deeply hurt Japanese pride. Yet, even with this strong feeling, it was remarkable that Japan was willing to ally herself with Russia. She knew very well that after all the greatest danger to her liberties lay across the Japan Sea. Russian autocracy, with its militarism, its religious intolerance, its discriminating policy against foreign interests in commerce and trade, was the natural opponent of liberal Japan.
The immediate object of Japan in joining hands with England was to destroy the German menace in the Pacific. Before she delivered her ultimatum the Germans had been active; ignoring the rights of Japan while she was still neutral they had captured a Russian steamer within Japanese jurisdiction, as well as a number of British merchant vessels, and even a few Japanese ships had been intercepted by German cruisers. This was the disturbance to general peace in the Far East, which had prompted England to request Japan’s assistance.
Japan, when she entered the war, was at least twice as strong as when she began the war with Russia. She had an army of one million men, and a navy double the size of that which she had possessed when the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed. As soon as war was declared she proceeded to act. A portion of her fleet was directed against the German forces in the Pacific, one squadron occupying Jaluit, the seat of government of the Marshall Islands, on October 3d, but her main forces were directed against the fortress of Tsing-tau.
The Germans had taken great pride in Tsing-tau, and had made every effort to make it a model colony as well as an impregnable fortress. They had built costly water works, fine streets and fine public buildings. They had been making great preparations for a state of siege, although it was not expected that they would be able to hold out for a long time. There were hardly more than five thousand soldiers in the fortress, and in the harbor but four small gunboats and an Austrian cruiser, the Kaiserin Elizabeth. As Austria was not at war with Japan the authorization of Japan was asked for the removal of the Kaiserin Elizabeth to Shanghai, where she could be interned. The Japanese were favorable to this proposition, but at the last moment instructions arrived from Vienna directing the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to ask for his passports at Tokio and the commander of the Kaiserin Elizabeth to assist the Germans in the defense of Tsing-tau. The Germans also received orders to defend their fortress to the very last. A portion of the German squadron, under Admiral von Spee, had sailed away before the Japanese attack, one of these being the famous commerce raider, the Emden.
On the 27th of August the Japanese made their first move by taking possession of some of the small islands at the mouth of the harbor of Kiao-chau. From these points as bases they swept the surrounding waters for mines, with such success that during the whole siege but one vessel of their fleet was injured by a mine. On the 2d of September they landed troops at the northern base of the peninsula upon which Tsing-tau was situated, with the object of cutting off the fortress from the mainland.
The heavy rains which were customary at that season prevented much action, but airplanes were sent which dropped bombs upon the wireless station, electric power station and railway station of Kiao-chau, and upon the ships in the harbor. On September 13th General Kamio captured the railway station of Kiao-chau which stands at the head of the bay. This placed him twenty-two miles from Tsing-tau itself. On September 27th he captured Prince Heinrich Hill, giving him a gun position from which he could attack the inner forts. On the 23d a small British force arrived from Wei-hai-wei to co-operate with the Japanese.