When the vote was taken the Government was defeated by 147 to 114. Instead of appointing Venizelos Premier, King Constantine gave the position to M. Skouloudis, and then dissolved the Greek Chamber by royal decree. Premier Skouloudis declared his policy to be neutrality with the character of sincerest benevolence toward the Entente Powers. The general conditions at Athens during this whole time were causing great anxiety in the Allied capitals, and the Allied expedition were in continual fear of an attack in the rear in case of reverse. They endeavored to obtain satisfactory assurances on this point, and while assurances were given, during the whole period of King Constantine’s reign aggressive action was prevented because of the doubt as to what course King Constantine would take.
In the end Constantine was compelled to abdicate. Venizelos became Premier, and Greece formally declared war on the Central Powers.
It was not till August 27th, 1916, that Roumania cast aside her rôle of neutral and entered the war with a declaration of hostilities on Austria-Hungary. Great expectations were founded upon the supposedly well-trained Roumanian army and upon the nation which, because of its alertness and discipline, was known as “the policeman of Europe.” The belief was general in Paris and London that the weight of men and material thrown into the scale by Roumania would bring the war to a speedy, victorious end.
Germany, however, was confident. A spy system excelling in its detailed reports anything that had heretofore been attempted, made smooth the path of the German army. Scarcely had the Roumanian army launched a drive in force into Transylvania on August 30th, when the message spread from Bucharest “von Mackensen is coming. Recall the army. Draft all males of military age. Prepare for the worst.”
And the worst fell upon hapless Roumania. A vast force of military engineers moving like a human screen in front of von Mackensen’s army, followed routes carefully mapped out by German spies during the period of Roumania’s neutrality. Military bridges, measured to the inch, had been prepared to carry cannon, material and men over streams and ravines. Every Roumanian oil well, mine and store-house had been located and mapped. German scientists had studied Roumanian weather conditions and von Mackensen attacked while the roads were at their best and the weather most favorable. As the Germans swept forward, spies met them giving them military information of the utmost value. A swarm of airplanes spied out the movements of the Roumanians and no Roumanian airplanes rose to meet them.
General von Falkenhayn, co-operating with von Mackensen, smashed his way through Vulkan Pass, and cut the main line running to Bucharest at Craiova. The Dobrudja region was overrun and the central Roumanian plain was swept clear of all Roumanian opposition to the German advance. The seat of government was transferred from Bucharest to Jassy on November 28, 1916, and on December 6th Bucharest was entered by von Mackensen, definitely putting an end to Roumania as a factor in the war.
The immediate result of the fall of Roumania was to release immense stores of petroleum for German use. British and Roumanian engineers had done their utmost by the use of explosives to make useless the great Roumanian oil wells, but German engineers soon had the precious fluid in full flow. This furnished the fuel which Germany had long and ardently desired. The oil-burning submarine now came into its own. It was possible to plan a great fleet of submersibles to attempt execution of von Tirpitz’s plan for unrestricted submarine warfare. This was decided upon by the German High Command the day Bucharest fell. It was realized that such a policy would bring the United States into the war, but the Kaiser and his advisers hoped the submarine on sea and a great western front offensive on land would force a decision in favor of Germany before America could get ready. How that hope failed was revealed at Château-Thierry and in the humiliation of Germany.
CHAPTER VII
Campaign in Mesopotamia
IN our previous discussion of the British campaign in Mesopotamia we left the British forces intrenched at Kurna, and also occupying Basra, the port of Bagdad. The object of the Mesopotamia Expedition was primarily to keep the enemy from the shores of the Gulf of Persia. If the English had been satisfied with that, the misfortune which was to come to them might never have occurred, but the whole expedition was essentially political rather than military in its nature.
The British were defending India. The Germans, unable to attack the British Empire by sea, were hoping to attack her by land. They had already attempted to stir up a Holy War with the full expectation that it would lead to an Indian revolution. In this they had failed, for the millions of Mohammedans in India cared little for the Turkish Sultan or his proclamations. Through Bagdad, however, they hoped to strike a blow at the English influence on the Persian Gulf. The English, therefore, felt strongly that it was not enough to sit safely astride the Tigris, but that a blow at Bagdad would produce a tremendous political effect. It would practically prevent German communication with Persia, and the Indian frontier.