Deadweight
Tons
Total losses (allied and neutral) August, 1914-September1, 1918 21,404,913
Total construction (allied and neutral) August,1914-September 1, 1918 14,247,825
Total enemy tonnage captured (to end of 1917) 3,795,000
Excess of losses over gains 3,362,088
Estimated normal increase in world’s tonnage ifwar had not occurred (based on rate of increase,1905-1914) 14,700,000
Net deficit due to war 18,062,088
In August, deliveries to the Shipping Board and other sea-goingconstruction in the United States for private partiespassed allied and neutral destruction for that month. Thefigures:
Gross
(Actual Tons)
Deliveries to the Shipping Board 244,121
Other construction over 1,000 gross 16,918
————
Total 261,039
Losses (allied and neutral) 259,400
America alone surpassed losses for month by 1,630
Note.—World’s merchant tonnage, as of June 30, 1914, totaled49,089,552 gross tons, or, roughly, 73,634,328 deadweighttons. (Lloyd’s Register.)

The climax to Germany’s piratical submarine adventure took place a few days after the armistice, when a mournful procession of shamefaced-looking U-boats sailed between lines of English cruisers to be handed over to the tender mercies of the Allied governments.

CHAPTER XI
China Joins the Fighting Democracies

THE circumstances connected with the entrance of the Republic of China into the World War were as follows: On February 4, 1917, the American Minister, Dr. Reinsch, requested the Chinese Government to follow the United States in protesting against the German use of the submarine against neutral ships. On February 9th Pekin made such a protest to Germany, and declared its intention of severing diplomatic relations if the protest were ineffectual. The immediate answer of Germany was to torpedo the French ship Atlas in the Mediterranean on which were over seven hundred Chinese laborers. On March 10th the Chinese Parliament empowered the government to break with Germany. On the same afternoon a reply was received from the German Government to the Chinese protest, of a very mild character. The reply produced a great deal of surprise in China.

A Chinese statesman made this comment on the German change of attitude: “The troops under Count Waldersee leaving Germany for the relief of Pekin were instructed by the War Lord to grant no quarter to the Chinese. On the other hand, the latter were to be so disciplined that they would never dare look a German in the face again. The whirligig of time brings its own revenge, and today, after the lapse of scarcely seventeen years, we hear the Vossische Zeitung commenting on the diplomatic rupture between China and Germany, lamenting that even so weak a state as the Far Eastern Republic dares look defiantly at the German nation.”

The breaking off of relations with Germany led to trouble between the President of the Republic and the Premier. The Premier desired to break off relations without consulting Parliament. The President insisted that Parliament should be consulted, which was actually done. The next move was to declare war, but here the Chinese statesmen hesitated, and their hesitation arose through their feeling toward Japan.

They sympathized with the Allies, but to Chinese eyes Japan had stood for all that Germany, as depicted by its worst enemies, stood for. The Japanese Government was professing friendliness to China, but that profession the Chinese could not reconcile with Japan’s action in the Chino-Japanese War, and on many other occasions since that war. In Chinese hearts there was a strong feeling of distrust, fear and hatred for their Japanese neighbor. There were other reasons also why they hesitated to declare war. Indeed the devotion to peace, which is deep-rooted in the nation, would be a sufficient reason in itself.

Moreover, China, like other neutral nations, was a strong center for German propaganda. German consuls and diplomatic officers, who were scholars in Chinese literature and philosophy, and who also had sufficient funds to entertain Chinese officials as they liked to be entertained, were actively endeavoring to influence Chinese statesmen.

The Chinese Government, however, was determined to declare war, and to secure support the Chinese Premier summoned a council of military governors to consider the question. The majority of the conference agreed with the Premier, but a vigorous opposition began to develop. On May 7th the President sent a formal request to Parliament to approve of a declaration of war. Parliament delayed and was threatened by a mob. The Premier was accused of having instigated the riot and support began to gather for Parliament, and an attack was made on the Premier as being willing to sell China.

Day by day the differences between the militants and democrats became more bitter. The question of war was almost lost in the differences of opinion as to the comparative powers of Parliament and the Executive. A demand was made that the Premier resign. He refused to resign and was dismissed from office by the President, who was supported in his action by the Parliament. This was practically a success of the Parliamentary party, when suddenly several of the northern generals and governors declared their independence, and the movement gradually developed into a revolution in favor of the restoration of the Manchu Dynasty. This revolution was finally suppressed.