While the Australians and New Zealanders, or Anzacs as they are now generally known from the initials of the words Australian-New Zealand Army Corps, were fighting so gallantly at Gaba Tepe, the British troops were landing at the southern end of the Gallipoli Peninsula. The advance was slow and difficult. The Turk was pushed back, little by little, and the ground gained organized. The details of this progress, though full of incidents of the greatest courage and daring, need not be recounted.
On June the 4th a general attack was made, preceded by heavy bombardments by all guns, but after terrific fighting, in which many prisoners were captured and great losses suffered, the net result was an advance of about five hundred yards. As time went on the general impression throughout the Allied countries was that the expedition had failed. On June 30th the losses of the Turks were estimated at not less than seventy thousand, and the British naval and military losses up to June 1st, aggregated 38,635 officers and men. At that time the British and French allies held but a small corner of the area to be conquered. In all of these attacks the part played by the Australian and New Zealand army corps was especially notable. Reinforcements were repeatedly sent to the Allies, who worked more and more feverishly as time went on with the hope of aiding Russia, which was then desperately struggling against the great German advance.
On August 17th it was reported that a landing had been made at Suvla Bay, the extreme western point of the Peninsula. From this point it was hoped to threaten the Turkish communications with their troops at the lower end of the Peninsula. This new enterprise, however, failed to make any impression, and in the first part of September, vigorous Turkish counter-offensives gained territory from the Franco-British troops. According to the English reports the Turks paid a terrible price for their success.
It had now become evident that the expedition was a failure. The Germans were already gloating over what they called the "failure of British sea power," and English publicists were attempting to show that, though the enterprise had failed, the very presence of a strong Allied force at Saloniki had been an enormous gain. The first official announcement of failure was made December 20, 1916, when it was announced that the British forces at Anzac and Suvla Bay had been withdrawn, and that only the minor positions near Sedd-el-Bahr were occupied. Great Britain's loss of officers and men at the Dardanelles up to December 11th was 112,921, according to an announcement made in the House of Commons by the Parliamentary Under Secretary for War. Besides these casualties the number of sick admitted to hospitals was 96,683. The decision to evacuate Gallipoli was made in the course of November by the British Government as the result of the early expressed opinion of General Monro, who had succeeded General Hamilton on October 28, 1915.
General Monro found himself confronted with a serious problem in the attempt to withdraw an army of such a size from positions not more than three hundred yards from the enemy's trenches, and to embark on open beaches every part of which was within effective range of Turkish guns. Moreover, the evacuation must be done gradually, as it was impossible to move the whole army at once with such means of transportation as existed. The plan was to remove the munitions, supplies and heavy guns by instalments, working only at night, carrying off at the same time a large portion of the troops, but leaving certain picked battalions to guard the trenches. Every endeavor had to be made for concealment. The plan was splendidly successful, and the Turks apparently completely deceived. On December 20th the embarkation of the last troops at Suvla was accomplished. The operations at Anzac were conducted in the same way. Only picked battalions were left to the end, and these were carried safely off.
The success of the Suvla and Anzac evacuation made the position at Cape Helles more dangerous. The Turks were on the lookout, and it seemed almost impossible that they could be again deceived. On January 7th an attack was made by the Turks upon the trenches, which was beaten back. That night more than half the troops had left the Peninsula. The next day there was a heavy storm which made embarkation difficult, but it was nevertheless accomplished. The whole evacuation was a clever and successful bit of work.
CHAPTER XXI
THE GREATEST NAVAL BATTLE IN HISTORY
Germany's ambition for conquest at sea had been nursed and carefully fostered for twenty years. During the decade immediately preceding the declaration of war, it had embarked upon a policy of naval upbuilding that brought it into direct conflict with England's sea policy. Thereafter it became a race in naval construction, England piling up a huge debt in its determination to construct two tons of naval shipping to every one ton built by Germany.
Notwithstanding Great Britain's efforts in this direction, Germany's naval experts, with the ruthless von Tirpitz at their head, maintained that, given a fair seaway with ideal weather conditions favoring the low visibility tactics of the German sea command, a victory for the Teutonic ships would follow. It was this belief that drew the ships of the German cruiser squadron and High Seas Fleet off the coast of Jutland and Horn Reef into the great battle that decided the supremacy of the sea.