At that time it seems probable that the armies of Great Britain and France numbered about three million five hundred thousand men, and that, of these, six hundred and seventy thousand were on the front lines when the German attack began, leaving an army of reserve of about two million eight hundred and fifty thousand men. A considerable number of these were probably in England on leave. The number of French soldiers must have been between four and five million, of whom about one million five hundred thousand were on the front line. Adding to these the American, Belgian, Portuguese, Russian and Polish troops the Allied forces could not have been short of eight million five hundred thousand men.
[Illustration: Map: Lens on the North, St. Quentin on the East, Soissons
on the South, Amiens on the West.]
HOW GERMANY ATTEMPTED TO DIVIDE THE ALLIED ARMIES
The map shows the ground covered by the Germans in the terrific
Picardy drive of March, 1918, which had for its object the capture of
Amiens and the push forward along the Somme to the channel, thus
dividing the British army in the north from the French and Americans
in the south.
The strength of the Germans on the western front before the Russian Revolution was probably about four million five hundred thousand men, and the withdrawal of Russia from the war had added to that number probably as many as one million five hundred thousand men, making an army of six million men to oppose that of the Allies. The Allies, therefore, must have considerably outnumbered the Germans.
In spite of this fact in nearly all the engagements in the early part of the great offensive the Allied forces were outnumbered in a ratio varying from three to one to five to three. This was possible, first, because in any offensive the attacking side naturally concentrates as many troops as it can gather at the point from which the offense is to begin, and second, since the Allies were not under one command it was with great difficulty that arrangements could be made by which the forces of one nation could reinforce the armies of another.
The first difficulty of course could not be obviated, but the solution of the second difficulty was the appointment of General Foch as Commander-in-Chief of all the Allied forces.
The appointment was made on March 28th and all the influence of the United States had been exerted in its favor. General Pershing at once offered to General Foch the unrestricted use of the American force in France and it was agreed that a large part of the American army should be brigaded with the Allied troops wherever there were weak spots.
Foch was already famous as the greatest strategist in Europe. He comes of a Basque family and was born in the town of Tarbes, in the Department of the Hautes-Pyrenees, which is on the border of Spain, on October 2, 1851. Foch served as a subaltern in the Franco-Prussian War and at twenty-six was made captain in the artillery. Later he became Professor of Tactics in the Ecole de Guerre, where he remained for five years. He then returned to regimental work and won steady promotion until he became brigadier-general. He was sent back to the War College as Director and wrote two books, "The Principles of War" and "Conduct of War," which have been translated into English, German and Italian and are considered standard works. He was now recognized as a man of unusual ability and was appointed to the command first, of the Thirteenth division, then of the Eighth corps at Bourges, and then to the command of the Twentieth corps at Nancy.
Unlike Marshal Joffre who was cool, careful, slow moving, Marshal Foch is full of daring and impetuosity. Everything is calculated scientifically but his strategy is full of dash. Many of his sayings have been passed from mouth to mouth among the Allies.
"Find out the weak point of your enemy and deliver your blow there," he said once at a staff banquet.
"But suppose, General," said an officer, "that the enemy has no weak point?" "If the enemy has no weak point," replied the Commander, "make one."