GENERAL MARCH'S OWN STORY OF THE WORK OF THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION—OF THE WAR PLANS DIVISION—OF THE PURCHASE AND TRAFFIC DIVISION—HOW MEN, MUNITIONS AND SUPPLIES REACHED THE WESTERN FRONT.

It is important that a general summary of America's military preparations, a detailed description of the operations behind the battle line and a detailed chronology of America's principal military operations in France during the year 1918 should be presented to the reader. Such a summary is afforded by the report of General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff, United States Army, for the last year of the war. Addressing the Secretary of War, General March wrote in part:

The signing of the armistice on November 11, 1918, has brought to a successful conclusion the most remarkable achievement in the history of all warfare.

The entry of the United States into the war on April 6, 1917, found the Nation about as thoroughly unprepared for the great task which was confronting it as any great nation which had ever engaged in war. Starting from a minimum of organized strength, within this short period of sixteen months the entire resources of the country in men, money, and munitions have been placed under central control, and at the end of this period the Nation was in its full stride and had accomplished, from a military standpoint, what our enemy regarded as the impossible. The most important single thing, perhaps, in this record of accomplishment, was the immediate passage by Congress of the draft law, without which it would have been impossible to have raised the men necessary for victory. In organizing, training, and supplying the vast numbers of men made available by the draft law very many changes have been made necessary in the organization of the War Department and in the methods existing therein which were inherited from the times of profound peace.

Shortly after my installation as Chief of Staff I adopted the principle of interchange of the personnel of the various staff corps of the War Department with men who had training in France, and in the application of this principle placed as the heads of various bureaus officers selected on account of their ability and experience in the system of warfare as conducted in France.

At this time, also, I found that the divisions organized in our armies were still regarded as separate units, designated by different titles in accordance with their origin. This made three different kinds of divisions in the United States army—the Regular army, the National Guard, and National army divisions. All these distinctions were abolished and the entire army consolidated into a United States army, without regard to the source from which drawn. The source of supply of all replacements for the various elements of the army, without regard to their origin, was drafted men; and the titles had no significance whatever and were a source of possible disturbance from the standpoint of military efficiency. There was, in fact, no actual difference between these divisions with respect to efficiency—all have done high-grade work from whatever source drawn. All have shown courage and capacity for quick absorption of the fundamentals of modern military training and irresistible dash and force in actual fighting.

When I returned from France on March 1, 1918, I came back with the belief that the most fundamental necessity, both for the American Expeditionary Force and for the success of the allies, was that the shipment of troops to France should be vastly increased and should have priority over everything else; and as this policy became effective a study was instituted looking to our putting in France, if that was possible, enough men to bring the war to a conclusion in the shortest period possible. After a study of the entire situation, including as accurate an estimate of the potential strength of our allies on the western front and of the probable German strength as was possible, I came to the conclusion that the war might be brought to an end in 1919, provided we were able to land in France by June 30th of that year eighty American divisions of a strength of 3,360,000 men. On July 18, 1918, I submitted to you a formal memorandum, accompanied by a study of methods by which the men could be obtained, the supplies procured, and an analysis of the shipping which must be obtained in order to accomplish this very large military program. This was accompanied by an estimate of the cost of the proposed program.

In this study I recommended to you the adoption, as the American program, of eighty divisions in France and eighteen at home by June 30, 1919, based on a total strength of the American army of 4,850,000 men. This was approved by you and by the President of the United States and adopted as our formal military program. To carry this program into effect required the adoption by Congress of a change in the draft ages so as to include men between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, and also created a deficiency over the enormous appropriations already made by Congress of some $7,000,000,000. The presentation of the program to Congress, accompanied by the statement that this increase in the army, if laws were passed by Congress which would make it effective, would lead to success in 1919, produced prompt and favorable consideration by that body. Up to the signing of the armistice troops were being transported to France monthly in accordance with that program. The results speak for themselves….

[Illustration: Photograph]
Photo by International Film Service.
THE SALVATION ARMY ON THE WESTERN FRONT
A shell-proof dugout used as a rest room for soldiers.

[Illustration: Photograph]
Copyright Press Illustrating Service.
THE Y. M. C. A. IN THE FRONT LINE TRENCHES
The Y. M. C. A. sign beside the trench points the way to a dugout,
instead of the usual hut, in which soldiers found the comforts which
made the sign of the triangle famous.