I learned afterwards that at the decisive discussion at Potsdam on July 5th the Austrian demand had met with the unconditional approval of all the personages in authority; it was even added that no harm would be done if war with Russia did come out of it. It was so stated at least in the Austrian report received at London by Count Mensdorff (the Austrian Ambassador to England).
At this point I received instructions to endeavor to bring the English press to a friendly attitude in case Austria should deal the death-blow to "Greater-Serbian" hopes. I was to use all my influence to prevent public opinion in England from taking a stand against Austria. I remembered England's attitude during the Bosnian annexation crisis, when public opinion showed itself in sympathy with the Serbian claims to Bosnia; I recalled also the benevolent promotion of nationalist hopes that went on in the days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi; and on these and other grounds I thought it extremely unlikely that English public opinion would support a punitive expedition against the Archduke's murderers. I thus felt it my duty to enter an urgent warning against the whole project, which I characterized as venturesome and dangerous, I recommended that counsels of moderation he given Austria, as I did not believe that the conflict could be localized (that is to say, it could not be limited to a war between Austria and Serbia).
[Illustration: Photographs of Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg and Prince
Maximilian.]
Photos from International Film Service.
THE GERMAN CHANCELLORS
On the right is Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg who is held responsible
in large measure for bringing on the war. On the left is Prince
Maximilian of Baden, the Kaiser's camouflage chancellor who was
appointed in a vain attempt to fool the American people into thinking
that a democratic government had been set up in Germany.
[Illustration: Photograph of ex-Emperor Charles and ex-Empress Zita.]
Copyright Press Illustrating Service. THE DEPOSED RULERS OF
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY The ex-Emperor Charles and his wife, the ex-Empress
Zita, in deep conversation with Hungarian leaders who are explaining
the distressing situation confronting the country.
Herr von Jagow answered me that Russia was not prepared; that there would be more or less of a rumpus; but that the more firmly we stood by Austria, the more surely would Russia give way. Austria was already blaming us for flabbiness and we could not flinch. On the other hand, Russian sentiment was growing more unfriendly all the time, and we must simply take the risk. I subsequently learned that this attitude was based on advices from Count Pourtales (the German Ambassador in Petrograd), that Russia would not stir under any circumstances; information which prompted us to spur Count Berchtold on in his course. On learning the attitude of the German Government I looked for salvation through English mediation, knowing that Sir Edward Grey's influence in Petrograd could be used in the cause of peace. I, therefore, availed myself of my friendly relations with the Minister to ask him confidentially to advise moderation in Russia in case Austria demanded satisfaction from the Serbians, as it seemed likely she would.
The English press was quiet at first, and friendly to Austria, the assassination being generally condemned. By degrees, however, more and more voices made themselves heard, in the sense that, however necessary it might be to take cognizance of the crime, any exploitation of it for political ends was unjustifiable. Moderation was enjoined upon Austria. When the ultimatum came out, all the papers, with the exception of the Standard, were unanimous in condemning it. The whole world, outside of Berlin and Vienna, realized that it meant war, and a world war too. The English fleet, which happened to have been holding a naval review, was not demobilized.
The British Government labored to make the Serbian reply conciliatory, and "the Serbian answer was in keeping with the British efforts." Sir Edward Grey then proposed his plan of mediation upon the two points which Serbia had not wholly conceded. Prince Lichnowsky writes:
M. Cambon (for France), Marquis Imperiali (for Italy), and I were to meet, with Sir Edward in the chair, and it would have been easy to work out a formula for the debated points, which had to do with the co-operation of imperial and royal officials in the inquiries to be conducted at Belgrade. By the exercise of good will everything could have been settled in one or two sittings, and the mere acceptance of the British proposal would have relieved the strain and further improved our relations with England. I seconded this plan with all my energies. In vain. I was told (by Berlin) that it would be against the dignity of Austria. Of course, all that was needed was one hint from Berlin to Count Berchtold (the Austrian Foreign Minister); he would have satisfied himself with a diplomatic triumph and rested on the Serbian answer. That hint was never given. On the contrary, pressure was brought in favor of war….
After our refusal Sir Edward asked us to come forward with our proposal. We insisted on war. No other answer could I get (from Berlin) than that it was a colossal condescension on the part of Austria not to contemplate any acquisition of territory. Sir Edward justly pointed out that one could reduce a country to vassalage without acquiring territory; that Russia would see this, and regard it as a humiliation not to be put up with. The impression grew stronger and stronger that we were bent on war. Otherwise our attitude toward a question in which we were not directly concerned was incomprehensible. The insistent requests and well-defined declarations of M. Sasanof, the Czar's positively humble telegrams, Sir Edward's repeated proposals, the warnings of Marquis San Guiliano and of Bollati, my own pressing admonitions were all of no avail. Berlin remained inflexible—Serbia must be slaughtered.
Then, on the 29th, Sir Edward decided upon his well-known warning. I told him I had always reported (to Berlin) that we should have to reckon with English opposition if it came to a war with France. Time and again the Minister said to me, "If war breaks out it will be the greatest catastrophe the world has ever seen." And now events moved rapidly. Count Berchtold at last decided to come around, having up to that point played the role of "Strong man" under guidance of Berlin. Thereupon we (in answer to Russia's mobilization) sent our ultimatum and declaration of war—after Russia had spent a whole week in fruitless negotiation and waiting.