History of the World War

by Jr. Francis A. March; Richard J. Beamish

But though the German fleet had been bottled up in her harbors, Germany was not yet impotent. There remained the submarine.

Up to 1905 Germany had not a single submarine. The first German submarine was launched on August 30, 1905. Even then it was considered merely an experiment. In February, 1907, it was added to the register of the fleet. On January 1, 1901, there were only four nations that possessed submarines, France, with fourteen; the United States, with eight; England, with six, of which not one was completed, and finally Italy, with two. In 1910, Germany appropriated 18,750,000 marks for submarines, and in 1913, 25,000,000 marks. On January 1, 1914, the total number of submarines of all nations was approximately four hundred.

Early in the war the submarine became a grave menace to the English navy and to English commerce. On the 5th of September the Pathfinder, a light cruiser, was torpedoed and sunk with great loss of life. On September 22d, three cruisers, the Cressy, Hogue, and Aboukir were engaged in patrolling the coast of Holland. A great storm had been raging and the cruisers were not protected by the usual screen of destroyers. At half-past six in the morning the seas had fallen and the cruisers proceeded to their posts. The report of Commander Nicholson, of the Cressy, of what followed gives a good idea of the effectiveness of the submarine.

"The Aboukir," says this report, "was struck at about 6.25 A. M. on the starboard beam. The Hogue and Cressy closed, and took up a position, the Hogue ahead of the Aboukir, and the Cressy about four hundred yards on her port beam. As soon as it was seen that the Aboukir was in danger of sinking, all the boats were sent away from the Cressy, and a picket boat was hoisted out without steam up. When cutters full of the Aboukir's men were returning to the Cressy, the Hogue was struck, apparently under the aft 9.2 magazine, as a very heavy explosion took place immediately. Almost directly after the Hogue was hit we observed a periscope on our port bow about three hundred yards off. Fire was immediately opened, and the engines were put full speed ahead with the intention of running her down. . . .

"Captain Johnson then maneuvered the ship so as to render assistance to the crews of the Hogue and Aboukir. About five minutes later another periscope was seen on our starboard quarter, and fire was opened. The track of the torpedo she fired at a range of from 500 to 600 yards was plainly visible, and it struck us on the starboard side just before the after bridge. The ship listed about ten degrees to the starboard and remained steady. The time was 7.15 A. M. All the water-tight doors, dead lights and scuttles had been securely closed before the torpedoes left the ship. All mess stools and table shores and all available timber below and on deck had been previously got up and thrown overside for the saving of life. A second torpedo fired by the same submarine missed and passed about ten feet astern.

"About a quarter of an hour after the first torpedo had hit, a third torpedo fired from the submarine just before the starboard beam, hit us under the No. 5 boiler room. The time was 7.30 A. M. The ship then began to heel rapidly, and finally turned keel up remaining so for about twenty minutes before she finally sank. It is possible that the same submarine fired all three torpedoes at the Cressy."

Of the total crews of 1,459 officers and men only 779 were saved. The survivors believed that they had seen at least three submarines, but the German official account mentions only one, the U-9, under Captain-Lieutenant Otto Weddigen whose account of this battle confirms the report of Commander Nicholson. Referring to the reports that a flotilla of German submarines had attacked the cruisers, he says:

"These reports were absolutely untrue. U-9 was the only submarine on deck." He adds: "I reached the home port on the afternoon of the 23d and on the 24th went to Wilhelmshaven to find that news of my effort had become public. My wife, dry-eyed when I went away, met me with tears. Then I learned that my little vessel and her brave crew had won the plaudit of the Kaiser who conferred upon each of my co-workers the Iron Cross of the second class and upon me the Iron Crosses of the first and second classes."

Weddigen was the hero of the hour in Germany. He had with him twenty-five men. He seems to have acted with courage and skill, but it is also evident that the English staff work was to blame. Three such vessels should never have been sent out without a screen of destroyers, nor should the Hogue and the Cressy have gone to the rescue of the Aboukir. A few days after the disaster the English Admiralty issued the following statement:

The sinking of the Aboukir was of course an ordinary hazard of patrolling duty. The Hogue and Cressy, however, were sunk because they proceeded to the assistance of their consort, and remained with engines stopped, endeavoring to save life, thus presenting an easy target to further submarine attacks. The natural promptings of humanity have in this case led to heavy losses, which would have been avoided by a strict adhesion to military consideration. Modern naval war is presenting us with so many new and strange situations that an error of judgment of this character is pardonable. But it has become necessary to point out for the future guidance of His Majesty's ships that the conditions which prevail when one vessel of a squadron is injured in the mine field, or is exposed to submarine attack, are analogous to those which occur in action, and that the rule of leaving ships to their own resources is applicable, so far, at any rate, as large vessels are concerned.