[154] The position taken by Messrs. Nicolay and Hay, I think, fully warrants this language.
[155] General Palfrey says of this committee that "the worst spirit of the Inquisition characterized their doings." The Antietam and Fredericksburg (Campaigns of Civil War Series), 182.
[156] Through Stanton; McClellan, Own Story, 156.
[157] Only a few days before this time Lincoln had said that he had no "right" to insist upon knowing the general's plans. Julian, Polit. Recoll. 201.
[158] It appears that he feared that what he said would leak out, and ultimately reach the enemy.
[159] For an interesting account of these incidents, from Secretary Chase's Diary, see Warden, 401.
[160] Lamon, 332; Herndon, 353-356; N. and H. try to mitigate this story, v. 133.
[161] He did not always feel his tongue tied afterward by the obligations of office; e.g., see Julian, Polit. Recoll. 210.
[162] For a singular tale, see McClellan, Own Story, 153.
[163] In fact, the feeling against McClellan was getting so strong that some of his enemies were wild enough about this time to accuse him of disloyalty. He himself narrates a dramatic tale, which would seem incredible if his veracity were not beyond question, of an interview, occurring March 8, 1862, in which the President told him, apparently with the air of expecting an explanation, that he was charged with laying his plans with the traitorous intent of leaving Washington defenseless. McClellan's Own Story, 195. On the other hand, McClellan retaliated by believing that his detractors wished, for political and personal motives, to prevent the war from being brought to an early and successful close, and that they intentionally withheld from him the means of success; also that Stanton especially sought by underhand means to sow misunderstanding between him and the President. Ibid. 195.