[15] Colonel Franklin Haven, who was on General McDowell's staff at the time, is my authority for this statement. He well remembers the reason given by Mr. Lincoln, and the extreme annoyance which the general and his officers felt at the delay.
[16] "The expediency of the junction of this [McD.'s] large corps with the principal army was manifest," says General Johnston. Narr. 131.
[17] Jackson used to say: "Mystery, mystery, is the secret of success."
[18] The Comte de Paris is very severe, even to sarcasm, in his comments on the President's orders to Banks (Civil War in America, ii. 35, 36, and see 44); and Swinton, referring to the disposition of the armies, which was well known to have been made by Mr. Lincoln's personal orders, says: "One hardly wishes to inquire by whose crude and fatuous inspiration these things were done." Army of Potomac, 123. Later critics have not repeated such strong language, but have not taken different views of the facts.
[19] Observe the tone of his two dispatches of May 25 to McClellan. McClellan's Report, 100, 101.
[20] The Comte de Paris prefers to call it a "chimerical project." Civil War in America, ii. 45. Swinton speaks of "the skill of the Confederates and the folly of those who controlled the operations of the Union armies." Army of Potomac, 122.
[21] Yet, if Fremont had not blundered, the result might have been different. Comte de Paris, Civil War in America, ii. 47.
[22] The Third, under Heintzelman, and the Fourth, under Keyes.
[23] Even his admirer, Swinton, says that any possible course would have been better than inaction. Army of Potomac, 140, 141.
[24] The Peninsula, 188. Swinton seems to regard it in the same light. Army of Potomac, 147.