Never had the fundamental intention of naval tactics been stated with so much penetration, simplicity, and completeness. The order, however, which Grenier worked out—that of three lines of bearing disposed on three sides of a lozenge—was somewhat fantastic and cumbrous, and it seems to have been enough to secure for his clever treatise complete neglect. It had even less effect on French tactics than had Nelson's memorandum on our own. This is all the more curious, for so thoroughly was the change that was coming over English tactics understood in France that Villeneuve knew quite well the kind of attack Nelson would be likely to make. In his General Instructions, issued in anticipation of the battle, he says: 'The enemy will not confine themselves to forming a line parallel to ours…. They will try to envelope our rear, to break our line, and to throw upon those of our ships that they cut off, groups of their own to surround and crush them.' Yet he could not get away from the dictum of De Grasse, and was able to think of no better way of meeting such an attack than awaiting it 'in a single line of battle well closed up.'
In England things were little better. In spite of the fact that at Camperdown Duncan had actually found a sudden advantage by attacking in two divisions, no one had been found equal to the task of working out a tactical system to meet the inarticulate demands of the tendency which Grenier had noticed. The possibilities even of Rodney's manoeuvre had not been followed up, and Howe had contented himself with his brilliant invention for increasing the impact and decision of the single line. It was reserved for Nelson's genius to bring a sufficiently powerful solvent to bear on the crystallised opinion of the service, and to find a formula which would shed all that was bad and combine all that was good in previous systems.[7]
The dominating ideas that were in his mind become clearer, if we follow step by step all the evidence that has survived as to the genesis and history of his memorandum. As early as 1798, when he was hoping to intercept Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, he had adopted a system which was not based on the single line, and so far as is known this was the first tactical order he ever framed as a fleet commander. It is contained in a general order issued from the Vanguard on June 8 of that year, and runs as follows, as though hot from the lesson of St. Vincent: 'As it is very probable the enemy will not be formed in regular order on the approach of the squadron under my command, I may in that case deem it most expedient to attack them by separate divisions. In which case the commanders of divisions are strictly enjoined to keep their ships in the closest possible order, and on no account whatever to risk the separation of one of their ships.'[8] The divisional organisation follows, being his own division of six sail and two others of four each. 'Had he fallen in with the French fleet at sea,' wrote Captain Berry, who was sent home with despatches after the Nile, 'that he might make the best impression upon any part of it that should appear the most vulnerable or the most eligible for attack, he divided his force into three sub-squadrons [one of six sail and two of four each]. Two of these sub-squadrons were to attack the ships of war, while the third was to pursue the transports and to sink and destroy as many as it could.'[9] The exact manner in which he intended to use this organisation he had explained constantly by word of mouth to his captains, but no further record of his design has been found. Still there is an alteration which he made in his signal book at the same time that gives us the needed light. We cannot fail to notice the striking resemblance between his method of attack by separate divisions on a disordered enemy, and that made by the Elizabethan admirals at Gravelines upon the Armada after its formation had been broken up by the fireships. That attack was made intuitively by divisions independently handled as occasion should dictate, and Nelson's new signal leaves little doubt that this was the plan which he too intended. The alteration he ordered was to change the signification of Signal 16, so that it meant that each of his flag officers, from the moment it was made, should have control of his own division and make any signals he thought proper.
But this was not all. By the same general order he made two other alterations in the signal book in view of encountering the French in order of battle. They too are of the highest interest and run as follows: 'To be inserted in pencil in the signal book. At No. 182. Being to windward of the enemy, to denote I mean to attack the enemy's line from the rear towards the van as far as thirteen ships, or whatsoever number of the British ships of the line may be present, that each ship may know his opponent in the enemy's line.' No. 183. 'I mean to press hard with the whole force on the enemy's rear.'[10]
Thus we see that at the very first opportunity Nelson had of enforcing his own tactical ideas he enunciated three of the principles upon which his great memorandum was based, viz. breaking up his line of battle into three divisional lines, independent control by divisional leaders, and concentration on the enemy's rear. All that is wanting are the elements of surprise and containing.
These, however, we see germinating in the memorandum he issued five years later off Toulon. In that case he expected to meet the French fleet on an opposite course, and being mainly concerned in stopping it and having a slightly superior force he is content to concentrate on the van. But, in view of the strategical necessity of making the attack in this way, he takes extra precautions which are not found in the general order of 1798. He provides for preventing the enemy's knowing on which side his attack is to fall; instead of engaging an equal number of their ships he provides for breaking their line, and engaging the bulk of their fleet with a superior number of his own; and finally he looks to being ready to contain the enemy's rear before it can do him any damage.
Thus, taking together the general order of 1798 and the Toulon memorandum of 1803, we can see all the tactical ideas that were involved at Trafalgar already in his mind, and we are in a position to appreciate the process of thought by which he gradually evolved the sublimely simple attack that welded them together, and brought them all into play without complication or risk of mistake. This process, which crowns Nelson's reputation as the greatest naval tactician of all time, we must now follow in detail.
Shortly before he left England for the last time, he communicated to Keats, of the Superb, a full explanation of his views as they then existed in his mind, and Keats has preserved it in the following paper which Nicolas printed.
'Memorandum of a conversation between Lord Nelson and Admiral Sir
Richard Keats, the last time he was in England before the battle of
Trafalgar.[11]
'One morning, walking with Lord Nelson in the grounds of Merton, talking on naval matters, he said to me, "No day can be long enough to arrange a couple of fleets and fight a decisive battle according to the old system. When we meet them" (I was to have been with him), "for meet them we shall, I'll tell you how I shall fight them. I shall form the fleet into three divisions in three lines; one division shall be composed of twelve or fourteen of the fastest two-decked ships, which I shall keep always to windward or in a situation of advantage, and I shall put them under an officer who, I am sure, will employ them in the manner I wish, if possible. I consider it will always be in my power to throw them into battle in any part I choose; but if circumstances prevent their being carried against the enemy where I desire, I shall feel certain he will employ them effectually and perhaps in a more advantageous manner than if he could have followed my orders" (he never mentioned or gave any hint by which I could understand who it was he intended for this distinguished service).[12] He continued, "With the remaining part of the fleet, formed in two lines, I shall go at them at once if I can, about one third of their line from their leading ship." He then said, "What do you think of it?" Such a question I felt required consideration. I paused. Seeing it he said, "But I will tell you what I think of it. I think it will surprise and confound the enemy. They won't know what I am about. It will bring forward a pell-mell battle, and that is what I want."[13]