Yet when all is said, when even full weight is given to the strategical pressure of the hour and the uncertainty of the weather, there still remains the unanswerable criticism of the officer of the Conqueror: that by an error of judgment Nelson spoilt his attack by unnecessary haste. The moral advantage of pushing home a bold attack before an enemy is formed is of course very great; but in this case the enemy had no intention of avoiding him, as they showed, and he acknowledged, when they boldly lay-to to accept action. The confusion of their line was tactically no weakness: it only resulted in a duplication which was so nicely adapted for meeting Howe's manoeuvre that there was a widespread belief in the British fleet, which Collingwood himself shared, that Villeneuve had adopted it deliberately.[38] Seeing what the enemy's accidental formation was, every ship that pierced it must be almost inevitably doubled or trebled on. It was, we know, the old Dutch manner of meeting the English method of attack in the earliest days of the line.[39] Had he given Villeneuve time for forming his line properly the enemy's battle order would have been only the weaker. Had he taken time to form his own order the mass of the attack would have been delivered little later than it was, its impact would have been intensified, and the victory might well have been even more decisive than it was, while the sacrifice it cost would certainly have been less, incalculably less, if we think that the sacrifice included Nelson himself.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Nelson's Letters and Despatches, p. 382.
[2] Nicolas, Nelson's Despatches, v. 287, note. It is also given in vol. vii. p. ccxvi, apparently from a captain's copy which is undated.
[3] Ibid. v. 283.
[4] Professor Laughton pointed out (op. cit.) that the conditions will fit June to August 1804, but that it might have been 'earlier, certainly not later.'
[5] It is very doubtful whether this formation was ever intended for anything but tactical exercises. Morogues has a similar signal and instruction (Tactique Navale, p. 294, ed. 1779), 'Partager l'armée en deux corps, ou mettre l'armée sur deux colonnes; et représentation d'un combat.' Anson certainly used it for manoeuvring one half of his fleet against the other during his tactical exercises in 1747. Warren to Anson, Add. MSS. 15957, p. 172.
[6] Mathieu-Dumas, Précis des Evénements Militaires, xiii. 193.
[7] Captain Boswall, in the preface to his translation of Hoste, says Grenier's work was translated in 1790. If this was so Nelson may well have read it, but I have not been able to find a copy of the translation either in the British Museum or elsewhere.
[8] Ross, Memoir of Saumarez, i. 212.