To begin with, the wording of the note contains an inexplicable blunder. The last paragraph shows clearly that the idea of the signal is an attack on the rear and centre, as at Trafalgar; yet the ships of each column as they come successively into action are told to engage the enemy's ship ahead of the point where their leaders broke through, a movement which would resolve itself into an attack on their centre and van, and leave the rear free to come into immediate action with an overwhelming concentration on the lee division.
That so grave an error should have been permitted to pass into the Signal Book is bad enough, but that such a signal even if it had been correctly worded should stand for Nelson's last word to the service is almost beyond belief. The final outcome of Nelson's genius for tactics lay of course in his memorandum, and not in the form of attack he actually adopted. Yet this remarkable signal ignores the whole principle of the memorandum. The fundamental ideas of concentration and containing by independent squadrons are wholly missed; and not only this. It distorts Nelson's lee attack into a weather attack, and holds up for imitation every vice of the reckless movement in spite of which Nelson had triumphed. Not a word is said of its dangers, not a word of the exceptional circumstances that alone could justify it, not a word of how easily the tables could be turned upon a man who a second time dared to fling to the winds every principle of his art. It is the last word of British sailing tactics, and surely nothing in their whole history, not even in the worst days of the old Fighting Instructions, so staggers us with its lack of tactical sense.[8]
FOOTNOTES:
[1] I.e. the Instructions of 1799, supra, p. 278. For Signal 27 see p. 255.
[2] 'To attack on bearing indicated.'
[3] In Ekin's text the punctuation of this sentence is obviously wrong and destroys the sense. It should accord, as I have ventured to amend it, with that of the previous paragraph.
[4] Signal 109, 'To close nearer the ship or ships indicated.'
[5] Sir Charles Elkin adds, 'In the same work he has also a signal (No. 785) under the head "Enemy" to "Lay on board," with the following observation:—
'"N.B.—This signal is not meant that your people should board the enemy unless you should find advantage by so doing; but it is that you should run your ship on board the enemy, so as to disable her from getting away."'
[6] Mathieu-Dumas, Précis des Evénements Militaires: Pièces Justificatives, vol. xiv. p. 408.