[1] The later Admiralty MS. is prefaced by the following Observation: 'There have happened several misfortunes and disputes for want of a sufficient number of signals to explain the general's pleasure, without which it is not to be avoided; and whereas it hath often happened for want of a ready putting forth and apprehending to what intent the signals are made, they are contracted into a shorter method so that no time might be lost. It is most certain that in all sea battles the flags or admiral-generals are equally concerned in any conflict, and no manner of knowledge can be gained how the rest of the battle goes till such time as it is past recovery. To prevent this let a person fitly qualified command the reserve, who shall by signals make known to the general in what condition or posture the other parts of the fleet are in, he having his station where the whole can best be discovered, and his signals, answering the general's, may also be discerned by the rest of the fleet.'
[2] The Admiralty MS. has this Observation: 'Unless you can outstretch their headmost ships there is hazard in breaking through the enemy's line, and [it] commonly brings such disorders in the line of battle that it may be rather omitted unless an enemy press you near a lee shore. For if, according to this instruction, when you have got the wind you are to press the enemy, then those ships which are on each side of them shall receive more than equal damages from each other's shot if near, and in case the enemy but observed the seventh instruction—that is, to tack with equal numbers with you—then is your fleet divided and not the enemy's.
[3] The Admiralty MS. here inserts an additional instruction, numbered 5, as follows: 'If in time of fight any flagship or squadron ahead of the fleet hath an opportunity of weathering any of the enemy's ships, they shall put abroad the same signal the general makes them for tacking, which, if the general would have them go about, he will answer by giving the same again, otherwise they are to continue on the same line or station.'
Observation.—'For it may prove not convenient in some cases to break the line.'
[4] The Admiralty MS. adds, 'And as soon as they have the wind to observe what other signals the general makes; and in case they lose sight of the general, they are to endeavour to press the headmost ships of the enemy all they can, or assist any of ours that are annoyed by them.' The whole makes Instruction VI. of the Admiralty MS. An Observation is attached to the old instruction as follows:—'This signal was wanting in the battle fought 11th August, 1673. The fourth squadron followed this instruction and got the wind of the enemy about four in the afternoon, and kept the wind for want of another signal to bear down upon the enemy, as Monsieur d'Estrées alleged at the council of war the next day. For want of this the enemy left only five or six ships to attend their motion, and pressed the other squadrons of ours to such a degree they were forced to give way.' Cf. note, p. 181.
[5] The Admiralty MS. makes of the three paragraphs of this instruction three separate instructions, numbered 7, 9, and 10, and inserts after the first paragraph a new instruction numbered 8, with an Observation appended. It is as follows: Additional Instruction, No. VIII.: 'When any of his majesty's ships that have gained the wind of the enemy, and that the general or admiral would have them bear down and come to a close fight, he will put abroad the same signal as for their tacking, and hoist and lower the same till it be discerned; at which, they that are to windward shall answer by bearing down upon the enemy. Observation.—The same in the battle of Solebay, Sir Joseph Jordan got the wind and kept it for want of a signal or fireships.' This Observation appears to be intended as a continuation of the previous one, the new instruction supplies the missing signal there referred to.
[6] The Admiralty MS. has this Observation: 'The 28th May, '73, the battle fought in the Schooneveld, the rear-admiral of their fleet commanded by Bankart (? Adriaen Banckers) upon a signal from De Ruyter gave way for some time, and being immediately followed by Spragge and his division, it proved only a design to draw us to leeward, and that De Ruyter might have the advantage of weathering us. So that for any small number giving way it is not safe for the like number to go after them, but to press the others which still maintain the fight according to the article following.
[7] No.11 in the Admiralty MS. with the following Observation: 'In bearing down upon an enemy when you have the wind, or standing towards them and they towards you, if it is in your power to fall upon any part of their ships, those to windward will be the most exposed; therefore you must use your utmost endeavour to ruin that part. The battle fought in 1666, the headmost or winderly ships were beaten in three hours and put to run before half the rest of the fleet were engaged. We suffered the like on the 4th of June, for Tromp and De Ruyter never bore down to engage the body of our fleet, but pressed the leading ships where Spragge and his squadron had like to have been ruined.'
[8] Admiralty MS. No. 12.
[9] For 'headmost of the enemy's ships' the Admiralty MS. has 'windmost ships of the enemy's fleet, and endeavour all that can be to force them to leeward.' Also this Observation: 'It may happen that the headmost of their fleet may be the most leewardly, then in such case you are to follow this instruction, whereas before it was said to stand with the headmost ships of the enemy.'