In this way we get a Definition of the Aim of Naval Strategy, expressed in terms of the actual functions of the fleet. For practical purposes it will be found the most useful definition as emphasising the intimate connection of Naval Strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of Major Strategy.
These functions of the fleet may be discharged in two ways:—
(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed (bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.).
(2) By getting command of the sea, i.e., establishing ourselves in such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the enemy's territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.
The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of all proportion to that of the first—direct attack. Indeed, the first can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a question of communications.
But not entirely. Circumstances have arisen when the fleet must discharge part of its function by direct action against territory before there is time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and military considerations may deflect the normal operation of Naval Strategy.)
EXAMPLES.—Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the unshaken Toulon Fleet. Holmes's capture of Emden in 1758.
Still, the fact remains that the key to the effective performance of the fleet's duties is almost always to secure communications as soon as possible by battle.
COMMAND OF THE SEA
Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we have adequate naval positions, and an adequate fleet to secure the command when war breaks out.