The true maxim is "The primary object of the fleet is to secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them unsafe it must be put out of action."
The enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always.
EXAMPLE.—Opening of the War of the Spanish Succession. The operations of 1702 were to secure some point (Cadiz, Gibraltar, or Ferrol) on the Spanish trade communications, the French lateral communications, and our own lines of passage to the Mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of operation. These last two lines were identical. In 1703, the chief operations had for their object to secure the alliance of Savoy, and particularly of Portugal. Rooke's official instructions directed that the French fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened the common communications.
RESULT.—By 1704 we had gained a naval position from which France could not eject us, and she abandoned the struggle for sea communications.
But nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable—
(a) Because for us general permanent command is usually essential to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the enemy's fleet.
(b) Because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt to dispute the control of the common communications.
(c) Because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex (i.e., the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a blow which will solve all the difficulties; e.g., Sir. Palmes Fairborne's solution of the problem in 1703.
Also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (i.e., forcing an action on him) is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of campaign.