[3] Ibid, Preparatory Notice, p. vii.
[4] Ibid, p. viii
[5] Wellington's view of the essential factor was expressed to Rear Admiral Martin, who was sent to Spain by the Admiralty to confer with him in September 1813. "If anyone," he said, "wishes to know the history of this war, I will tell them it is our maritime superiority gives me the power of maintaining my army while the enemy are unable to do so." (Letters of Sir T. Byam Martin) [Navy Records Society], ii, p. 499.
[6] Correspondance de Napoléon, xix, 421, 4 September.
[7] Development of Strategical Science.
[8] The strategical object with which the Baltic fleet was sent was certainly to prevent a counter-stroke—that is, its main function in our war plan was negative. Its positive function was minor and diversionary only. It also had a political object as a demonstration to further our efforts to form a Baltic coalition against Russia, which entirely failed. Public opinion mistaking the whole situation expected direct positive results from this fleet, even the capture of St. Petersburg. Such an operation would have converted the war from a limited one to an unlimited one. It would have meant the "overthrow of the enemy," a task quite beyond the strength of the allies without the assistance of the Baltic Powers, and even so their assistance would not have justified changing the nature of the war, unless both Sweden and Russia had been ready to make unlimited war and nothing was further from their intention.
[9] In justice to Wellington, it should be said that his complaints were due to false reports that exaggerated a couple of insignificant captures into a serious interruption.
[10] But not without analogous precedent. In the later Middle Ages small craft were assigned the function in battle of trying to wedge up the rudders of great ships or bore holes between wind and water. See Fighting Instructions (Navy Record Society), p. 13.
[11] Daveluy, L'Esprit de la Guerre Navale, vol. i, p. 27, note.
[12] Mahan, War of 1812, i, 316.