The Kolnische Zeitung, which opened the discussion with regard to a rapprochement with France, now closes it by observing—
"That if ever the French should feel impelled to seek a reconciliation with Germany, it could only be sincerely effected on the condition that they abandon once and for all the idea of a reckoning to be settled between the two countries for the war of 1870-71."
When we have estimated the nature and extent of Germany's greed, calculated the number of her demands and ambitions, reflected by the light of history and German exaggerations, on the character of the German race and its unbridled lust of domination, then the National, Colonial and Continental interests of France (considered dispassionately and without hatred for the conqueror or resentment for the cruel and humiliating past) do not lie in the direction of a rapprochement with Germany. They lie in the establishment and combination of the Slav States in Europe, in a more effective alliance with Russia, and a rapprochement between the Latin nations.
March 27, 1899. [2]
By our resistance, since the national defeat of 1871, we have pledged ourselves not to accept it. Our moral position and the dignity of our claims to restitution have been worthy of our history because we inveterate Frenchmen have never ceased to maintain that our power over Alsace-Lorraine has been overthrown by force, but that our rights remain undiminished. Austria, to Germany, and Italy, to Austria, have sacrificed this moral position and the dignity of their respective claims, in return for an alliance which, besides being treacherously false, has brought them neither wealth nor honour.
But alas! even whilst our rights became strengthened by our very faithfulness and constancy, our rulers were yielding to the insidious counsels of the enemy. M. Ferry listened to Bismarck and slowly, drop by drop, we wasted the blood with which we should have reconquered Alsace-Lorraine. Bismarck, seeing us regaining our strength too quickly for his liking, and becoming a danger to Germany, and prevented by the Tzar from stopping our recovery by striking at us again, played his hand so as to throw us headlong into a policy of colonial adventures. But the Great Iron Chancellor, the would-be genial fellow, had not foreseen that his pupil William II would be inspired by ambitions entirely different from his own: that of a relentless colonial policy, that of commercial and industrial development, on broad lines of encroachment, and that of a navy. All these things however, followed logically, one from the other; for profitable colonisation one must have a market for one's produce, and to protect a mercantile marine one must have a navy. Therefore, under these conditions, which Bismarck did not foresee, the danger to France became an immediate and equal danger to Germany, for England would be free to sweep the seas of Germany's merchantmen as well as those of France.
Certain misguided people, moved by their extravagant feelings either of hatred towards England or of fear, seized the opportunity of the hour of danger under cover of the well-worn word (which leads so many worthy folk to lose their heads, even when it represents just the opposite of what it means) pleading our interests, I say, seized the opportunity to lower France by making overtures to the Kaiser and to Prussia. Our interest, our twofold interest, was not to have a war with England, and to let Germany see that it was to her interest that we should not be deprived of our maritime power which protects the free development of German expansion.
We possess at this moment a third of Africa, a portion of Asia and Madagascar; before trying to add to these possessions, let us endeavour to make the most of their wealth.
To sum up: our position has never been better, if we know how to wait and not to make ourselves cheap. As the faithful Allies of Russia, either England or Germany will have need of us.
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