For the past year we have repeatedly been told, in more or less sensational revelations, that the influence which chiefly determined Nicholas II in his action, was his reading of a famous book on war by M. de Bloch. This is no doubt true and the fact may be admitted. Much moved by the eloquent description, given by the great financial writer of Warsaw, of the heavy burdens imposed on the nations by the extravagant armaments of the Continent, and terrified at the thought of the calamities which the next war would let loose upon all Europe, Nicholas II, full of Christian pity for the sufferings of humanity, directed Count Mouravieff to send the famous circular to the Powers, which resulted in the convening of the Hague Conference.
But I would ask, how are we to reconcile the hostile attitude of William II's delegates to the Russian proposals with his solemn declaration that he was absolutely in agreement with his friend Nicholas II? Why did the German Emperor first give his approval to De Bloch's campaign in favour of disarmament and then make Von Schwartzkopf publicly repudiate the most important arguments of that writer's book? Was it that William II was in the first instance seduced by the lamentable picture which De Bloch gives of France and the organisation of her army, or (and this seems far more likely) did he simply approve of the intrigue set on foot by the author of this work on war, an intrigue which aimed at casting a shadow over the patriotic hopes that France placed on the Russian alliance, by inciting Nicholas II to call for a general disarmament?
It must be confessed that the Franco-Russian alliance struck a bitter blow at the hopes of Polish patriots. The contempt and hostility towards France which inspire M. de Bloch's book are proof sufficient of the grudge its author bears us. It is perfectly evident that they must have been delighted in Berlin at the chief object of his work. But there were other objects in view.
For years William II has unceasingly laboured to persuade England that she has every interest to join the Triple Alliance. His perseverance in this direction is quite natural. But if Germany succeeded last year in concluding an agreement with England on a few special questions, the Hague Conference has proved that it does not involve an agreement in matters of general policy.
Nevertheless, William II counted on this Congress to produce closer relations with Great Britain. He hoped that the Congress would result in sharp antagonism between England and Russia and he reckoned on this antagonism to help him to inflict a severe defeat on Russia, which in its turn would have enabled him to draw one or other of these two Powers into the orbit of his policy. Great then was the disappointment of the German Emperor when, from the very outset of the Conference, England, performing a most unexpected volte-face, made proposals on the subject of arbitration, which went a great deal farther than the Russian proposals laid before, the Congress. This master-stroke of British diplomacy compelled Germany to come out into the open and to reveal herself in her true light: that is to say, as the only obstacle to the fulfilment of the Tzar's humanitarian designs.
The Stengels, Zorns and Schwartzkopfs completed the success of British diplomacy by the brutal violence of their opposition and the cynicism of their proposals. It was not only on the two committees that dealt with arbitration and disarmament that German opposition (always supported by Turkey alone) wrecked the magnanimous attempt of Nicholas II to minimise the horrors of war. The committee presided over by M. de Martens succeeded in effecting certain improvements in the terms of the Brussels Convention; if the labours of its President and members were not successful in doing more to lessen the evils of war upon land, the fact is again due to the opposition of the German representatives. Thus, for instance, the humane measures proposed in forbidding the bombardment of open towns and private dwellings unoccupied by troops, or the destruction of unfortified villages, were not adopted because the German delegate insisted on the impossibility of limiting the powers of a commander-in-chief, who must remain the sole judge of the utility of such destruction in the general interest of military operations. It was the same in the case of the article whereby it was proposed that provinces occupied by enemy forces should be guaranteed in the maintenance of their autonomous administration and in certain rights against the demands of invasions, Germany declared her unwillingness to fetter in any way the decision of her army commanders.
I would ask those amongst us who rejoice at the idea of seeing William II take part in the Exhibition of 1900, to let their thoughts dwell a little on the attitude of the Prussian delegates at the Peace Conference. William I took part in the Exhibition of 1867 and we know what that visit cost France three years later.
Now that all the perfidious plans inspired by Berlin have come to nought, now that the defenders of German policy at St. Petersburg, Warsaw and elsewhere have come to grief, and that the Peace Congress—even though it may not have fulfilled the generous hopes of Nicholas II—has nevertheless led to a great advance in the opinion of the public as in that of governments, on the subjects of arbitration and disarmament, William II shifts his rifle on to the other shoulder. In order to clear Germany of the blame for the failure of the Conference in the eyes of the Tzar, the same individuals who constituted themselves the protectors and sponsors of M. de Bloch at the Russian Court and who had assured the Tzar of the absolute support of William II, have now started a campaign of intrigue against Count Mouravieff.
That faithful minister and servant of the Tzar, who undertook with great skill to carry out the initiative of his sovereign, and who has devoted himself whole-heartedly to the task of winning over to the Tzar's ideas not only the sympathy of the entire civilised world, but even the vast majority of the sceptical diplomats, who are leaving the Conference with the conviction that they have done useful work—well, it is this same Count Mouravieff that the German Press is now trying to hold responsible for the misdeeds of the Stengels, the Zorns and the Schwartzkopfs.
By way of a first attempt at abolishing the horrors of war by means of international agreements, the Hague Conference has given very satisfactory results, and the honour for these is due to M. de Staal, Count Mouravieff and M. de Martens. The Tzar has reason to be equally satisfied in that he has compelled his very good friend William II to throw off his mask and to reveal all his hostility towards Russia.