By turns they catch the vital breath and die;
Like bubbles on the sea of matter born,
They rise, they break, and to that sea return.”
[24] i. e. The celestial region.
[25] i. e. The sublunary region.
ADDITIONAL NOTES.
[a] Page 1.—“But others from opinion in conjunction with reason;”—which in the original is, τα δε και δοξῃ, μετα λογου. But Ocellus is not accurate in what he here asserts, as is evident from what Plato says in his Timæus. For the divine philosopher having, in the former part of this dialogue, proposed to consider “what that is which is always being, but is without generation, and what that is which is generated [or consists in becoming to be], but is never [really] being,” adds: “The former of these, indeed, is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason, since it always subsists with invariable sameness; but the latter is perceived by opinion in conjunction with irrational sense, since it is generated and corrupted, and never truly is.” Τι το ον μεν αει, γενεσιν δε ουκ εχον· και τι το γιγνομενον μεν, ον δε ουδεποτε· το μεν δη, νοησει μετα λογου περιληπτον, αει κατα ταυτα ον· το δ’αυ δοξῃ μετ’ αισθησεως αλογου, δοξαστον, γιγνομενον και απολλυμενον, οντως δε ουδεποτε ον. Plato, as is evident from what is said in the Introduction to this work, had seen this tract of Ocellus, and corrects him in what he here says, as he also did the opinions of other philosophers anterior to, or contemporary with him. For if Ocellus had spoken accurately, he should have said, “that he had learnt some things through clear arguments from nature herself, but others from opinion in conjunction with irrational sense.” For, as Proclus admirably demonstrates in his Commentary on the above passage from the Timæus of Plato, truly existing being is only to be apprehended by us through illuminations from an intellect superior to the human, in conjunction with the energy of the summit of our reasoning power; for such is the accurate meaning of λογος in this place. But opinion is a knowledge of sensibles conformable to reason, yet without being able to assign the cause of what it knows; and sense is an irrational knowledge of the objects to which it is passive, and the instrument of sense is passion only. See the first volume of my translation of the Commentaries of Proclus on the Timæus of Plato, p. 202, &c.
Ocellus adds, “that it is his intention [in this treatise On the Universe] to derive what is probable from intellectual perception.” For in physiological discussions we must be satisfied with probability and an approximation to the truth. Hence, Proclus, in his Commentary on that part of the Timæus in which Plato says, “What essence is to generation, that truth is to faith,” admirably observes as follows: “The faith of which Plato now speaks is rational, but is mingled with irrational knowledge, as it employs sense and conjecture; hence, it is filled with much of the unstable. For receiving from sense or conjecture the ὁτι, or that a thing is, it thus explains causes. But these kinds of knowledge have much of the confused and unstable. Hence, Socrates, in the Phædo, reprehends sense in many respects, because we neither hear nor see anything accurately.
“How, therefore, can the knowledge which originates from sense possess the accurate and the irreprehensible? For the powers which use science alone, comprehend the whole of the thing known with accuracy; but those that energise with sense, are deceived, and deviate from accuracy, on account of sense, and because the object of knowledge is unstable. For, with respect to that which is material, what can any one say of it? since it is always changing and flowing, and is not naturally adapted to abide for a moment. But that which is celestial, in consequence of being remote from us, is not easily known, nor can it be apprehended by science, but we must be satisfied in the theory of it with an approximation to the truth, and with probability [instead of certainty]. For everything which is in place requires the being situated there, in order to a perfect knowledge of its nature. The intelligible, however, is not a thing of this kind, since it is not apprehended by us in place; for, wherever any one establishes his reasoning energy, there, truth being everywhere present, he comes into contact with it. But if it is possible to assert anything firm and stable about that which is celestial, this also is possible, so far as it participates of being, and so far as it can be apprehended by intelligence. For, if anything necessary can be collected concerning it, it is alone through geometrical demonstrations which are universal. But so far as it is sensible, it is difficult to be apprehended, and difficult to be surveyed.”—See the first volume of my translation of Proclus on the Timæus of Plato, p. 291.