Ocellus Lucanus on the nature of the universe

by Julius Firmicus Maternus; Proclus; Tauros

But the Fates themselves distinguish and separate the impassive part of the world from that which is perpetually moved [or mutuable][14]. For the course of the moon is the isthmus of immortality and generation. The region, indeed, above the moon, and also that which the moon occupies, contain the genus of the gods; but the place beneath the moon is the abode of strife and nature; for in this place there is a mutation of things that are generated, and a regeneration of things which have perished.

In that part of the world, however, in which nature and generation predominate, it is necessary that the three following things[15] should be present. In the first place, the body which yields to the touch, and which is the subject of all generated natures. But this will be an universal recipient, and a signature of generation itself, having the same relation to the things that are generated from it, as water to taste, silence to sound[16], darkness to light, and the matter of artificial forms to the forms themselves. For water is tasteless and devoid of quality, yet is capable of receiving the sweet and the bitter, the sharp and the salt. Air, also, which is formless with respect to sound, is the recipient of words and melody. And darkness, which is without colour, and without form, becomes the recipient of splendour, and of the yellow colour and the white; but whiteness pertains to the statuary’s art; and to the art which fashions figures from wax. Matter, however, has a relation in a different manner to the statuary’s art; for in matter all things prior to generation are in capacity, but they exist in perfection when they are generated and receive their proper nature. Hence matter [or a universal recipient] is necessary to the existence of generation.

The second thing which is necessary, is the existence of contrarieties, in order that mutations and changes in quality may be effected, matter for this purpose receiving passive qualities, and an aptitude to the participation of forms. Contrariety is also necessary, in order that powers, which are naturally mutually repugnant, may not finally vanquish, or be vanquished by, each other. But these powers are the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist.

Essences rank in the third place; and these are fire and water, air and earth, of which the hot and the cold, the dry and the moist, are powers. But essences differ from powers; for essences are locally corrupted by each other, but powers are neither corrupted nor generated, for the reasons [or forms] of them are incorporeal.

Of these four powers, however, the hot and the cold subsist as causes and things of an effective nature, but the dry and the moist rank as matter and things that are passive[17]; but matter is the first recipient of all things, for it is that which is in common spread under all things. Hence, the body, which is the object of sense in capacity, and ranks as a principle, is the first thing; but contrarieties, such as heat and cold, moisture and dryness, form the second thing; and fire and water, earth and air, have an arrangement in the third place. For these change into each other; but things of a contrary nature are without change.

But the differences of bodies are two: for some of them indeed are primary, but others originate from these: for the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, rank as primary differences; but the heavy and the light, the dense and the rare, have the relation of things which are produced from the primary differences. All of them, however, are in number sixteen, viz. the hot and the cold, the moist and the dry, the heavy and the light, the rare and the dense, the smooth and the rough, the hard and the soft, the thin and the thick, the acute and the obtuse. But of all these, the touch has a knowledge, and forms a judgement; hence, also, the first body in which these differences exist in capacity, may be sensibly apprehended by the touch.

The hot and the dry, therefore, the rare and the sharp, are the powers of fire; but those of water are, the cold and the moist, the dense and the obtuse; those of air are, the soft, the smooth, the light, and the attenuated; and those of earth are, the hard and the rough, the heavy and the thick.

Of these four bodies, however, fire and earth are the transcendencies and summits [or extremities] of contraries. Fire, therefore, is the transcendency of heat, in the same manner as ice is of cold: hence, if ice is a concretion of moisture and frigidity, fire will be the fervour of dryness and heat. On which account, nothing is generated from ice, nor from fire[18].

Fire and earth, therefore, are the extremities of the elements, but water and air are the media, for they have a mixed corporeal nature. Nor is it possible that there could be only one of the extremes, but it is necessary that there should be a contrary to it. Nor could there be two only, for it is necessary that there should be a medium, since media are opposite to the extremes.

Fire, therefore, is hot and dry, but air is hot and moist; water is moist and cold, but earth is cold and dry. Hence, heat is common to air and fire; cold is common to water and earth; dryness to earth and fire; and moisture to water and air. But with respect to the peculiarities of each, heat is the peculiarity of fire, dryness of earth, moisture of air, and frigidity of water. The essences, therefore, of these remain permanent, through the possession of common properties; but they change through such as are peculiar, when one contrary vanquishes another.