[28.] Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 498; 30, 1, app., 64. Polk, Message, Dec. 8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages, iv, 484). (Marcy) Sen. 1; 29, 1, p. 194. [52]Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 25, 1847. Jan. 27, 1847, a bill establishing post-routes south of the Nueces passed the Senate unanimously (Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 251). (Six months) Nat. Intelligencer, Sept. 4, 1846. (People) Mo. Reporter, Jan. 6, 1846. It is true that no right to go to the Rio Grande was explicitly asserted; but as everybody held that either that stream or the Nueces was the boundary, a claim extending beyond the latter extended practically to the former. See Lumpkin’s speech (Cong. Globe, 29, 1, 836). More than a month before Taylor left Corpus Christi the House voted down a motion to ask the President whether he had ordered our forces to move against Mexico, and thus became accomplices of Polk (Von Holst, iii, 214–5). The order of Jan. 13 soon became known to Congress and the public (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 279). Feb. 3 Ashmun of Massachusetts offered a resolution calling upon the President for information regarding the matter (ibid., 280). Mar. 23 Brinkerhoff stated in the House that Taylor’s army must be supposed to be approaching or already upon the Rio Grande; yet no one in Congress protested (29, 1, 534). Mar. 26, 1846, while discussing an appropriation bill, McIlvaine of Penn. said that in sending troops to the Rio Grande Polk had been “invading Mexico” (ibid., 558); yet, though he made a most urgent appeal to the opponents of slavery—in behoof of which he intimated the step had been taken—and there were other objections to the bill, it passed the House by 111 to 38 (ibid., 573–4). Note also the vote on Delano’s motion (chap, ix, note 4). See chap. xxxiv, [note 16], and the corresponding text.
[29.] (1794) Ho. Report 752; 29, 1, p. 44; C. J. Ingersoll in Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 129; Chase, Polk Admin., 131–2; Schouler, U. S., i, 296–7. (Fla.) Moore, Amer. Diplom., 163; H. Adams, U. S. v, 310–4, 318. Benton, Abr. Deb., xvi, 77 (Pearce). (Hilliard) Cong. Globe, 29, 1, p. 148. (Adams) Ibid., p. 127.
[30.] (Weakened) Wash. Union, Jan. 11, 1848 (Reverdy Johnson in Senate); [256]Marcy to Wetmore. May 10, 1846; Cong. Globe, 29, 1, app., 934; 30, 1, app., 65. (Wise) [52]Buchanan to Slidell, Jan. 20, 1846. (Argument) [56]W. S. Parrott, Aug. 5, 1845; Slidell, Feb. 17, 1846; [364]Worth to S., Oct. 2, 1845; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 107 (Taylor, Oct. 4); Niles, July 18, 1846, pp. 313–4; Polk, Diary, Sept. 1, 1845; [108]Mayer to Bancroft, May 22, 1846; London Times, May 30, 1846 (Wash. corr.); Calhoun in Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 499 (Those in power were confident that the march to the Rio Grande would not bring on war); M. Brown in Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 356 (Polk determined to convince the Mexicans by hostile demonstrations that they must settle promptly); Hilliard denounced Polk in the House for using a display of force to intimidate Mexico (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, p. 566), and Calhoun felt somewhat the same (ibid., 497); Boston Atlas, May 15, 16, 1846 (Wash. corr.); Howe, Bancroft, i, 282; [345]Poinsett to Van Buren, May 26, 1846; [108]Bradford to Bancroft, Aug. 17, 1845; Coxe, Review, 38. Public men who talked with Polk probably knew more about his views than anti-slavery agitators who did not. Calhoun and Brown were criticising, not defending, Polk. [162]Bancroft to Conner, Jan. 17, 1846. Wash. Union, Oct. 15, 1847. (Conceded) Boston Atlas, May 15, 16, 20, 1846. See also chap. vi, [note 22], last paragraph.
[31.] Wash. Union, Oct. 15, 1847. [256]Paper indorsed “Projet—Genl. Scott.” Richardson, Messages, iv, 486. (Sabine) [76]Mora, Nov. 15, 1845. (Prevented) [81]Arista to troops, July 31, 1845; [76]Id. to Parrodi, Dec. 22. Addressing the nation in denunciation of the revolution of Paredes, Dec., 1845, the Mexican Chamber of Deputies stated that only his attitude had prevented war upon the United States that year. [77]Almonte, Sept. 20, 1844. (Mobile) [66]Sanders to Taylor, Feb. 15, 1846; Elliot, chap. v, note 6; Nat. Intelligencer, May 29, 1845; Sept. 10, 1846. (180) Stevens, Campaigns, 18. [52]Dimond, no. 257, 1845. W. S. Parrott, July 22, 1845. [297]Polk to Dallas, Aug. 23, 1845. (Accentuate) [256]Marcy to Wetmore, Aug. 12, 1845; Jan. 21, 1846 (Our relations with Mexico “have worsened by the change which has undoubtedly taken place in that country”). [76]Mejía to Canales, Feb. 16, 1846; to Guerra, Mar. 17. Art. 1, sec. 10 of our Constitution and the Act of Feb. 28, 1795, show that not only invasion but danger of invasion authorized military measures. Authorization implied a corresponding duty. To neglect this duty and throw the matter into Congress, where partisan complications and ignorance regarding the region and the circumstances prevailed, would have caused the delay which the Constitution aimed to prevent. Note also Cong. Globe, 29, 2, app., 209–10, col. 1 (action of com. for. rels.). Again, had Texas been independent in Jan., 1846, no one would have censured her for sending troops to the Rio Grande; and the United States succeeded to all her rights. This right was independent of our claim to the intermediate region (Cong. Globe, 30, 1, app., 425–6).
[32.] Picayune, Dec. 12, 1846. (Confessed) [218]Henshaw narrative. [13]Giffard to Bankhead, May 13, 1846. Henry, Camp. Sketches, 106.
[33.] [297]Scott, memo., undated.
[34.] Von Holst, U. S., iii, 245, note. Autograph, Jan.-Feb., 1912 (Taylor, Apr. 7). The proof that Mexico claimed still to the Sabine is voluminous: e.g. Paredes, proclamation, Mar. 21, 1846 (Mexico “does not acknowledge the right of the American flag on the soil of Texas, and she will defend her invaded territory”); [76]Gen. Mora, Nov. 15, 1845 (“the contest in which the Republic is engaged with the United States for the possession of the territory of Texas”); Diario, Mar. 25; Sept. 18, 26 (the Sabine “is the boundary”), 1846; Monitor Repub., June 28, 1847 (Mexico “neither recognizes nor has recognized any boundary except the Sabine”); Peña, Comunicación circular, Dec. 11, 1845 (indicates repeatedly that the object of the war would be the recovery of Texas); Otero, Comunicación. (After Herrera’s fall “reconquest [of Texas] again became our policy”); Memoria de ... Relaciones, Jan., 1849. Wash. Union, Nov. 10, 1847. (Probably) [69]Alba to Taylor, Mar. 6, 1846; [76]Mejía, Jan. 21; Mar. 28; [76]Mora, May 4; Bankhead, no. 47, 1846: note Mejía’s action in Feb. and March, 1846, supra; and Ampudia’s orders to him before Taylor left Corpus Christi (note 24). (Notice) [76]Relaciones to ministers at London and Paris, July 30, 1845. Benton in Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 497 (the causes of the war existed before Taylor advanced, and his advance resulted from them). See also the next note.
[35.] Otero, Comunicación. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 486, 490. Monitor Repub., Oct. 29, 1847. (Arista) Suárez y Navarro, Alegato, 48. Polk, Message, Dec. 8, 1846 (Richardson, Messages). Paredes to Arista, Apr. 18 (captured in A.’s baggage, May 9, 1846) in Wash. Union, Aug. 27, 1847, and in Tex. Democrat, Nov. 11, 1846. The reader will not fail to note the decisive bearing of the letter of Apr. 18 on the question discussed in the preceding paragraph.
[36.] Vattel, Law of Nations, 352. If any substantial arguments against Polk’s course existed, Calhoun, Webster or the American (Whig) Review should have been able to find them. Calhoun (Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 500) said Polk should have refrained from sending Taylor to the Rio Grande and have referred to Congress or the Senate the question of the boundary. But (1) he forgot that as to the boundary near the east (the only part of it now under consideration) our government stood committed; (2) he did not seem to know whether Congress or the Senate was the proper authority on the subject; (3) he refuted his criticism by saying that Polk should have referred the question on finding he could not settle it by negotiation; and Polk, instead of having found he could not do so, had Taylor advance with the hope of thus inducing Mexico to negotiate; (4) Calhoun had thought it right in 1844 to place our military forces virtually at the orders of Texas for defensive uses (Smith, Annex. of Texas, 367), and she would very likely have sent them to that river (see Wash. Union, Feb. 22, 1847); (5) reference of the question to Congress would almost certainly have caused long delay and paralyzed the Executive, for about fifteen unsuccessful attempts were made in the business of annexing Texas to determine the boundary, and after the war that subject vexed Congress for nearly two years. (See also the text.) Calhoun’s fundamental objection against the President’s policy, however, was that Polk should have let the Mexican difficulties alone until after settling the Oregon question (Cong. Globe, 29, 2, p. 498). But (1) it was not certain that the Oregon question could be settled amicably; at one time, as we have noted, Polk believed it could not be; and therefore it may well have seemed prudent to get rid of a smaller but annoying affair before the greater one should reach a crisis; (2) other important reasons for settling with Mexico have been given on pp. 118, 120–2, 134–7.
Webster, after thinking on the subject for more than half a year, took it up in a long speech at Philadelphia (Writings, iv), and said: Polk ordered the occupation of territory to which we had “no ascertained title” (p. 26). [But a serious claim may be an adequate basis for pacific joint occupation.] Polk viewed the Rio Grande as the boundary [being committed to that position], and “intended to extinguish the Mexican title by force” (p. 27). [Polk desired to extinguish it through negotiation, and had not abandoned the effort to do so when he ordered Taylor to advance. Mexican jurisdiction was not to be attacked. There were other grounds than that alleged by Webster for the instructions given to our general.] Taylor was ordered to treat every Mexican assertion of title as an act of hostility (p. 29). [By no means. Taylor was ordered not to molest the Mexican posts.] Why did not Polk consult Congress before ordering Taylor to the Rio Grande (p. 29)? [The matter could not be laid in definite shape before Congress until the fate of Slidell’s mission should have been decided. Polk’s diary shows that he desired to present the matter to Congress as promptly as he could.] Only “self-defence” could justify sending troops into a territory claimed and occupied by a power with which at that time no war existed (p. 29). [This can hardly be admitted. We claimed the territory; Mexico was believed to have troops there; it was only fair to place ourselves on an equality with her.] And “there was, I think, no case of such necessity for self-defence” (p. 30). [Webster admits that for self-defence (i.e. defence of the Texans, now virtually American citizens) we had a right to send the troops, and it is believed that the necessity of such defence has been established in the text.] Taylor’s letters prove that there was no danger of a Mexican invasion (p. 30). [Taylor’s outlook extended, and his letters had reference only, to the immediate frontier, and even to little of that except Matamoros. He could furnish no opinion regarding the intentions of the Mexican government. Of the orders actually given to the Mexican generals he was in total ignorance until after May 9, 1846. The outlook of the authorities at Washington was broader and clearer than his, and as the text shows they were warned officially that Mexico was liable to make secret preparations and a sudden invasion.] “Ordering the army to the Rio Grande was a step naturally, if not necessarily, tending to provoke hostilities” (p. 31). [Of course the assertion of a claim denied by another power tends naturally in the direction of hostilities, but no nation can for that reason forbear to assert its claims. Webster’s suggestion that sending the troops did not necessarily produce hostilities is noteworthy.] If the President can declare war, what becomes of the Constitution, which gives that power to Congress (p. 32)? [The President may take steps logically leading to war; but in this case there was reason to believe that Taylor’s advance might tend toward peace.] Was it Polk’s object to force Mexico to treat? If so, it was an “idle hope” (p. 32). [Here Webster seems to admit that such might have been Polk’s intention. The fact that Polk failed does not prove that such was not his design. Webster failed to acquire northern California, but he certainly attempted to do so.] It will be said that Polk’s course was sanctioned by “the act of May 11th,” 1846 (the virtual declaration of war against Mexico, the preamble of which stated that Mexico had brought on the war), but neither a preamble nor an act of Congress can “create a fact” (p. 32). [But a preamble can state an opinion; and Congress thus expressed an opinion justifying the President’s course.] “I hardly suppose” Congress by that act “meant more than to enable the President to defend the country, to the extent of the limit claimed by him” (p. 32). [He claimed the Rio Grande as the limit; and if Congress believed the country was to be defended to that river, it believed the country extended to it, and consequently that Polk had a right to send troops thus far.