But the Americans did not come. Taylor had scarcely any fresh troops except those guarding the wagons nearly or quite five miles in the rear. May’s dragoons had been used up. Apparently no effort had been made to communicate with Fort Brown, and have its defenders—now tired but not exhausted—sally forth to help reap the fruits of the expected victory. Taylor only claimed to have captured “a number” of this utterly broken army facing a difficult river. Even badly wounded men got safely across, it would seem; and very soon, in spite of everything, nearly four fifths—that is to say, about 4000 besides those under Canales—of the troops commanded by Arista on the first of the month appear to have been in safety on the south shore. He lost on May 9, according to his official report, 160 killed, 228 wounded and 159 missing, but the accuracy of the figures may be doubted. Fourteen officers, eight guns and a large amount of property were captured by the Americans, while their casualties were only 33 killed and 89 wounded.[16]
During the whole week so dramatically concluded, Fort Brown had been under attack.[17] On May 3 it replied vigorously, though with trifling results, to the guns of Matamoros; but as Taylor, with more than a month of good weather and about 300 wagons at his disposal, had neglected to bring up a stock of ammunition, it fired only occasionally after that in order to notify both friend and foe that its courage still held good. On the 4th Canales occupied the road, and on the next day Ampudia arrived with four guns and nearly a thousand men. Arista, however, believing his cannon were not heavy enough to breach the wall and confident that hunger would soon reduce the garrison, forbade assault. The besiegers made themselves extremely disagreeable; but by this time the Americans had bomb-proofs and “gopher holes,” and, aside from the death of Major Brown, met with no serious losses. Taylor’s profound silence, after as well as before the battle of Palo Alto, caused intense anxiety; but when the cannon began to “bark” again on the 9th, and especially when a throng of panic-stricken fugitives could be seen rushing past, haggard faces put on smiles. Finally a solitary messenger approached at a gallop with his reins on the horse’s neck, waving cap and sword, and shouting “Victory!” and the long strain ended in exultation.[18]
SITUATION OF THE MEXICANS
The Mexican army was now hanging like a plum, overripe, shaken by the wind and ready to fall. To the British consul it seemed utterly demoralized, and beyond the possibility of reorganization. Yet there it was permitted to rest and recuperate undisturbed. The official explanation said that although a pontoon train had been proposed a long time before, the dim prospect of hostilities had not seemed to warrant that expense; but like numerous other official statements put out in the course of the war, this explanation hid more than it told.[19]
A bridge might have been in readiness; but, though several officers had been laboring for more than a month to focus Taylor’s mind upon the subject, “the old gentleman,” wrote Meade, “would never listen or give it a moment’s attention,” Flat-boats and scows, towed by the light steamers belonging to the army, might have been sent from Point Isabel into the river, and the troops, reinforcements and light batteries, crossing at the much-used ferry of Burrita, less than twenty miles from Matamoras, and by land appearing at the town, say, in early morning, could probably have taken army, cannon and ammunition substantially complete. Instead of doing anything of this description, Taylor now sent down to Point Isabel for mortars and for plank to make into boats, and went there himself. A slight illness delayed him further; and in eight days nothing was accomplished in the direction suggested beyond placing at Burrita a battalion of the First Infantry and some 200 volunteers just landed at Point Isabel.[19]
Still, though let alone, Arista occupied no enviable position. He was commonly charged with incompetence, treason or both. Many of the officers had forsaken their troops in the hour of danger, and were now viewed with distrust and contempt. The men felt exhausted and profoundly disheartened. Even the dogs kept still. Provisions, ammunition and funds were scant. Fierce complaints and recriminations became rife. Panic brooded over all. Taylor’s inaction seemed an encouraging sign, however, and on the 17th a request for a suspension of hostilities, accompanied with hints of a peaceful settlement, was made by Arista. This petition Taylor rejected. But, not aware that a general’s first duty in war is to eliminate the fighting strength of the enemy, he said that Arista might retire with his army, the sick and the wounded, if he would give up all public property. In fact, as if anxious to fight these men again after letting them get nicely rested, he threatened to bring Matamoros down about their ears, unless they would move to a safer place.[20]
Arista had been ordered to hold the city as long as possible, but a council of officers pronounced it indefensible; and, besides feeling no violent wish to sacrifice himself, he doubtless realized that nobody was ready to stand by him. He therefore ordered now an immediate retreat, and a wild scramble ensued. The transportation facilities were entirely inadequate. Some of the guns and ammunition had to be thrown into the river. The troops of Canales were dismissed. A large number of men deserted; and the rest, leaving four or five hundred sick and wounded in the town, hurried away. Fatigues and miseries almost unspeakable were their lot, and also for some time a terrible fear of pursuit. Heat, cold, thirst, famine, tempest, sickness, desertion, a route lined with dead animals, sleep in the mud as profound as the sleep of the grave, troopers carrying their horse furniture, deaths from exhaustion or broken hearts, and even suicides—these made up the record. Finally, almost at the end of the month 2638 men, according to an officer, crawled painfully into Linares, and a week later Arista received orders to place Mejía in command.[21]
Taylor, all this while, had been proceeding in his deliberate way. Boats were made and put on the river two or three miles above the town, and early on the eighteenth troops began to cross; but when the first of them were over, a report that Arista had retreated was confirmed, and the greater part of the army, retracing their steps, used the regular Anacuitas ferry. As they approached Fort Paredes the city officials—dressed all in white, bearing white flags and riding white horses—came forth to surrender Matamoros. No terms of capitulation were granted, but the General said he would protect persons and property, and allow the civil laws to continue in force; and already he had promised to respect the religion of the people. To their surprise the Americans appeared to find themselves among friends, for the lately implacable but seldom tactless Mexicans came up smiling, cried “Amigo, amigo!” and with sunny enthusiasm offered their hands; and although a feeble pursuit of Arista produced only insignificant results, the victors felt well content. Their superiority as fighting men had been demonstrated. Their artillery had evidently surpassed the Mexican artillery in both mechanical and personal qualities. The officers had exhibited the finest courage, esprit de corps and skill. An army supposed to outnumber ours three to one had been scattered, and a prestige of the utmost value at home, in Mexico and in Europe, had been gained.[22]
EFFECTS OF THE BATTLES
Regarding Taylor, thoughtful officers did not feel enthusiastic, however. The General had shown himself slow, unskilful, wanting in penetration and foresight, and poorly grounded professionally. Nine tenths of the regular officers felt that no talents had been displayed by him, even in the battles. He had shown, said Meade, “perfect inability to make any use of the information” given him. In the opinion of another excellent officer he seemed “utterly, absurdly incompetent to wield a large army.” He had failed to realize the difficulties of his position; had undervalued the enemy; and, as Bliss admitted, had had “no conception” of the Mexican preparations. This last fact dimmed his credit, even for courage, in the minds of discerning critics. But, after all, his resolution had been superb and inspiring. He had succeeded; and among us Americans “Nothing succeeds like success.” The reports written for him read admirably. Terse remarks of his, often tinged with soldierly humor, delighted the general taste at home, and mere questions of tactics or strategy signified in comparison rather less than zero. Besides, he was so democratic—no military stiffness, no West Point “aristocracy” about him. A tidal wave of popularity rose in his favor, and soon Thurlow Weed of New York, the Warwick of the Whig party, came out for him as Presidential candidate. A commission as brevet major general and other official honors did not fail to arrive.[23]