Where fell the dead, the living stept,
Still charging on the guns which swept
The slippery streets of Monterey.”
But the enemy, seldom visible, appeared to be everywhere. A large part of the groping Americans got in front of Purísima bridge, and went down fast under a rain of bullets from the tête de pont, while Captain Gutiérrez, who had now masked his gun on the opposite bank, poured grape and canister upon them at short range. Ridgely came up and fired several times at the bridgehead, but without effect. Among our troops, as one of the surgeons wrote, “All was confusion.” Smoke hid the outlook; and the Mexican shots, breaking the limestone, mortar and adobe, raised a blinding dust. The assailants did not know where to turn or what to do. Taylor, Butler, Hamer, Quitman and other officers shouted orders that few could hear amidst the uproar, and perhaps fewer could reconcile. It was proposed to cut through from house to house, but the necessary implements had not been brought. Ridgely’s and Bragg’s batteries and the captured Mexican guns fired on El Diablo, and finally the 24-pound howitzers were brought in; but nothing could be accomplished in that way. Many of the best and the bravest fell; and eventually, at about five o’clock, the Americans retreated from all of Monterey except the Tenería redoubt and a few adjacent buildings.[10]
A COSTLY AMERICAN TRIUMPH
So the fight ended. It had been one long scene of gallantry, confusion, mistakes and waste. Lieutenant D. H. Hill, afterwards General Hill of the Confederate army, wrote in his journal on learning the details: “It seems that every sort of folly was committed.” To pitch handfuls of infantry into an unknown maze of obstacles, fortifications and cannon as if they had been fighting Indians in a Florida swamp, and to send field batteries into narrow streets—in the suburb crooked, too—against heavy stone works and roofs filled with protected marksmen was extraordinary. And, it was credibly reported, Taylor did more. He ordered Ridgely out into the open to try conclusions with El Diablo. Ridgely was absolutely fearless. To satisfy the General he went out himself and reconnoitred, but he would not lead his battery to destruction. The Tennessee regiment was needlessly taken back and forth six times within range of the citadel.[10]
Now—to get shelter, food, ammunition—the troops had to march separately or in groups all the way to camp, exposed for a long distance not only to the citadel guns but also to the lancers, who nearly caused a disaster and might have done so, had all, instead of but a part of them, obeyed the order to charge. A howitzer, aided by the captured guns, still exchanged compliments now and then with El Diablo, but the battle of the day was over. A redoubt had been won, and Worth’s operations against the Federation Ridge redoubts had been assisted; but these advantages might have been gained far more cheaply.[10]
The Tenería position was garrisoned for the night by Garland’s exhausted command, the Kentucky regiment (Louisville Legion), which had been on guard at the mortar, and Ridgely’s battery. This was not an agreeable task. The rain fell in torrents, and the interior of the fort was so thoroughly searched by the guns of El Diablo, that a part of the men had to lie on their backs in the mud. Some defences were thrown up, however; Tuesday morning Quitman’s brigade relieved the garrison; and Taylor’s men, cheered now by the sight of their comrades taking Independence Hill, were given a necessary rest. Both sides used their artillery to some extent, and in spite of the Mexican fire our position was further strengthened; but on this day nothing was done at the eastern end to assist Worth.[10]
During Tuesday night the enemy seemed to be in motion. They should have made an attack; and the Americans—without blankets, overcoats or food, soaked with rain, and chilled by a north wind—passed the hours reconnoitring or standing in water behind their breastwork. Far, however, from Ampudia’s mind was the thought of a vigorous offensive. Dismayed by the cutting of his communications and by the stubborn valor of the Americans, and weakened by the cowardice of certain officers, he ordered all the outworks abandoned, and concentrated his forces in and near the grand plaza. Such a change could not be made at night without much confusion. Many of the troops, too, were indignant; some refused to leave their posts; all felt disheartened, and a few broke out in riotous disorder. The work of fortifying the inner line went on, but the loss of morale far more than offset this advantage.[10]