The month after Clay’s chart appeared, the first session of the Thirtieth Congress assembled. About half the Representatives were new men, a majority belonged to the Whig party, and all had been chosen during the gloomy autumn of the previous year. By the Navigator and by other party leaders their work had been mapped out for them. The objects of the war were to be defined as at most a settlement of the Texas boundary at the Rio Grande, or a little farther north, and payment of the old American claims; supplies were to be qualified and limited accordingly, or entirely cut off; and in this manner hostilities would be ended.[35]

But politics, not principle, still dominated most of the Whigs. They viewed everything with reference to the impending election of a President; and public sentiment regarding the war had now changed. The battle of Buena Vista had aroused extraordinary enthusiasm; Scott’s victories, refuting the charges of inefficiency and silencing the prophets of calamity, had been decisive as well as brilliant; the expenses of the war were far less burdensome than its opponents had prophesied; Mexico had proved stubborn and unreasonable; the sort of opposition that had been practised was seen to be aiding the enemy, and hence fell somewhat into disfavor; and the people, believing peace and a reward for their sacrifices within reach, had made up their minds to carry the business through. Besides, many of the Whigs themselves were too proud to “back out,” and many at the north—high-tariff men—wished the war to continue. By a rather small vote and a very narrow margin—85 to 81—it was duly branded as unnecessary and unconstitutional, and Webster, now an out-an-out opposition candidate for the Presidency, approved of this little black “blister-plaster”; but in view of national sentiment “patriotic sublimity” of a practical sort now looked expensive, and a motion contemplating the withdrawal of our troops perished in the House under a vote of 41 to 137.[35]

THE OPPOSITION FAILS

It was perfectly feasible, however, to snarl, nag, procrastinate and work for personal aims; and few opportunities passed unheeded. “Tiger hunts”—ambitious members attacking rivals—used up much time. Cliques locked horns over pressing military needs. Webster seemed to forget everything except his ambition. Benton raged over the fate of the Lieutenant General bill and the censure of Frémont for disobeying Kearny. Calhoun, having allowed his hair to grow, resembled a porcupine less than before, but felt no less anxious to prove himself the sole hope of the South. Polk, instead of gaining popularity from the success of his administration, was looked upon as intoxicated by its fumes, and a section of his party advised throwing him openly to the sharks. Congressional resolutions were aimed at him. All the dying embers of controversy were solicitously fanned. The causes of the war, the conduct of the war, the instructions to Slidell, the return of Santa Anna, the occupation of New Mexico, the tariff in Mexican ports and the treatment of Taylor and Scott furnished themes for stale speeches. To chill the growing popularity of the war, direct taxes were suggested; and the chairman of the ways and means committee piled up the prospective costs far above the estimates of the government. After some two months of it Marcy gave up hope. But the Whigs knew they must do nothing serious against the war, and before long it happily ended.[36]

The results of all this personal, designing or factious opposition to the government and the war proved most unfortunate. The administration could never be sure what action Congress would take, nor when; and therefore its course was necessarily timid, weak and hesitating. Time and strength had to be consumed in foreseeing and in meeting captious objections, and in battling against public prejudices that hampered both military and financial efficiency. “We shall have three months of turmoil—our errors exposed, our good deeds perverted,” wrote Marcy to a friend at the beginning of December, 1846; and such an expectation did not conduce to satisfactory work. Bold, rapid strokes could not be ventured; caution and cheese-paring had to be the rule. In the field all this bore fruit in vexation, delay, expense and loss of life. “In the name of God,” exclaimed a man at the front, “will the politicians of our country never cease gambling for the Presidency upon the blood of their countrymen?”[37]

And the uproar had another consequence. When the treaty was ratified the government organ referred to the conflict with Mexico as “one of the most brilliant wars that ever adorned the annals of any nation”; and the chief Whig journal placed these words without criticism in its own editorial column. The trial was over, and the fiercely contesting lawyers walked off, arm in arm, to dine. The inefficient and shameless war was now brilliant and most creditable. Indeed, the Whigs chose for standard-bearer a man who represented professionally the military spirit they had raised pious hands against, who belonged to the slaveholding order so plainly viewed askance by the New Commandment, who had recommended the advance to the Rio Grande, who had aimed the cannon at Matamoros, who had advised appropriating Mexican territory by force of arms, and who owed in fact all his prominence to playing a leading rôle in the “illegal, unrighteous, and damnable” war. Nobody thought of impeaching Polk, or of bringing home to him the guilt that was to have sunk him to the bottom of the bottomless pit.[38]

RESULTS OF THE OPPOSITION

Yet all the Whig journalism and oratory stood in the record. Hosea Biglow became an immortal.[39] New Englanders gained the ear of reading people. Keen young radicals of the northeast, where the muse of history chiefly dwelt, dominated to a great extent the public thought. Polk retired from power and from life, and nobody cared to defend, or even to hear defended, a creature so unpopular and so generally denounced. Declamation that well-informed men of the day had rated at its true value came to be taken seriously. One side of the case faded from sight, the other was engraved on bronze. And so the patriotic habit of eagerly throwing stones at the Mexican War and its backers became traditional.[40]

This has been a mistake. No doubt, as we have seen, errors and misdeeds enough must be charged to the administration. All the actors were vessels of clay, like the rest of us. But in reality the least creditable phase of our proceedings was the conduct of the opposition.