Scott, however, was of course the pre-eminent commander. In war he felt at home. He “is a Soldier and a General from the ground up,” wrote Consul Parrott after watching his operations. With the possible exception of Molino del Rey, the petulant indiscretion that he sometimes exhibited in civil affairs did not affect his conduct in the field. To appreciate him, “to know him at all,” said Trist, one had to see him in the military sphere. Karl von Grone, who observed him at work, wrote: “He is quiet, reserved, reflective. When, after mature consideration of the circumstances, he has formed his decision, he goes with strong, sure steps to his goal. He can manage with scanty resources, is adroit in deceiving the enemy, and where feints are not possible, deals a heavy, straight blow. When main force must break the way, he demands much from his troops; but, as he possesses their full confidence, and is recognized as a fighter of dauntless courage, he can do this.”[12]

“He sees everything, and calculates the cost of every measure,” said Robert E. Lee. He could be “quick as guncotton when neccessary,” wrote Parrott, yet deliberate and cautious under the utmost pressure. His initiative and self-reliance never failed; yet, as even the prejudiced Semmes admitted, he made full use of all the talents, as well as all the valor, of his army. Though his plans were laid with extreme care in view of all the information that could be obtained, he never permitted them to shackle him, and promptly adapted himself, whether in campaign or in battle, to a change of circumstances. Both great things and little things were given his attention, but with due reference to their comparative importance. He knew the rules of his art, and also knew when to disregard them. He could both rouse troops to the highest pitch of enthusiasm, and surpass the calculations of the expert. Says Hamley, it is “impracticable” to “conceive how sustained operations can be conducted in the face of an enemy without a secure starting-point.” Scott accomplished this.[12]

Characteristics of a more personal kind supported his professional ability. The General, Trist assured his wife, was “the soul of honour and probity, and full of the most sterling qualities of heart and head; affectionate, generous, forgiving and a lover of justice.” Though few made allowances for his imperfections, he was always ready to do this for others; and his magnanimity would have been remarkable, even had he not been a natural fighting man. Such traits enabled him to get on excellently with reasonable officers, while his ability, prudence, vigilance, good cheer, steadiness, courage, sympathy, and trust in his army, and his anxiety to avoid wasting the labor and lives of the men, gave him the entire confidence of the privates. A soldier who loved peace instead of war, a general who valued the lives of his troops more than glory, a conqueror who became in the hour of triumph a friend, and a citizen who placed his country above self-interest, he was the ideal commander of a republican army.[13]

To speak broadly and leaving genius out of the account, he possessed all the military qualities of Taylor, and all Taylor lacked. Taylor could fight splendidly, Scott could also avail himself of the advantages that knowledge and skill were able to supply. The soldiers of the one believed their leader was going to win, those of the other could give reasons for their faith. The army of occupation was ready to follow its commander with eyes shut, the army of conquest with eyes open. Both were kind at heart, but Scott’s humanity was made systematically effective. Both faced perils with unwavering courage, but Scott did all he could to understand what lay before him. Both complained of the government, but Scott had reason to do so. Both disregarded instructions; but while Taylor aimed to gratify himself, Scott’s aim was to benefit his country.[14]

The advantages were not all on one side, however. Taylor had excellent control of his temper and the everyday, personal shrewdness that Scott needed. His unsophistication bore the winning appearance of ingenuousness, while Scott’s reflective and studious ways gave him the reputation of a schemer. Each needed to be supplemented, but only Taylor had a Bliss. Scott’s men felt they were serving under a strong leader, Taylor’s that they were serving with one; while to Great Demos, always undiscriminating, the one represented head, the other heart; the one science, the other heroism.[14]

Both were remarkable. Taylor was a distinguished plebeian, Scott a distinguished patrician; the first a superb captain, the second a superb general; and each a great man.

THE AMERICAN ARMY

The soldiers, of course, did not equal their chief commanders in point of interest, but certain facts concerning them deserve attention. The total number of regulars in the war service down to July 5, 1848, was about 31,000. Of these, to use round numbers, 1600 were discharged because their term expired, 2550 for disability, and 500 for other causes; 2850 deserted; 530 were killed and 2100 wounded in battle; 400 died of their wounds; and there were 4900 ordinary or accidental deaths. Of the volunteers 59,000 actually served; 7200 were discharged for disability, and 2000 for other reasons before the expiration of their term; 3900 deserted; 1350 were wounded; 600 were killed or died of their wounds; and there were 6400 ordinary or accidental deaths. So it appears that out of some 90,000 officers and men serving, 6750 deserted, 12,250 had to be discharged before their term expired, 11,300 met with ordinary or accidental deaths, and only 1550 were accounted for by the enemy. The difference between the number mustered in and the number available at the front, and also between the number who lost their lives by fighting and the number who dropped out from other causes, was most instructive. The Americans captured seem to have numbered less than 1100. Of the volunteers, a very disproportionate percentage went from the southwest; the northwest did well, and the northeast lagged.[15]

From these figures it appears that approximately three out of one hundred regulars were killed or died in consequence of wounds and eight were discharged for disability, whereas the numbers for the volunteers were one and twelve; and in fact the showing of the regulars was still better, since the “new” regulars, officered with inferior men chosen largely for political reasons, did not equal the record of the old establishment. In many other respects also the volunteers ranked low. Not only was there a greater percentage of sickness among them, but the invalids required attendants. The volunteers wasted clothing, provisions and ammunition both heedlessly and through ignorance of administrative business; and their arms were not properly cared for.[16]

They had no intention of submitting to the discipline and routine labor of campaigning, and even at the close of the war could not be called real troops. The volunteers, wrote one of them, “will not be treated as regular soldiers.”