[24.] Summons and bombardment. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 222–44 (reports of Scott and his officers; summons and reply; etc.); 230 (Scott to consuls, Mar. 25). Ho. 1; 30, 2, pp. 1175–83 (naval reports). [13]Morales, circular, Apr. 4. [13]Giffard, nos. 7, 8, Mar. 22, 29. [12]Matson to commodore, Mar. 25, 28; Apr. 2; to Perry, Mar. 27. [47]Perry, Mar. 26; Oct. 22. Henshaw narrative. Nunelee, diary. [216]Heiman, First Regt. Trans. Ill. State Hist. Soc., 1906, pp. 179–80. Collins, diary. [224]Hitchcock to Lizzie, Mar. 27. [60]Perry to Mason, Mar. 25. [60]Scott to Perry and reply, Mar. 25. [61]Bankhead to Scott, Mar. 26. [60]Pickett to ——, Mar. 10. Robertson, Remins., 227–32, 278. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 555. Scott, Mems., ii, 426–7. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 244–7. Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 24. Davis, Autobiog., 127. A Soldier’s Honor, 24. Apuntes, 155–8. Tributo á la Verdad, 30–1, 109. McCall, Letters, 480. Nebel and Kendall, 19–21. Hartman, Journal, 9–10. Picayune, Apr. 4. Meade, Letters, i, 192. F. Lee, Lee, 36–7. McClay, Navy, ii, 180–1, 183. Oswandel, Notes, 90–5. Semmes, Service, 130–42. [139]W. B. Campbell to D. C., Mar. 28. Diario, Mar. 29; Apr. 10. Regenerador Repub., Apr. 7. Kenly, Md. Volunteer, 267. Lawton, Artillery Off., 91–7, 101, 104. Caswell, diary. [322]Smith, diary. Moore, diary. [358]Williams to father, Mar. 25, 28. Judah, diary. Moore, Scott’s Campaign, 15. Arnold, Jackson, 84. Conner, Home Squadron, 47, note 3. Wash. Union, Sept. 11. N. Y. Sun, Apr. 16. [162]Conner to wife, Mar. 31. Soley, Porter, 67–9. Jones, Tattnall, 57. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 913, 1220 (Scott). [180]Scott to Stribling, Mar. 25. Ramsey, Other Side, 190, note. Bishop, Journal. So. Quart. Rev., July, 1851. Weekly Courier and N. Y. Enquirer, Mar. 2, 1848 (letter probably by Hitchcock). Griffis, Perry, 221–3. Furber, Twelve Months Vol., 519–40 [76]G. Gómez, Mar. 25. [76]Soto, Mar. 28. [76]Morales, Mar. 24. [76]Vega Mar. 25.
[25.] March 24 the consuls requested Scott to grant a truce and allow the women and children to leave town ([12]Matson to commodore, Apr. 2). With perfect propriety he declined to do so (Scott, Mems., ii, 427), unless Morales should ask for a truce with a view to surrender (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 226), pointing out that due warnings had been given ([note 18]). He could not afford to suspend his operations or let the number of mouths be diminished; and doubtless he was counting on the moral effect of the presence of women and children. Time pressed; there were well-founded reports that a Mexican army was approaching; and cases of yellow fever had occurred (Scott, Mems., ii, 427, and see Davis, Autobiog., 141). Scott’s action looks hard, but it was humane to force an immediate surrender. Roa Bárcena (Recuerdos, 178) fully admits that the American policy was just. This move of the consuls tended to shake the confidence of the Mexicans, and led to dissensions among the officers.
March 25 Harney was sent against a force posted at a bridge near Medellín, about ten miles from Vera Cruz (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 250–2). Including reinforcements, his detachment consisted of about 500 men with artillery. The independent reports of the two principal Mexican officers give their number as 140–50 with scarcely any ammunition. Harney thought there were 2000 of them, and claimed great credit for carrying the day. His orders were to reconnoitre only. There were other insignificant affairs (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 249–55; Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 915; Reavis, Harney, 186).
[26.] On the Mexican side. [13]Giffard, Mar. 11, 29. [12]Matson to commodore, Mar. 25; Apr. 2. Papeles Varios, no. 10. Henshaw narrative. Nunelee, diary. Collins, diary. Robertson, Remins., 222. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 552–3, etc. Ballentine, English Soldier, ii, 32–3. Davis, Autobiog., 138. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 220–38 (reports, etc.). Tributo á la Verdad, 29, 30, 109 (Ult. Boletín). Apuntes, 157–60. Picayune, Apr. 9. (Fish) Delta, Oct. 16. [312]Morales, Apr. 3. Revue de Paris, Dec., 1844. Semmes, Service, 149. [82]Noticias de Veracruz. [86]Relaciones to gov., Jan. 27. [86]Treasurer to gov., Jan. 15. [86]Many letters regarding inability to pay the tax. [100]Morales to ayunt., Mar. 12, 17, 20; reply, Mar. 14. [95]Ibarra, proclam., Mar. 23. Regenerador Repub., Apr. 7. [82]Gov. to legislature of Puebla, Mar. 9. [82]Ibarra, proclam., Mar. 17. [82]Morales to gov. Puebla, Mar. 13. [86]Id.to Soto, Mar. 8. Lawton, Artillery Off., 106–7. Caswell, diary. Moore, diary. [375]Morales to Soto, Mar. 14. Monitor Repub., Apr. 4. Spirit of the Times, Apr. 17. [80]Legislature of Méx. state, address. [165]Conner to Scott, Mar. 19. Bishop, Journal. And from [76] the following. Comte. gen. Puebla, proclam., Mar. 16. Arrieta, Mar. 15. Cano, Mar. 26. S. Anna, Apr. 29. Memo., Feb. 9. F. Vázquez, Mar. 26. Soto, Jan. 23, 26; Mar. 7, 9, 19, 24, 25 (two). G. Gómez, Mar. 18, 19, 20 (two). Vega, Mar. 24, 25 (two). Canalizo, Apr. 1. Morales, Mar. 5, 10, 16, 20, 24. Landero, Jan. 30, Apr. 3. Hacienda, Mar. 15. To G. Gómez, Mar. 16. To Soto, Mar. 28. And many documents of minor importance.
[27.] Morales, probably in view of Santa Anna’s enmity, would not surrender though he believed he ought to do so ([76]Landero, Apr. 3), but he turned the command over to Landero when capitulation was seen to be inevitable, and left the city in a boat during the night of March 25–6. He induced Gen. José Durán, who commanded at Ulúa, to regard himself as under Landero’s orders, it was stated by Santa Anna ([76]Apr. 29), and so brought about the surrender of the castle. This apparently singular move was doubtless made to save Vera Cruz from being bombarded by Ulúa. (Recognizing this danger to the city, Scott intimated, when summoning the town, that no batteries would be established in it against Ulúa, unless Ulúa should open fire upon it.) There was considerable dissatisfaction among the Americans because the prisoners were set free, for their parole was justly deemed of slight value; but it would have been costly, and perhaps not easy, to hold them at Vera Cruz or send them to the United States, and they did good service by spreading tales of American prowess. Mar. 26 the consuls went to Scott’s camp under a white flag, but he would not see them ([12]Matson to commodore, Apr. 2). On the morning of March 27 two boat-loads of neutrals under the French flag attempted to reach the neutral vessels at Sacrificios, but Perry would not allow them to proceed ([12]Matson to commodore, Apr. 2). (Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 178, admits that Perry’s course was proper.) At about the same time the consuls and the second alcalde threatened that unless the military chiefs would promptly bring hostilities to an end, they would lead the non-combatants toward the American lines at the risk of being fired upon. This was said to have had great effect in town, but the chiefs had already decided to give up. Owing to bad weather the navy was not represented at all the deliberations. Some of the American military men felt that the share of the navy did not entitle its representative to sign the capitulation. It was stated by Sedgwick that, aside from the investment, only about 600 Americans took part in the operations.
[28.] Next to Matson’s figures our best evidence regarding the casualties is the statement of Giffard, that hundreds of women and children, harbored at the consulates, escaped from harm though the buildings suffered ([13]Mar. 29). Many other buildings were no doubt equally solid and equally distant from the principal scene of destruction. Vera Cruz was a great importing city, where large stocks of goods needed to be securely housed. Mercantile establishments had strong vaults, in which families now took refuge. Many found safety on the long mole. Scott asserted that most of the people were sheltered in the basements. Consequently one can hardly believe that more than 500 persons out of a civilian population probably not exceeding 3000 were injured. Lieut. Mackall believed that perhaps thirty or forty soldiers were killed or wounded ([252]Apr. 30). Kendall, editor of the New Orleans Picayune, who was on the ground, represented 150 as a mean estimate of the total number that perished (Picayune, Apr. 9). Landero reported 750 killed and 200 wounded ([76]Apr. 3), evidently an absurd statement, for a greater number must have been hurt than killed. Other Mexican estimates rose as high as 600 civilians killed, which would imply on a reasonable calculation that almost every civilian was hit. One of the best Mexican authorities (Apuntes, 165) states that 600 or more soldiers were wounded, and 400 of these lost their lives. This is far too large a percentage of fatalities. How accurate this authority is may be judged also from the fact that the Americans are said to have thrown 6700 projectiles into the town, whereas (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 244) the number was actually about 2500 (possibly besides those from the naval battery, which may have thrown 800). It is worth while to add that Scott was persistently represented (partly to exalt the Mexicans and partly to injure the Americans) as having destroyed a great number of non-combatants, but Morales wrote on March 24 that most of the killed and wounded had been soldiers.
Next let us inquire as to the provisions. Giffard stated ([13]Mar. 29) that when the Mexicans surrendered, the city had food enough for three days and the castle for ten; but probably he had reference only to the provisions belonging to the authorities, and perhaps, as he had objected strongly to the destruction of property and tried to stop the bombardment by sending word to Scott that hunger would force the Mexicans to yield in a few days, he felt compelled to support that representation. March 10 Conner thought the enemy had subsistence enough for about four or five weeks (Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1179). [76]April 29, after having talked with officers from Vera Cruz, Santa Anna assured the minister of war that Morales could have held out until he (Santa Anna) could have arrived with regular forces. Gov. Soto, who went down to the coast, where he was in communication with the city by means of boats and doubtless knew whether stocks of foodstuffs (belonging perhaps to neutrals) existed there, placed drafts for $30,000, payable at Vera Cruz, in the hands of Morales on March 24 ([76]Soto, March 25). This money must have been intended solely or principally for provisions, for on the fourteenth Morales had written to Soto that nothing else was needed. On the same day $2000 from Oaxaca were delivered. These sums would have purchased enough food to last beyond April 15. About March 17 a French barque ran in during a norther, which shows that supplies from the outside could be hoped for. The property loss due to the bombardment was estimated at five to six million dollars (Monitor Repub., Apr. 4). The southwest quarter of the town was demolished. It was ordered that not only Morales, but Landero and Durán should be tried. Besides disliking Morales, Santa Anna felt resentment against Vera Cruz for receiving him so coldly in August, 1846.
[29.] The surrender; losses ([note 28]). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 224–6 (Scott); 228 (consuls); 229–38 (Scott, etc.); 239 (gen. orders 80). Apuntes, 159–66. McCall, Letters, 483–4. Picayune, Apr. 9. [252]Mackall to father, Mar. 30. [312]Morales, Apr. 3. [12]Matson to commodore, Mar. 25; Apr. 2; to Perry, Mar. 27; reply, Mar. 27. Semmes, Service, 141. Diario, Mar. 27; Apr. 4, 8. Regenerador Repub., Apr. 7. Lawton, Artillery Off., 98, 100, 106. Hiney, diary. [358]Williams to father, Mar. 28. Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal, ii, 160. [375]Morales to Soto, Mar. 14. Monitor Repub., Apr. 4, 5. N. Y. Sun, Aug. 16. [166]Kirby to Conner, Mar. 27. Ho. 1; 30, 2, p. 1186. Mag. of Amer. Hist., xiv, 570. Bishop, Journal. [13]Giffard, nos. 7, 8, Mar. 22, 29. Henshaw narrative. Collins, diary. [95]Puebla ayunt., address, Apr. 7 (V. Cruz yielded because of “the lamentations of innocent families expecting every instant to die”). Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 177–9. Tributo á la Verdad, 109 (Ult. Bol.). Nebel and Kendall, 21. Robertson, Remins., 232. Lerdo de Tejada, Apuntes, ii, 558–69. Scott, Mems., ii, 427–9. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 243–8. [76]Landero, Apr. 3. [76]Id.. to Canalizo, Mar. 31. [76]Canalizo, Apr. 1. [76]S. Anna, Apr. 4, 29. [76]To S. Anna, May 4. [76]Terms of capitulation. The date Of the capitulation was Mar. 27.
Had Vera Cruz held out until April 15, perhaps 5000 regulars would have been in Scott’s rear (chap. xxiii, [note 12]). With this backing, 3–4000 irregulars could probably have been embodied. By means of signals and boat communication operations in concert with the garrison of Vera Cruz could have been arranged for, and the prospect would have encouraged the city to hold out to the uttermost. Very likely Scott’s line could have been broken, and provisions introduced. He could not, then, before the advent of the yellow fever, have reduced Ulúa and Vera Cruz, and have made the preparations necessary for advancing into a hostile region in the face of a numerous enemy. When the fever became active, Santa Anna’s upper country troops could have retired quickly, leaving the Americans to be annoyed by the coast forces. Other diseases quite as fatal as the vómito prevailed in that district (Thompson, Recolls., 4). Lieut. Hatch (to father, Apr. 2) wrote that all attributed the surrender to the effect of Scott’s artillery upon the civilians, and the circumstances prove as much.
[30.] The northers, though in themselves a scourge, drove the mosquitoes away, and so prevented the yellow fever. They subsided about the middle of April, and then the fever was due.