Smith’s plan to attack Santa Anna on Aug. 19 has been criticised as unsound (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 339, note). But he believed a repulse of Santa Anna would ensure the defeat of Valencia; he wanted to dispose of Santa Anna before his forces could become stronger; he did not wish (having no artillery) to let him cannonade at his leisure; and probably the situation of the American right appeared to require unusual boldness. Lee ([66]to J. L. Smith, Aug. 21) attached less importance to this operation. Tower ([66]to J. L. Smith, Aug. 25) said the inexperience of the new troops, particularly Cadwalader’s, had something to do with leading Smith to give up the plan. Doubtless Pillow’s fiasco, Aug. 19, tended to inflate Valencia’s confidence and so to ensure his destruction. Valencia’s artillery accomplished nothing against the Americans at San Gerónimo, partly because the trees and rough ground hid and protected them, and partly because the guns he used were not very powerful. Smith supposed he was Shields’s senior, and retained the command after the latter’s arrival at San Gerónimo. Shields refrained from claiming it, knowing that Smith had made preparations to attack and understood the situation best. Cadwalader, as well as Shields, outranked Smith; but doubtless he felt unequal to the situation, and he did not assert his rights. During the night the few houses at San Gerónimo were required for the wounded.
Santa Anna has been too much criticised for his course. Valencia did not see the Americans in force, Aug. 19, until after one o’clock, and we do not know how promptly he reported the fact. Santa Anna stated that at about two o’clock he received word from Valencia that cannon fire had begun. He was then at San Antonio, yet in about four hours he had a considerable force near San Gerónimo. He reasonably hesitated about attacking an unknown number of Americans in an admirable defensive position. His cavalry could have done nothing in the ravines, lanes and woods which composed it, and his artillery little. Had he attacked, as he threatened to do, late on Aug. 19, he would have been beaten. After Riley joined him, Smith had about 3600 men (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 105). Had Santa Anna advanced by the turnpike he would have exposed his flank to Smith. Valencia had got himself into a hopeless impasse, and the best thing he could have done was to tear himself out of it, as Santa Anna ordered. Santa Anna sent orders to Pérez in the afternoon to help Valencia, but overtaking that brigade (which had set out for the purpose) took charge of it. Shields brought about 600 men (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 344).
Smith’s plan of attack against Valencia was not perfectly safe, for, as Napoleon said, the ground of a night attack should be thoroughly known; but the circumstances warranted the risk. Friday morning Tower, who had discovered the ravine ([66]Tower to J. L. Smith, Aug. 25), led Riley’s brigade, and Beauregard led Smith’s. As soon as Valencia was routed, orders were given to complete the road begun Aug. 19, but this was soon found to be unnecessary. The Fifteenth regiment, on account of its distance from Riley, reached Valencia’s camp too late to take part in the battle. It should be remembered that Smith’s troops did not know of the demoralization of the Mexicans, and expected to find them elated and confident. Apparently Shields made a mistake in leaving San Gerónimo to go to the road on Friday morning, but the mistake was natural. Valencia went to Toluca with a few troops. He was notified to present himself for trial, which would have meant death. Some irregulars made a trivial attack upon Quitman (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 347), but Alvarez’s troops did not come near San Agustín. Twiggs had a lame foot at this time, and he was not under fire Aug. 19. Brookes (Brooks) was on his staff.
Ripley (War with Mexico ii, 291) intimates that Scott sent Pillow and Twiggs forward, Aug. 19, without taking much into account Valencia’s army and cannon, and permitted the Mexicans to open the battle when they pleased. This seems careless on Scott’s part; but, as the text shows, Scott did not know Valencia had marched to Padierna, and had no reason to suppose (particularly in view of the threat against S. Antonio) that large Mexican forces would be there. Ripley suggests (p. 292) that it was improper to let Valencia see the road-building, learn the Americans were moving that way, and prepare to receive them; but road-building ceased when the Americans came in view of Valencia, and after that time he had little opportunity for preparations. Ripley complains (p. 293) that it was confusing to have Twiggs open the battle, Pillow take charge of it, and Scott supersede Pillow; but it is not customary for the general-in-chief to ride at the head of his forces on a road-building expedition, and under the circumstances the above arrangement was natural. He remarks (p. 297) that Riley’s reconnoitring with a view to assaulting Valencia’s rear proves that he understood his mission was more than to occupy S. Gerónimo and await orders [i.e. understood that Pillow sent him to do what Smith did]; but Riley testified that he had no such understanding, and reconnoitred on his own responsibility to obtain information that might prove useful (Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 147–8). Ripley, in his efforts to sustain Pillow’s claims, says (p. 297) that Riley fell back because of his “believing himself unsupported,” yet says that Riley “relied” on being supported. He explains (p. 298) Pillow’s not informing Riley of the despatch of Cadwalader by saying that a single mounted officer could not cross the pedregal; but an officer could cross on foot, and all or most of the officers were afoot (Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 304). Rives (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 488) observes that placing four brigades successively between superior forces of the enemy involved a great risk; but it should be remembered not only that it was worth while to take the risk and that the American troops were of superior quality, but that Santa Anna was not present when Riley went to S. Gerónimo, Valencia could not see what was taking place in that quarter, he was expecting a frontal attack all the afternoon, S. Gerónimo was a splendid defensive position, and the Mexicans could not see how large forces occupied it.
Had Santa Anna and Valencia coöperated with judgment and good-will, Scott’s army would perhaps have been crushed; but had the Mexicans been sensible and patriotic, we should have had no war. How much Scott knew about the mutual relations of Santa Anna and Valencia one cannot say, but in all probability he was well informed regarding them. As scarcely needs to be pointed out, this battle and that of Churubusco had a great effect in discouraging, not merely the Mexicans in the vicinity but those at a distance. Men intending to fight or to provide money drew back at once (e.g. [76]Isunza, Aug. 24).
[12.] Santa Anna’s course after the battle of Contreras. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Smith to Abert). [224]Intercepted letters (14, L. V. to M. O.; 22, diary; 23, narrative; 26, to Old Gentleman). Apuntes, 209–10, 241, 244, 250–4. Semmes, Service, 396–7. Picayune, Oct. 8. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 325; app., 69 (reports of Scott and others). S. Anna, Apelación, 53 Id.., Detail, 14–5. Balbontín, Invasión, 120–1. [217]Henshaw to wife, Aug. 21. [61]Huger, Aug. 22. [70]“Guerra,” no. 30 (F. Pérez, Rangel, Argüelles, Zenea). México á través, iv, 678. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. Diario, Sept. 1, 2. Monitor Repub., Oct. 24; Dec. 13, 17. Carreño, Jefes, ccxc (Pérez), ccciv, cccvi. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 446; iv, app., 283–4. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 295. Remarks on Mason and Hardcastle’s Plan of Worth’s operations (Sen. 1; 30, 1). [76]Report of losses, Churubusco, Aug. 21. [76]Rincón, Aug. 20. [76]Argüelles, Aug. 22. [76]Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26.
[13.] To guard against contingencies Scott had ordered Worth with Garland’s brigade and Quitman with his troops to proceed toward San Gerónimo on Friday morning, leaving San Agustín guarded by Harney (Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306–7). This has been thought risky. But Scott had no doubt learned from Lee that Santa Anna was operating in the vicinity of San Gerónimo, where was evidently the critical field, and hence probably he felt that there was little danger of an attack upon San Agustín that Harney aided, if necessary, by Clarke’s brigade (not far distant) could not meet.
[14.] Scott’s course after the battle of Contreras. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306–9, 338, 344; app., 36 (reports of Scott, Pillow, Shields, Kearny). Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 278, 281–2. Davis, Autobiog., 199. Picayune, Sept. 8. [66]Lee to Smith, Aug. 21. [335]Trist, draft of address. Wash. Union, Sept. 15. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 74, 632 (Scott); 77 (Lee). So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 81–2. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1018 (Scott). Smith, To Mexico, 199.
[15.] Worth’s operations at Churubusco. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 333; app., 36,41–2,44–65 (reports of Scott and officers). [221]Hill, diary. [68]Bonneville court-martial (testimony of Hoffman, Nelson, Pemberton, Worth, Armistead, Ruggles, etc.). [335]Trist, draft of address. Semmes, Service, 394–400. Sen. 19; 30, 2 (Smith to Abert). Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 464 (Lee). [224]Intercepted letters (14, L. V. to M. O.; 23, narrative; 26, to Old Gentleman). Apuntes, 244–6. Picayune, Sept. 22; Oct 8. Delta, Sept. 26. [76]Zerecero to Guerra, Aug. 25. [76]Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26. Balbontín, Invasión, 120–2. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 278, 282. [260]Henshaw, comments on map. Stevens, Stevens, i, 198. [61]Huger, report, Aug. 22. [65]Scott, gen. orders 327, Oct. 28. Gamboa, Impug., 47. [70]“Guerra,” no. 30 (Pérez, Perdigón Garay). Ramírez, México, 299–301. [73]Lozano, no. 2, Aug. 24. [236]Judah, diary. Ho. 60; 30, 1, pp. 1018 (Scott); 1076 (Hoffman). Carreño, Jefes, cccvi (Pérez). So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 82–4, 90–1. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 294–5, 298. Smith, To Mexico, 199–202. Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 284. S. Anna, Detall, 15. Monitor Repub., Dec. 17.
[16.] Twiggs’s operations. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 306, 315, 322, 325, 348, etc.; app., 69–82, 85–8, 96–7, etc. (reports of Scott and officers). [221]Hill, diary. [12]Caryton to Lambert, Sept. 1. Apuntes, 246, 250–3. Ballentine, Eng. Sold., ii, 230. [66]Stevens to Smith, Aug. 24. Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 98 (H. L. Scott). Stevens, Stevens, i, 180–4, 199. Stevens, Vindic., 4–7. Carreño, Jefes, 29. Michigan Pioneer Soc. Colls., ii, 173; vii, 117. So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 87–90. Engineer School, U. S. A., Occas. Papers, no. 16. Journ. Milit. Serv. Instit., xvii (Van Deusen). [76]Argüelles, Aug. 22. [76]Rincón to S. Anna, Aug. 26. Davis, Autobiog., 199. [70]“Guerra,” no. 30 (G. Pérez). Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 447. Calderón, Rectificaciones, 43. S. Anna, Mi Historia, 73–4. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 278–9, 282.