[11.] Scott [335]wrote to Trist, July 17, to the following effect: I concur with you, several of my generals and many foreigners of high standing here and at Mexico in believing that our occupation of twenty principal towns, besides those we already hold, probably would not within a year or more force the Mexicans to accept a peace on terms honorable to the United States without the pledge in advance or the payment of money to some of the principal authorities. This is expected as a preliminary to any negotiation. We must pay $10,000 down to one high official, and $1,000,000, probably to be divided among many, on the ratification of a treaty. With your concurrence I sent $10,000 to Mexico yesterday, and at the proper time I will unite with you in pledging $1,000,000. I have no question as to the morality of this course, nor have you. We have tempted the integrity of no one. The overture, if corrupt, came from parties already corrupted. We merely avail ourselves of that corruption to obtain an end highly advantageous to both countries. Such transactions have always been considered allowable in war. We do not know that this money would not go into the same channels as that which our government is willing to pay publicly for territory would go into.
June 4 Poinsett said he should be “surprised” if the Mexicans could be made to accept the terms of the United States ([345]to Van Buren). June 11 Buchanan said privately he should not be “much disappointed” should the war continue for years ([132]to Frémont). July 16 Marcy could see no hopes of terminating it ([256]to Wetmore). Hence the fears of Trist and Scott do not seem unreasonable. The $1,000,000 was to have been deducted from the sum to be paid by the United States government ([224]Hitchcock, memo.) Who the intended go-between was cannot be stated, though on settling his accounts Scott told confidentially who received the $10,000 (Scott in N. Y. Herald, Nov. 3, 1857); but there is reason to believe that it was Miguel Arroyo, who will presently appear as secretary to the Mexican peace commissioners. It has been said (Rives, U. S. and Mexico, ii, 501) that Scott acted as he did with reference to peace because anxious to get back to the United States for personal political reasons. Had this been true, Scott would have resigned under the cloud of glory rising from his capture of Mexico City. We have political letters written by Taylor at this period, but Scott seems to have shown no such activity. On the other hand he wrote to Marcy ([note 9]), “On setting out, on my present mission, I laid down whiggism.”
July 16 Scott mentioned the subject of paying for a treaty to a number of his principal officers at what came to be called improperly a council, stating (cf. supra) that he felt no scruples about it (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 257). Pillow, who had already assented heartily to the plan (Claiborne, Quitman, i, 317), supported that view of it strongly ([68]Shields to Marcy, Mar. 11, 1848). Quitman, Shields and Cadwalader opposed it. Probably their opinions had no practical effect, for Scott had already committed himself, and the Mexicans soon ceased to desire peace. July 7 Trist sent to Buchanan a copy of a note written by him ([52]to Thornton) which could hardly fail to suggest to a politician that something peculiar was afoot, and early in August “Gomez,” an army correspondent of the St. Louis Republican, gave some account of the negotiations (published Nov. 22, republished by the Baltimore Sun, Dec. 6). Polk and the Cabinet made no sign, however. But on Oct. 28 and January 18 Pillow, now a bitter enemy of Scott, wrote to Polk about the affair (Polk Diary, Dec. 11, 18, 20, 28, 1847; Feb. 16, 19, 1848), pretending ([224]Hitchcock, memo.) that Scott had beguiled him into supporting the plan, and that his better nature had almost immediately reacted against it. Pillow and Polk doubtless thought that here lay an opportunity to do Scott a great injury, and took the matter up with much apparent indignation; and in March, 1848, Marcy confidentially ordered the officers sitting in the Pillow court of inquiry to make an investigation (Polk, Diary, Mar. 14, 16; [68]Marcy, Mar. 17). They did what they could, but the investigation came to nothing, for Trist and Scott would not implicate the British legation. See [68]proceedings of the court and statements of generals; Daily Democrat, Chicago, Sept. 15, 1857; [256]Marcy to Towson, Mar. 17, 1848; [68]Scott to Marcy, Jan. 28, 1848, and Shields to Marcy, Feb. 12, 1848; Davis, Autobiography, 177; [224]Hitchcock, memo.; Claiborne, Quitman, i, 326; [256]memo. Scott overlooked the facts that such a bargain could not be kept secret indefinitely, and that, even if ethically justifiable and in accordance with the practice of giving presents to Indian chiefs and Barbary pirates, it would give great offence to American pride. The latter point was urged forcibly by Shields. To buy peace of a vanquished enemy seemed to him and Quitman humiliating and degrading.
[12.] The Puebla negotiations. [52]Trist to Buchanan, nos. 7, June 13; 9, July 23 (and P. S., July 25); 12, Aug. 22. [52]Thornton to Trist, July 29. [13]Thornton to Bankhead, June 14; to Addington, June 29. [13]Pakenham, no. 116, Sept. 13, 1846. [335]Trist to Scott, June 25, confidential; July 16, confidential. [335]Worth to Trist, July 2, 22. [132]Atocha to Buchanan, July 3. [335][Thornton] to Hargous, undated. [335]Trist to Thornton, July 3. [335]Scott to Trist, July 17; to P. F. Smith, July 6. [335]Trist to Buchanan, no. 8, July 7. [335]—— to Trist, July 8. St. Louis Republican, Nov. 22. Baltimore Sun, Dec. 6. Diario, May 21, 23–5; June 8, 26, 27; July 2, 18, 24–6; Aug. 18. Monitor Repub., May 13; June 18, 25, 27–8. [335]—-- to ——, July 21. [335]Otero to Pesado, July 13. Picayune, June 30; Aug. 8; Oct. 1, 15. Republicano, June 24–5. Scott, Mems., ii, 579. [47]Semmes to Perry, July 28. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 314–21, 326. Polk, Diary (see [note 11]). [68]Quitman to Marcy, Mar. 9, 1848. [68]Pillow to Marcy, Jan. 18, 1848. [52]Buchanan to Trist, no. 7, Dec. 21, 1847. [68]Shields to Marcy, Mar. 9, 1848. Raleigh Star, Aug. 25, 1847. [60]Wilson to Marcy, July 31; Aug. 1. London Times, May 10; Aug. 6; Sept. 6. Ramírez, México, 239, 255–6, 263, 271. Davis, Autobiography, 177–8, 207–9. [224]Hitchcock, Memorandum. N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 2, 1848. Missouri Republican, Sept. 16, 1857. [68]Scott to Marcy, Jan. 28, 1848. [68]Shields to Marcy, Feb. 12, 1848. Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 38, 40. Sen. 1; 29, 2, p. 44. Sen. 34; 34, 3, pp. 21, 37–9. Lawton, Artill. Officer, 144, 150, 229, 232, 235, 238, 240, 259–61, 269–70. [335]Trist to Thornton, July 30. [335]E. E. Smith to Trist, Aug. 31. [335]Trist to Scott, Sept. 30 (draft). [256]Marcy to Wetmore, July 16; Oct. 21. Otero, Comunicación. Dictamen de la Comisión, etc., 29, 30. Republicano, May 8, 21; June 9, 28. [82]J. J. Otero, proclam., Apr. 25. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 115–20. [52]J. A. Jones to Polk, May 2. Delta, July 15. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 260–1, 264–9, 326. [60]Scott to Marcy, Apr. 5. [13]Bankhead, nos. 184, Dec. 30, 1846; 6, Jan. 29; 34, Apr. 1; 42, 46, Apr. 30; 47, May 6; 54, 58–60, May 29; 61, June 26; 67, June 29; 75, July 29, 1847. [68]Scott to Towson et al., Apr. 17, 1848. [335]H. L. Scott to Trist, May 29, 1852. Wash. Telegraph, Oct. 13, 22, 1852. London Chronicle, Aug. 6. [335]Trist to Scott, Sept. 1, 1861. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 524–5. [56]M. Y. Beach, June 4. Wash. Union, June 2; July 10; Aug. 5, 20. N. Y. Sun, May 22, Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 830 (Trist); 945, 1011, 1085 (Scott); 922 (Marcy). [132]Atocha to Buchanan, July 3; Aug. 1; Sept. 4, 21. [132]Dimond to Buchanan, Aug. 2. Klein, Treaty, 255. Buchanan, Works (Moore), vii, 484. N. Y. Herald, Nov. 3, 1857 (Scott). Furse, Organization, 143. Réplica á la Defensa. Semmes, Service, 310, 413. [73]Bermúdez de Castro, no. 517, June 29. Apuntes, 199. [185]—— to Lewis, July 20. [335]Trist, marginal notes on Sen. 52; 30, 1. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 135, 172 (Scott); 181–6, 231–46, 306 (Trist); 194 (S. Anna). [76]Orders for Guzmán and Avila. [76]Alvarez, July 16.
Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 149) represents Scott as desiring a reconciliation with Trist in order to play a brilliant part in bringing about peace and so increase his political popularity. This view, which befits a pupil and friend of Pillow and furthers the purpose of both to injure Scott, is disproved by a number of circumstances and particularly by the fact that, after the reconciliation took place, Scott, while ready to do all in his power for peace—even at the sacrifice of military glory—kept himself entirely in the background so far as that business was concerned. July 23, 1847, Trist wrote to Buchanan: Scott’s whole conduct with reference to the duties with which I am charged “has been characterized by the purest public spirit, and a fidelity and devotion which could not be surpassed, to the views of the government, in regard to the restoration of peace” (Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 831). Aiming to further the negotiations with Santa Anna, Scott sent from Puebla to Mexico a [335]Memorandum that he would advance and would either defeat the Mexicans in view of the capital (if they would offer battle) or capture a strong position, and then, if able to restrain his troops, would halt and give the Mexicans an opportunity to save the capital by making peace (Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 524). Ripley (War with Mexico, ii, 167–9) endeavors to relate this honorable incident in a way to represent Scott as the dupe of Santa Anna and to compliment Pillow. But the fact that for good and purely American reasons the general-in-chief pursued this very course after the negotiations had ended, refutes Ripley; and it also proves that in offering to make that agreement Scott did not allow his military plans to be influenced by the enemy, as was charged, for by the morning of Aug. 20, as no sign of a disposition to treat had met Scott, he regarded the Memorandum and every other vestige of an understanding as no longer binding upon him “in any degree” ([68]Scott to court, Apr. 17, 1848, confid.). Scott was ready, in the interest of his country and humanity, to do anything, compatible with his duty, to obtain peace.
Rives (op. cit., ii, 445) states that in consequence of a letter of July 16 from Pacheco, minister of relations, to Congress a committee of Congress reported that the restrictions placed by the law of Apr. 20 on the prerogatives of the Executive had been removed by the recent “Act of Reforms” of the Constitution. This would have been an important point; but the facts are that the committee’s report, now lying before the author, was dated July 13 and did not mention the law of Apr. 20, and that Congress was not in session to receive Pacheco’s reply of July 16 to its report ([52]Trist, no. 9, July 23).
[13.] Pacheco asked Bankhead to use his good offices with Scott to save the city from sack; but as neither the United States nor Mexico had shown favor to the offer of British mediation, he would not act. It is hard to see how, with due regard to Polk’s declarations and the real desire of the United States for peace, Scott could have taken the risk of scattering the Mexican government and the elements of peace by refusing to remain outside the city for a time; and remaining outside involved an armistice, because—for one thing—the only large stock of provisions on which he could count lay in town. Hence censure of Scott for making the armistice came from Polk with a very bad grace ([52]Trist, no. 22; [221]Hill, diary).
[14.] The making of the armistice. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 186, 190, 231–2 (Trist); 189 (Pacheco), 192 (Scott). [52]Trist to Buchanan, no. 12, Aug. 22. [52]Bankhead to Trist, Aug. 20, 21. Contestaciones Habidas, 3–7, 11–19. Picayune, Sept. 9. Apuntes, 260–3, 268–9. Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 314 (Scott); 356–9. Kenly, Md. Vol., 350. [68]Scott, statement to court, Apr. 17, 1848, confid. [13]Bankhead, nos. 76, Aug. 21; 82, Aug. 29. Raleigh Star, Sept. 22. [221]Hill, diary. México á través, iv, 681. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 279–80, 284–6. Davis, Autobiog., 189, 207, 215–6. [224]Intercepted letters (Hitchcock, ed.). [259]Intercepted letter. Chicago Democrat, Sept. 15, 1857. [61]Gates to adj. gen., Aug. 31. Henshaw narrative. S. Anna, Apelación, 61–2. [291]Pierce to wife, Aug. 23; to Appleton, Aug. 27. [335]Trist, memo., July 29. Semmes, Service, 412, 415–9, 427, 446. N. Y. Courier and Enquirer, Mar. 1, 1848. Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 170, 178, 191, 196–8, 204, 281, 288, 460, 465, 543. [80]Relaciones, circulars, Aug. 23, 30. [80]Relaciones to Olaguíbel, Aug. 31, res. [73]Lozano, no. 5, res., Aug. 28. Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 447–8; iv, app., 286. [335]Trist, notes on a letter to Ho. of Repres., Feb. 12, 1848. Wash. Telegraph, Oct. 13, 1852. [236]Judah, diary. Sedgwick, Corresp., i, 114. So. Qtrly. Review, July, 1852, pp. 112–6. S. Anna, Detall, 16. Monitor Repub., Dec. 12 (S. Anna, report, Nov. 19). [70]“Guerra,” no. 30 (F. Pérez, statement, June 17, 1853). Ramírez, México, 301. Wash. Union, Nov. 3. [76]To Lombardini, Aug. 21. [76]Tornel to Lombardini, Aug. 24. [76]Circulars, Aug. 26; Sept. 1, 6, 7. [76]Many others. Mora was accompanied by Arrangóiz, lately Mexican consul at New Orleans.
Quitman and Pierce, who had not been able to distinguish themselves in the recent battles, and P. F. Smith were armistice commissioners for the Americans and Generals Mora and Quijano for the Mexicans. They met at Mackintosh’s house. In brief the terms, as drawn up, were as follows: 1, cessation of hostilities; 2, to continue while the peace commissioners are negotiating or forty-eight hours after one of the commanders-in-chief gives formal notice of its termination; 3, during the armistice no military work, offensive or defensive, shall be begun, enlarged or reinforced; 4, neither army shall be reinforced; troops and munitions en route shall stop twenty-eight leagues [about seventy-five miles] from Mexico; 5, no troops of either side shall advance “beyond the line now actually occupied”; 6, the intermediate ground shall not be trespassed upon by military men except when acting as messengers or engaged under a white flag on other business; 7, neither side shall prevent the other from receiving provisions; the Americans may obtain supplies from city or country; 8, prisoners shall be exchanged; 9, Americans residing at Mexico and banished thence may return; 10, either army may send messengers to or from Vera Cruz; 11, the Americans will not interfere with the administration of justice when Mexicans are the parties; 12, they will respect private property, personal rights and trade; 13, wounded prisoners shall be free to move for treatment and cure; 14, Mexican army health officers may attend on such Mexicans; 15, commissioners shall superintend the fulfilment of this agreement; 16, the agreement is to be approved by the commanders-in-chief within twenty-four hours (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 310). Santa Anna struck out article 9, but through passports the same end was reached ([52]Trist, no. 13); and it was agreed that “supplies” (recursos) in article 7 should cover everything needed by the army except arms and munitions. For Scott’s draft see Sen. 65; 30, 1, p. 543.
It is believed that enough has been said in the text to show the wisdom of making the armistice, and more space cannot be given to the subject. Any one interested in it should read Trist’s [52]no. 22 (most of it in Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 231–66). It should be borne in mind that the Mexicans believed the armistice was greatly for the advantage of the Americans. Alcorta, minister of war, said that Scott’s purpose in proposing it was solely to give his troops a needed rest, collect his wounded, obtain provisions and prepare batteries (Negrete, Invasión, iii, app., 448). It was believed that his losses had been severe ([61]undated Mexican letter). The reasons avowed by Santa Anna for accepting the armistice were to let the troops rest and recover morale, to gather the wounded and the dispersed, and in general to undo the effects of the recent battles; also to show the world that Mexico was willing to discuss peace, and to convince all that the American demands were unreasonable. The weakest point about the armistice was Scott’s not requiring that Chapultepec should be surrendered or evacuated, as at one time he intended to do (Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 285). The reason for his policy was, in brief, that he believed Santa Anna fully intended to make peace, and, understanding the immense difficulties that Santa Anna would have to meet, he did not wish to increase them ([52]Trist, no. 13). Besides, magnanimity—which is a strong quality, not a weak one—to a beaten foe often produces good results. Perhaps Scott erred on this point; but if so, it was a noble error and not hastily to be censured. Apparently by oversight, neither Scott nor Trist had been instructed what to do should the Mexicans ask for an armistice with a view to peace. Hence Scott was left to take the course that seemed to him best, and that he did. Pillow claimed great glory for opposing the unsuccessful armistice. Rives says (U. S. and Mexico, ii, 501) that Scott was too eager for a return to the United States to be “critical” of Santa Anna’s honesty. This is to say that Scott was unfit to be a corporal. Everybody was suspicious of Santa Anna. See Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 248–52. Rives further says (p. 507) that Scott should have seen that Santa Anna, situated as he was, would have accepted any conditions; but Santa Anna certainly would not. He did not accept our peace terms. Rives also alludes to Scott’s “amiable weakness” in the matter (p. 508)—very erroneously, the present author thinks.