[7.] Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 375 (Scott) and map. [73]Lozano, no. 7, 1847. Semmes, Service, 430. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, 2–3. Niles, Oct. 9, p. 89. [92]Piedad judge, Sept. 9. Diccionario Universal (México). Robertson, Visit, ii, 344.
[8.] Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 376 (Scott), 425–7 (Smith). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77 (Lee), 185 (Ripley), 579 (Pillow says he reported to Scott on Sept. 9 that the Mexican works opposite Piedad, where Pillow then was, could be carried easily). Davis, Autobiog., 223. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 298–300. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, pp. 4–5. [66]Lee to J. L. Smith, Sept. 15. [66]Beauregard to Id.., Sept. 20. [111]Id.to Id.., Sept. 27. [218]Henshaw narrative. [76]To Olaguíbel, Sept. 11.
Ripley (op. cit., ii, 470) and Rives (op. cit., ii, 528) reflect upon Scott for having no reconnaissances made between Aug. 20 and Sept. 7. But to make them would have violated the meaning and spirit of the armistice, which prescribed an “absolute cessation of hostilities” (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 310), and it was highly important to show the strictest good faith during the delicate negotiations. Rives (ibid.) says “no preparation whatever had been made for the contingency of renewed hostilities.” This statement results from a lack of information. Numberless things had been done to put the army and its equipment into fighting trim. Rives says also (ibid.) that the Mexicans, had they been enterprising, could easily have beaten our army in detail at this time. This seems to be a mistake (see Sen. 19; 30, 2, p. 8). A frontal attack upon Worth could certainly have been repulsed, and an attempt to strike Pillow, Twiggs or Quitman would have exposed their own flank and rear. Moreover it was clear that Santa Anna had no intention of assuming the offensive. Rives says himself he had none (op. cit., 466), attributing his decision to “well-justified distrust of his own army”; and since the decision was made (July) nothing had occurred to reassure him. Napoleon said, “A well-established maxim of war is, not to do anything which your enemy desires.”
[9.] Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77–8, 145 (Lee), 81 (Cadwalader), 112–3 (Beauregard), 123 (Trist), 169 (Hooker). Sen. 1; 30, 1, pp. 375 (Scott), 427 (Smith). Exposición dirigida, 6. So. Qtrly. Rev., Jan., 1853, pp. 6–15. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 300. [113]Beauregard, remins. [66]Id.to J. L. Smith, Sept. 20. [111]Id.to Id.., Sept, 27. [69]Letter of Sept. 11 from Mexico. Semmes, Service, 430. (Gunners) [76]Carrera, report, Dec., 1847. (Key) Apuntes, 304, 317. Wash. Union, Dec. 9. [210]Alvord to Hammond, Feb. 21, 1848. Rodríguez, Breve Reseña, 870. Stevens, Stevens, i, 207.
Ripley (op. cit., ii, 472) remarks that even after taking Chapultepec Scott was “yet at a distance of two miles from the city, with the positive certainty of running upon the citadel if the direct route were pursued.” But two miles on a broad, good causeway signified little, it was unnecessary to take the direct route, and Scott had no intention of taking it. Ripley admits (p. 473) that Scott reasonably supposed that the defences at S. Cosme were comparatively weak.
[10.] Sen. 1; 30, 1, p. 428 (Smith). Sen. 65; 30, 1, pp. 77 (Lee), 112 (Beauregard), 169 (Hooker), 257 (Quitman). [113]Beauregard, remins. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 300. Claiborne, Quitman, i, 353–5. The description of Lee is based principally upon a picture (seen at the Confederate Museum, Richmond) made soon after the Mexican war. The weather was still unusually favorable for military operations.
[11.] Negrete, Invasión, iv, app., 294–6. Evidence at the trial of Bravo ([70]“Guerra,” no. 273). S. Anna, Detall, 22. [76]To Monterde, May 24. [76]Monterde, June 18, 21–2. [76]To Lombardini, July 6, 23; Aug. 3. [76]Tornel, Sept. 12. [76]To Bravo, Sept. 10. [76]Bravo, Sept. 14. [76]Liceaga to Lombardini, Aug. 22. [76]Reports on Bravo’s conduct, July 21, 24, 1848. Apuntes, 317. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 459.
[12.] Sen. 1; 30, 1, map; pp. 400 (Pillow), 410 (Quitman). [76]Bravo, Sept. 14. Negrete, Inv., iv, app., 294–6. Semmes, Service, 450–1. Tornel, Sept. 12. To Bravo, Sept. 10. Apuntes, 307–8. [357]Wilcox, diary. [70]Evidence at the trial of Bravo (“Guerra,” no. 273). Ripley, War with Mexico, ii, 396–8. (Impreg.) [221]Hill, diary. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 285, 302.
The southeastern corner of the rectangle was irregularly cut off. A bullet-proof wall, about fifteen feet high, protected the eastern end, and ran along the southern line of the rectangle with platforms or scaffolds for infantry on its inner side, while a stone aqueduct—its arches filled in here with heavy masonry—extended (in the Anzures causeway) along the northern side of the rectangle, and continued via S. Cosme to the city. Cultivated fields, adjacent to El Molino, occupied about a third of the rectangle. On each side of the north-and-south drainage ditch there was an embankment. The next section—perhaps one sixth—of the rectangle was occupied by the swamps and cypresses, and then came the hill—extremely steep except at the west, and steep there. A road or wide path led east through the grove to the foot of the hill. The opening in the south wall, covered by the exterior, unarmed redan (B), had a ditch outside of the redan for additional protection. The road that went up to the college was defended inside the main gateway with a 9-pounder (placed here Sept. 12). The circular (arc of a circle) redoubt (C) was at the glorieta (an open space furnished with seats, etc.). One or two other slight fortifications probably existed.
The south wall of the terre-plein had a parapet except near the southeast corner. Along the base of the west wall ran a fosse about twelve feet wide and ten deep. Rather extensive mines (to be fired by powder-trains laid on or just under the surface of the ground) lay below the fosse; and beyond them—about half-way down the slope—stood a redan (E) for some fifty men, which seems to have been about 125 feet from the wall. This west wall was a priest-cap: i.e., it was indented like a shallow V, so that its two halves could afford support to each other. In the central portion of the terre-plein stood the masonry edifice of the military college with an open terrace at its eastern end and some stone buildings with flat, parapeted roofs, at its western end. A half-round bastion on each of the long sides afforded room for a heavy gun commanding in each case a semicircle. (The one in the southern bastion seems to have been disabled on Sept. 8.) East of the southern bastion, in a smaller projection, stood a lighter gun looking toward the lower gateway; behind the somewhat zigzag parapet westward two or three smaller pieces covering the road and the southwest approach; on the terre-plein commanding the upper gateway a couple of light howitzers; and at the western end, specially screened with timber and sand-bags, two heavy pieces, which swept the approach from El Molino. (One of the pieces was a 68-pound howitzer. Ripley is precise in his account of the size and the placing of the guns, but the evidence is against him. He says there were eleven. There seem to have been thirteen; but one of them was not mounted, and two were now disabled.) Timbering, proof against bullets, covered much of the lower story, the parapeted azotea of the main edifice and some other parts of the buildings; and sand-bags afforded further, though inadequate, protection at a number of peculiarly exposed points.