[8.] (Traitorous) London Times, Mar. 15, 1848. Sen. 52; 30, 1, pp. 140, 144 (Scott). [256]Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 28, 1848. Scott, Mems., ii, 576. [13]Thornton, no. 21, confid. Id.to Trist: note 7. Sen. Rep. 261; 41, 2. Trist, no. 22. [13]Id.to Thornton, Dec. 4, 1847. [335]Id.to Id.., Nov. 24. [335]Id.to wife, Dec. 4.
It has been said that Trist’s decision was due to Scott, but Trist was not under Scott’s control. Scott tried without success to dissuade him from breaking with Polk ([335]statement by Trist in his papers). Trist [335]wrote to his wife, Dec. 4, “Knowing it to be the very last chance, and impressed with the dreadful consequences to our country which cannot fail to attend the loss of that chance,” I decided to-day at noon to attempt to make a treaty; the decision is altogether my own. Sen. Rep. 261, the basis of which was evidently supplied by Trist, says that Freaner, the correspondent of the New Orleans Delta, was “the only man who had been in any way instrumental in determining Mr. Trist to make the attempt.” It has also been said that Scott and Trist wished to make the treaty because Polk now wanted more of Mexico, and they desired to “spite” him; but neither man was of such a type, no suggestion of the scheme appears in Trist’s official or personal letters or in Thornton’s reports to the Foreign Office, and public considerations are quite enough to explain Trist’s course. Sen. Rep. 261 says that on Dec. 4 occurred an incident “in itself of the most casual, and trivial, and commonplace kind,” which led to Trist’s making the treaty. This has been thought to mean the postponement of the train with which he was to have gone down; but the above description does not seem to fit this important occurrence, and the author is inclined to believe that it refers to a chance meeting of Trist and Freaner, while Trist’s decision hung in the balance. Freaner was regarded by Trist as an honest man of unusual sagacity, and he was a strong, sympathetic character. Peña held that, since his peace commissioners had been appointed, he could deal with the subject through them only, and hence, as they were at a distance, he could not possibly send a proposal to Mexico for Trist to carry home, as it was suggested to him to do. Trist counted on one fact as lessening his responsibility: the government could disavow his work without embarrassment ([52]no. 22). See Napoleon’s dictum (chap. xxvii, note [17], p. 398).
[9.] [13]Thornton, no. 21, confid., 1847. [13]Doyle, nos. 1, 3, 1847; 10, 1848. [52]Trist, nos. 23–5. [256]J. Parrott to Marcy, Dec. 27, 1847, private. Sen. 60; 30, 1, pp. 61 (Peña), 62 (Trist). (Rincón) México á través, iv, 705–7. [335]Memo. re withdrawal of notice. [335]Thornton to Trist, Nov. 24, priv.; Dec. 5, 11, confid. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 590. [335]Trist to Peña, Dec. 26, 1847. Lee, Gen. Lee, 43. Noticias Muy Importantes. Richardson, Messages, iv, 545. [335]Powers of the commrs. [335]Trist, minutes of meetings, etc.
Doyle arrived at Vera Cruz on Nov. 30, and soon received from the Foreign Office a despatch ([13]no. 40) making clear its attitude of benevolent neutrality (Doyle, no. 3). Polk’s message encouraged the Eventualists, because it showed that if they could defeat the present negotiations, the war would continue, the peace party would fall from power, and then the Eventualists would have American support in setting up a government according to their ideas. Rincón pretended to be ill. Associated with the ministry of Relaciones at this time as confidential advisers were such men as Pedraza, Lafragua and Cuevas.
[10.] Sen. 20; 30, 1, p. 21. [335]Buchanan to Trist, Oct. 24, personal. [335]—— to Id.., Oct. 25. [335]Dimond to Id.., Oct. 27. [73]Lozano, no. 3, res., 1847. [335]Trist, notes and memoranda. [335]Notes of Trist and Couto. [335]Thornton’s translation of Mexican draft of treaty. [335]Notes from Doyle and Thornton. (Unreasonable) México á través, iv, 706. Sierra, Evolution, i, 223. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 592, 596–7. [13]Doyle, nos. 10 (with memoranda), 29, 1848. [13]Palmerston to Mora, June 20, 1848. [52]Trist, no. 27. Exposición dirigida, 6. (Trist’s conduct) Negrete, Invasión, iv, 324.
Trist relied for guidance on his original instructions (Ho. 69; 30, 1, pp. 43–7), the projet of a treaty accompanying the instructions (ibid., p. 47), [52]instructions of July 13 and 19, 1847, former treaties of the United States, and our general principles and policy ([52]Trist, no. 27). See also Polk’s Diary, Apr. 13, 1847. In regard to the western end of the boundary the instructions were faulty, and Trist found it necessary to use his judgment ([52]enclosure in his no. 27). Greatly fearing the designs of the Monarchists, he desired to have a secret article binding upon Mexico the constitution of 1824, and was willing to promise in return that enough American troops to support the government should remain five years; but the proposition was declined ([13]Doyle, no. 10, 1848). There was a difficulty in doing anything about Tehuantepec, for British interests were involved, and that matter was dropped by Trist in order to facilitate the adjustment of the boundary (Exposición, supra). It did not signify much now, for the United States had its eye upon a better route (J. S. Reeves in Amer. Hist. Rev., x, 323). The subject that consumed the most time was the status of the people of the surrendered territory (Trist, no. 27). The Mexicans asked that their civil law should continue to rule there until the territory should be organized into states, but Trist (perhaps in the interest of slavery) would not consent ([13]Doyle, no. 10).
[11.] [13]Doyle, nos. 10, 12, 13, 1848. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 568, 579, 591, 602–3, 605–6. Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1039 (Scott). [52]Trist, nos. 25–7. México á través, iv, 706–8. [335]Trist to wife, Dec. 26, 1847; to Scott, Jan. 28, 1848; to commrs., Jan. 29, 1848. [13]Doyle to commrs., Jan. 28–9. (S. L. P.) [83]Gov. S. L. P. to gov. Querétaro, Feb. 5, 1848; [77]Relaciones, circular, Jan. 17; Nacional, Jan. 26 (plan); Feb. 2; Rivera, Jalapa, iv, 41, 43; México á través, iv, 706. [256]Marcy to Wetmore, Jan. 28.
Peña became the chief executive again because the expiration of Anaya’s term (ordered by the Congress that elected him to occur on Jan. 8, since it was expected that the new Congress would have assembled by that date) left the country without a head, and the position devolved upon him as chief of the supreme court. L. de la Rosa was then appointed minister of relations. The plan of the S. L. P. governor was that four states—S. L. P., Zacatecas, Guanajuato and Jalisco—should combine, repudiate the national government, and continue the war, expecting other states to join them; but public opinion, even in his own state, failed to support him. Almonte was actively working against peace at this time, basing his arguments particularly on the attitude of the peace party in the United States and the poverty of the American treasury. Jan. 30 he called attention to the Whig majority in our House, said our Congress would probably refuse to send more troops to Mexico, and urged the Mexican government to procrastinate. The reply of the government was a mere acknowledgment of receipt. Feb. 14 he argued that Walker’s report showed we could not continue the war much longer. On the other hand there seems to be some reason to believe that personal relations and interests may have influenced the Mexican commissioners in favor of making the treaty (Puga y Acal, Documentos, letter no. 74). Marcy to Scott, Oct. 6, 1847: Your military operations are not to be modified by Mexican proposals to negotiate (Sen. 52; 30, 1, p. 140).
[12.] [13]Thornton, no. 11, 1847. [13]Doyle, nos. 4, 1847; 13, 14 and 18, 1848. Sen. 60; 30, 1, p. 65 (Trist). Ho. 60; 30, 1, p. 1082 (Scott). Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 604–7. [13]Doyle to commrs., Jan. 28, 29; to Rosa, Jan. 29. Hitchcock, Fifty Years, 315–6. México á través, iv, 706–8. [335]Memo. from Freaner.
The Mexican government naturally desired to keep all information about the treaty from its enemies. The public came to believe, however, that an important act had taken place on Feb. 2. Freaner carried the treaty to Washington. For two weeks escorts had been waiting at the proper points on the road to Vera Cruz. The Spanish representative, under his instructions, took no part in these negotiations. The Prussian minister, lacking both official authorization and personal influence, was equally inactive. France had no minister on the scene.