The Fortifications of Churubusco Convent
Victory did not arrive, however; so now the Second and the Seventh Infantry, led by Riley, attacked the Mexican right. Amidst the corn the American infantry became scattered, yet in the same haphazard way fought on; and Taylor, placed in a very exposed position before the state of things was understood, fired at short musket range with beautiful precision and rapidity. But the Mexicans, inspired by good leaders and by the example of the American deserters, who aimed the cannon, stood their ground. From parapets and bastions poured sheets of unceasing flame, sally followed sally, and guns at the bridgehead coöperated. In an hour and a half Taylor drove the enemy from the walls and from the roof of the church, but he lost twenty-four men and fourteen horses killed and wounded. The battery had to be withdrawn, and victory seemed almost beyond reach.[16]
Worth had now been attacking the bridgehead for half an hour or more. Hurrying the troops along, without giving them definite instructions, at a speed limited only by their wind and the obstacles in their way, he had left the Sixth Infantry on the highway, placed the Fifth and the Eighth at the right of it, and sent the rest of his infantry obliquely against the Mexican left; and then, without a reconnaissance of the bridgehead, the Sixth was ordered to charge whatever lay in its front.[15]
Probably the army contained no better corps, but it recoiled twice in confusion under a terrific storm of iron and lead. Valor was not lacking, but the men were dumfounded to come “butt-end first,” as a soldier put it, upon such a fort so strongly held, when they had supposed they were chasing a parcel of rabbits; and their numbers were unequal to the task. Officers as well as men showed every sign of panic. The regiment could not be kept on the highway; and the troops in the tall corn on the right accomplished no more. The ground was soft there; and it was cut up with dikes and with deep, wide ditches containing about three feet of water. The men fought, but they fought in general disorder. C. F. Smith found himself with not more than twenty of his battalion at hand. Even the artillery, the backbone of the army, failed now, for Duncan’s light pieces could not challenge the bridgehead squarely on the highway, and the ground beside it was unsuitable for them; while occasional fire from the convent and the explosion of an ammunition wagon abandoned by the Mexicans added to the difficulties.[15]
At the same time, besides these two combats which Scott had not expected, one planned by him was taking place. A few minutes after sending Twiggs toward Churubusco he ordered Pierce—and presently Shields also—to follow a road leading north from Coyoacán, cross Churubusco River, and move toward Santa Anna’s rear, so as to protect the American flank and rear, favor the attack on the convent, and cut off the retreat of the Mexicans. The route adopted by the troops after leaving the road took them for a mile and a half through cornfields and marshes, and placed them near the highway, about three quarters of a mile north of the bridgehead, not far from the hacienda of Los Portales. To parry the blow Santa Anna at once moved in that direction with the Fourth Ligero, the Tulancingo regiment and most of the Eleventh Line, his finest corps, extending his men—perhaps 2200 in all—until they almost overlapped the Americans; while some 1500 or 2000 cavalry, probably consisting of the horse that had followed him to San Angel reinforced by that which had escaped from Contreras, menaced—though afraid to attack—Shields’s left.[17]
Precisely what occurred now cannot be stated, for apparently most of the reporting officers were more anxious to conceal than to disclose facts; but it seems clear that Shields handled the men clumsily, that his own regiments fell into disorder when charging and shrank from the devouring Mexican fire, and that Pierce’s brigade, composed of excellent material but officered to a large extent with political favorites, actually skulked. The Mexicans, on the other hand, finding two ditches along the highway to protect them from the dreaded bayonet and an embankment to screen them somewhat from bullets, fought stiffly. Shields was therefore unable, with his six hundred good men and two small howitzers, to make any impression, and after a time his troops huddled wherever they could in the shelter of some buildings.[17]
But finally, between three and four o’clock, the spell broke. Worth’s men, though astonished and for a time dismayed, had no thought of giving up. “Victory or death” was not a phrase to them, but a conviction. Though dikes, ditches, bad ground, corn higher than their heads, and the Mexican artillery fire broke up their organization, personal courage and personal leadership survived. In smaller or larger groups they fought on. Santa Anna, by taking the Fourth Ligero from Pérez to defend the rear, deducted half the strength of his left wing, and no doubt Shields’s operations, very suggestive of the American methods used in previous battles, tended to make the troops at the bridgehead nervous. Gradually a part of the unlucky Sixth and men of C. F. Smith’s and Garland’s commands, working toward the extreme American right, out-reached the enemy, crossed the river, turned the Mexican line, and moved on toward the highway. This created great alarm. The fate of Valencia was recalled. Many of the officers wilted. Ammunition seems partially to have failed; and at length, under a still galling fire, some of the Eighth Infantry, followed by more of the Fifth, waded the ditch of the bridgehead—twenty feet broad it was—climbed over the parapet or pushed through the embrasures, and settled the question hand to hand.[15]
At once Duncan planted two of his guns on the highway near the convent, and for ten or fifteen minutes, aided by a piece or two at the bridgehead, he fired with a judgment, rapidity and accuracy that delighted the on-lookers. By this time two of Rincón’s guns at the right of the convent and one of the other pieces had become unserviceable; the ammunition, so lavishly expended, had failed the infantry; and the loss of the bridgehead, which stood on higher and commanding ground, was recognized as a most serious blow. The artillery commandant began to move a cannon from the front side to the right. Only two guns were in play on the front; and our Third Infantry, noting the slackened fire, dashed over the parapet at the left of the convent. Still the American deserters would not permit a white flag to be shown, and the garrison retired sullenly to the interior of the building. But Captain J. M. Smith, seeing that active resistance was over, now put up a white handkerchief himself to prevent further bloodshed. The signal of surrender stopped Duncan’s work, too; and the Mexicans, astonished by the consideration shown them, laid down their arms.[18]