BATTLE OF CHAPULTEPEC
Yet for 7180 available Americans including those required to make a feint against the southern front—an “army” that had to contemplate still harder work beyond, and could not afford severe losses here—Chapultepec meant a great deal. In general the position formed an approximate rectangle about three fourths of a mile in length by one fourth of a mile in width, bounded at its western end by El Molino and on the other sides with high stone walls. In the south wall, at about its middle point, there was an opening covered on the outside by a sand-bag redan (B), unarmed. From the main gateway in the eastern end the causeway of Belén struck off toward the city, another road—guarded here by a cut and by two batteries—ran toward Tacubaya, and a third, after running westwardly into the rectangle and a little way up the slope until it arrived at a 4-pounder in a circular redoubt (C), flanked with an infantry entrenchment (D), turned sharply toward the northeast, and finally climbed to the summit.[12]
Blindage at Chapultepec.
Here on a rectangular level space or terre-plein, supported at the eastern end by an almost vertical precipice and on the other sides by high, parapeted walls, rose the masonry buildings of the military college, skilfully though incompletely reinforced with sand-bags and screens of timber (blindage), supplemented with parapeted azoteas, and surrounded with ten effective guns, heavy and light. A deep, broad fosse at the base of the western wall, mines below that, and finally, half-way down the slope, a redan (E) strengthened this end, where the incline was gentlest. In swamps at the western foot of the hill stood a large grove of huge cypresses—extending also toward the main gateway—through which ran an east and west road commanded by this redan (E) and also by the wall of the fort. Beyond the grove came a north-and-south ditch, intended for drainage, with a redan-breastwork (A)—looking westward—at its northern end; and finally, after traversing level and open fields for about a quarter of a mile toward the west, one arrived at El Molino. Placed so conspicuously in view, 150 or 200 feet in height, Chapultepec seemed to deserve its popular reputation of impregnability, and the American soldiers gazed at the white walls on the summit, transfigured in the sunlight, with dread if not with consternation.[12]
Late in the afternoon, September 11, Quitman’s division ostentatiously presented itself at La Piedad, but after dark both his and Pillow’s moved to Tacubaya, leaving Twiggs with Brevet Colonel Riley’s brigade and Steptoe’s and Taylor’s field pieces behind. During the night two 16’s and an eight-inch howitzer under Drum were placed behind bushes on the road from Tacubaya to Mexico, about 1000 yards from Chapultepec, and a similar howitzer with a 24-pounder, masked in the same way, south of El Molino under Hagner; and these batteries (Nos. 1 and 2) opened fire the next morning (September 12). Later in the day a 16-pound siege gun and an eight-inch howitzer (Battery No. 3) and a ten-inch mortar (No. 4), planted nearer the mill, joined in the work. Chapultepec replied; and, as usual, the Mexican artillerymen—of whom there was a full complement—did well, occasionally knocking sand-bags from the American parapets, while our own gunners, warned by the burst of smoke, took shelter at each discharge. Meantime Steptoe, in the hope of deceiving the Mexicans as to Scott’s purpose, made as much noise as possible opposite the San Antonio garita.[13]
During these preparations the Mexicans passed their days in a state of fever. Reports that our army had only half-rations cheered them, and Scott’s deceptive manoeuvres were attributed by many to indecision or timidity. On the eleventh a review and a valiant proclamation from the President recalled his “victory” of 1829 over the Spaniards. But a sense of weakness and confusion, the loss of friends, the continual alarms, the marchings and countermarchings, and the ominous clang of the bells kept them sad and anxious. Santa Anna, for his part, displayed as usual a remarkable activity and a remarkable want of judgment and method. During the night of September 9 he set perhaps 2000 men at work—one hour each—on the southern fortifications, and the parapets rose as if by enchantment. Not knowing where Scott would strike, he broke his army into a number of detachments, and shifted troops and guns frequently according to his notion of the probabilities, while always maintaining a reserve. But he lost himself in a maze of details; and on the eleventh, deceived by the rather weak American feint, he unwisely drew men and cannon from Chapultepec and Belén.[14]