Polk moved in the same direction. In September, 1847, he concluded that, should the war continue, he might demand Tamaulipas and the line of thirty-one degrees, and reduce the compensation to fifteen millions; and before the end of January, 1848, he felt inclined to throw aside entirely the terms offered through Trist. Besides, he loathed the treaty on account of the man who made it and the man who gave assistance. After his recall, considering himself a private citizen, Trist reported with a free hand, criticising the President’s recent Message as encouraging the Eventualists, and expressing his opinions on the business without much reserve. Naturally Polk the Mediocre, guided by Pillow the Cunning, totally misconceived the spirit of Trist and Scott. In his eyes they had contrived a wicked political “conspiracy” against Him, His administration, His party and His Pillow. Both had proved “utterly unworthy,” and on January 25 the “arrogant, impudent” and “very base” Trist was ordered to leave headquarters. To accept, approve, endorse, recommend and support the work of such a scoundrel seemed impossible.[18]
But Polk had professed to be considerate and forbearing toward our erring sister, and to seek only redress, indemnity, security and peace. His terms had been officially stated; and while his Message of December, 1847, had suggested that a continuance of the war might be expected to modify them, no real fighting had occurred since then, and—although Polk had known for about six weeks that negotiations on virtually the old basis were afoot—no modification of them had been announced. That Message had expressly disclaimed all thought of making “a permanent conquest” of Mexico; and on the fourth of this very February Sevier, chairman of the committee on foreign relations, had stated in the Senate that Polk was anxious for peace, desired only indemnity, and wanted to preserve Mexican nationality.[19]
Trist had substantially embodied Polk’s terms in the treaty, and had even anticipated his thought of reducing the compensation. Congress had voted men and money on the basis of Polk’s professions and terms; and, should he now raise his demands, all his enemies would say their charges of greed, falsehood, injustice, o’ervaulting ambition and bloodthirsty wickedness had been proved. Hostilities might continue, the Whigs might carry the election, the war might end in disaster and ignominy, and all the gains now embodied in the treaty might be lost. Even should these perils be avoided, it seemed extremely doubtful whether Mexico would ever accept by treaty a more encroaching boundary, and quite possible that an endeavor to obtain it would open a long vista of expenses, guerilla warfare, foreign complications and Heaven only knew what. Extension toward the south was liable to kindle the fires of an anti-slavery agitation and perhaps disrupt the Union. The treaty and the victories that it consummated meant enough glory for any President. Finally, Polk, now moving about with dragging steps, dry, brown face, gray hair and sunken eyes, perhaps felt weary of battling both abroad and at home; and at the very least, should he endorse this paper and lay it before the Senate, his responsibility would cease.[19]
Buchanan and Walker opposed the treaty; but the former, as well as Polk himself, recognized that any personal misconduct of Trist, a mere agent of the Executive, had no proper bearing on the question. The rest of the Secretaries favored placing the document before the Senate. On February 22, after full debates in the Cabinet, Polk did this, recommending by implication the acceptance of it; and so a paper which had been simply a memorandum drawn up by a private American citizen and several Mexicans holding official positions, became a real treaty, merely awaiting confirmation.[20]
Among the Senators the treaty met with jeers and scowls. “Great Jehovah!” exclaimed Lieutenant W. T. Sherman on learning its terms; it is “just such a one as Mexico would have imposed on us had she been the conqueror”; and so thought a number of the Senators. It is a mere piece of waste paper, cried many; the impudent, perhaps traitorous, work of a discredited agent, whom the President had ordered out of Mexico; and it would be undignified, ridiculous, degrading, to accept such a thing. The war party opposed it. The annexationists opposed it. The no-territory men opposed it. The Little Unionists, who thought the country too big already, opposed it. Not a few hated to think of letting Polk elude them so easily.[21]
But suddenly the head of John Quincy Adams, as he sat in the House, dropped. He was borne to the Speaker’s room. “This is the last of earth; I am content,” murmured the venerable statesman. For two days he lingered, unconscious; and then he passed away. This tragic event had a deep effect. There fell a hush, as when snow descends upon the city pavement. The sessions of Congress were suspended. Senators were prevented from announcing their positions hastily. And when discussion began once more, it was resumed with a new feeling of seriousness, a new sense of responsibility.[21]
THE TREATY BEFORE THE SENATE
If the President could put up with Trist and his work, surely the Senate could, one began to think; and in every way Polk’s virtual endorsement gave the paper enough respectability. Politics played a leading rôle in almost every mind, but after a little it seemed like bad strategy to vote against the glory and the territory ensured by its terms. The committee on foreign relations, which decided to throw the treaty aside and send an “imposing” commission to do the work over, dropped the scheme when Polk told them bluntly this would be “worse than an idle ceremony.” Benton, thoroughly angry at the administration because Frémont, his son-in-law, had been condemned for insubordination in California; Berrien, wedded to his “no-territory” idea; Corwin, anxious perhaps to have more Americans find hospitable graves in Mexico; Webster, who asserted that California and New Mexico were “not worth a dollar”; and certain other Senators, committed for this or that reason, were beyond argument; but all their hopes failed.[22]
The deep current set against them. “What better can we do?” became an unanswerable argument for the treaty. The people wanted peace. They desired no more bloodshed, no more costs. One could not be sure of obtaining another treaty from chaotic Mexico, or sure that any treaty differing from the present one could have as good a chance in the American Senate. To reject the work of Trist was understood more and more clearly to involve, perhaps, not only interminable fighting, but a train of moral, political, industrial, commercial and financial ills of which no one could see the end. Already enough generals had built up reputations, thought many of the politicians. It would be of priceless advantage, urged some of the finer men, to supplement our military triumphs with a great act of magnanimity. By March 7 ratification, which had been for a time extremely doubtful, appeared probable. Houston of Texas, a leading opponent, concluded to visit New Hampshire. And on the tenth by 38 against 14—a narrow margin, since a majority of two-thirds was requisite—the treaty won. A transfer of four votes from the affirmative to the negative would have defeated it.[22]
There were a few amendments. Article X, which might have revived extinct Mexican claims to lands in Texas now occupied by bona fide settlers, went overboard at once. The provision of security for the Roman Catholic church in the acquired territory (Art. IX) fell out as unnecessary, as reflecting on the good faith of the United States, as suggesting government interference with religious affairs in this country, and as tending to confirm the Mexican pretence that we entertained hostile feelings toward that communion. The Senate refused to agree that California and New Mexico should be made into states “as soon as possible” (Art. IX), regarding that as a step to be taken with deliberation, and only when, in the judgment of Congress, all the prerequisites of statehood should exist. Instead of allowing Mexico to choose between payment by instalments and payment in securities convertible at once into cash (Art. XII) it was decided to offer only the former method, as a veiled hint that an infraction of the treaty would cause a suspension of the instalments. Another amendment permitted the Indians to have firearms, which, as they lived by the chase, had to be done. A further modification, intended to hasten the conclusion of peace, authorized the exchange of ratifications at Querétaro whenever Mexico should accept the amended treaty; and it was also provided by the Senate that evacuation could then begin. Finally a secret article, which permitted Mexico to consummate the ratification of the agreement at any time within eight months, instead of the four months of Article XXIII, was cancelled, because it seemed to encourage procrastination, and allow her time to escape from the treaty, while compelling us to bear great expenses. But none of these changes touched the essentials.[23]