[604]. The italics in the quotation are the author’s.
[605]. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 133 (Lansdowne to Scott).
[606]. See pp. [246]–248, above.
[607]. It is highly interesting that at this moment, when the Russian Government was, on the one hand, negotiating with Japan, and, on the other, proposing new demands upon China, the Russian Ambassador at London intimated the desire of his Government to come to an agreement with Great Britain regarding their interest in China. It appears that Russia wished Great Britain to declare Manchuria as outside of her sphere of interest, in return for a similar declaration by Russia regarding the Yang-tsze valley. Lord Lansdowne’s reply was characteristic. “I repeated,” he wrote to Sir C. Scott, “that we should be glad to arrive at one [i. e., an agreement with Russia], but that it must, of course, include the Manchurian question. We could, however, of course not come to terms unless we were fully informed as to the intentions of the Russian Government [in Manchuria]. Count Benckendorff again asked me whether, if we were satisfied upon this point, we should be likely to assist in bringing about an arrangement between the Russian and Chinese Governments. I said that we should certainly make no secret of our concurrence, if we were thoroughly satisfied. Meanwhile, however, I was afraid that our attitude must remain observant and critical.”—China, No. 2 (1904), No. 142 (August 12). Cf. No. 139.
The Russian Government could not have forgotten that Great Britain had agreed with Japan, on January 30, 1902, that neither of the two Powers should come to a separate understanding with another Power regarding China or Korea without a full and frank discussion between themselves.
[608]. China, No. 2 (1904), Nos. 147, 148, 149, 156.
[609]. China, No. 2 (1904), No. 150.
[610]. Ibid., Nos. 149, 151, 153, 160.
[611]. Ibid., Nos. 147 and 156.
[612]. Ibid., Nos. 150 and 160.