It should be noted that this note from Mr. Kurino reached Tokio at 5.15 P. M., or three hours and a quarter after the Japanese notes severing relations had been sent.
Count Cassini, in the following striking sentence, includes, among the contents of the last Russian reply, a point which was not in the least mentioned in Count Lamsdorff’s personal opinion expressed to Mr. Kurino. M. Cassini says: “... However, in another effort to bring the negotiations to a peaceful conclusion, my country did all that dignity would permit, and offered to give assurances again that the sovereignty of the Emperor of China in Manchuria would be recognized.”—The North American Review for May, 1904, p. 686.
[663]. From the reply of the Japanese Government to the Russian charge that Japan had broken peace and taken Russia by surprise. See pp. [352]–353, below.
It should not be forgotten, at the same time, that Japan had all the while been taking precautionary measures in the most careful and exhaustive manner, not only in military and naval affairs, but also in other matters connected therewith. The difference between the Russian and Japanese attitude may thus be stated: Russia apparently played the three-fold game of employing sharp diplomacy at Seul and Peking, of strengthening her control over Manchuria and the Korean frontier, and of endeavoring at once to intimidate Japan by vast warlike measures, and to evade her overtures till she might be compelled to acquiesce in the situation to be at length perfected by Russia; Japan expressed her wishes in straightforward language, and relied upon her negotiations with Russia, which she, in spite of extremely trying circumstances, conducted with the utmost cordiality and patience, but at the same time prepared for any emergency in which the unconciliating attitude of Russia might probably result. It will perhaps be always regretted by many that the control of Russian diplomacy throughout the negotiations rested in the hands of those who seemed to fail to grasp the exact state of Japan’s mind in this greatest crisis of her national existence.
[664]. N.-R., No. 48.
[665]. Ibid., No. 49.
[666]. Mr. Kurino left St. Petersburg on the 10th, and the next day saw the departure of Baron Rosen from Tokio. It was generally believed that the former had once sincerely desired that a satisfactory agreement between Russia and Japan should be effected. As for Baron Rosen, every one surmised that the respected gentleman was little responsible for the conduct of Russian diplomacy, of which he was regarded as an unfortunate agent. From a personal point of view, the sudden departure of both from their posts had something tragic about it, and Baron Rosen’s situation was deeply sympathized with by the Japanese people.
[667]. From the English translation in the London Times, February 11, 1904, p. 3.
[668]. The rescript appeared in the Kwampō, February 10, 1904, extra. An authoritative English translation, which has been slightly altered in our text in order to bring it nearer to the original language, was published in the London Times, February 12, 1904, p. 3.
[669]. The London Times, February 19, 1904, p. 3.