According to the instructions he had received from his Government, Mr. MacCormick, the United States Ambassador, had an interview with Count Lamsdorff in the evening of April 28. The Count at once denied in the most positive manner that such demands as were rumored had been made by the Russian Government. He expressed surprise that they should have been credited in any quarter, and that a friendly government like that of the United States should be the only one to question him as to whether Russia could have made demands some of which were on the face of them ridiculous, as, for instance, those for the right of using China’s telegraph poles and for the restriction of foreign trade in Manchuria. It may be questioned whether Count Lamsdorff has ever made to a strong Power another denial in as positive language, which was, one will soon observe, as quickly falsified by subsequent events, as this remarkable disclaimer of April 28, 1903. He went on to say that he could give the United States Government the most positive assurances that Russia would faithfully adhere to its pledges regarding Manchuria, and to her assurances to respect the rights of other Powers. Moreover, American capital and commerce were what Russia most desired to attract in order to develop Manchuria. The Count also intimated that any delay in the evacuation was due to the natural necessity of obtaining assurances that China was fulfilling her part of the agreement. This could be better ascertained by the Russian Minister, M. Lessar, who had been absent from Peking on sick leave, but was about to return to his post, than by an acting Chargé d’Affaires.[[475]] A careful reading of this disclaimer will show that it denied that the reported demands had been made by Russia, but it did not establish that no demands whatsoever had been made by her. This consideration would seem to make it truly remarkable that Mr. MacCormick should have been, as he was, entirely satisfied with the result of the interview, and should have had no further remark to make. He could perhaps have inquired whether M. Plançon had acted without authorization, what were the conditions he had proposed, and by what means M. Lessar was expected to obtain the assurances from China that her obligations would be fulfilled.[[476]]

The positive statements of Count Lamsdorff were partly reinforced and partly neutralized by the clever remarks made on April 29 by Count Cassini, the Russian Ambassador at Washington, which appeared in the New York Tribune of May 1. He considered it unfortunate that Mr. Conger should have been misinformed, by unreliable parties, of Russia’s intentions in Manchuria, of which they were grossly ignorant,—a matter which was regretted, he was sure, no less by the American Government than by Russia. He, however, not only intimated that some sort of negotiation was in progress between Russia and China regarding Manchuria, but was bold enough to say that the United States would assist Russia in quieting the uneasy sentiment caused by false reports. He said:—

“Because of the singularity of the interest held by the United States in Manchuria—for all the world realizes that yours is a trade, not a territorial one—it lies within the power of your Government to exert a powerful influence in the preservation of peace there. Russia’s desire is also for peace, not disturbances, in Manchuria, and it is to this end that negotiations are now proceeding in Peking in the effort to establish a condition of evacuation, and to safeguard Manchuria against a recurrence of the troubles of 1900.

“Striking evidence of the direct effect in this country caused by unrest in China was seen in 1900, when, I am told, many cotton mills in the United States were forced to shut down until conditions in China were again normal. This fact and the evidence the United States has already given of its desire to make for peace are sufficient assurance that the Washington Government will lend its strong moral support to calm excitement wherever it has been aroused by the incorrect reports from Peking.”

According to Count Cassini, it was “because of the long standing and genuine friendliness which, without exception, had characterized the relations of these two great countries, as well as in recognition of the frankness with which the American Secretary of State had dealt with my Government in all diplomatic matters,” that the latter took pleasure in assuring the United States regarding negotiations pending with another Power, “even though in so doing all diplomatic precedent was broken.” “I am not aware,” he said, “that any other Powers have received from the Foreign Office [of St. Petersburg] such a statement as was handed your Ambassador.” In referring to Mr. MacCormick’s interview, however, it will be seen that Count Lamsdorff made no direct reference to the negotiations at Peking, still less to their contents, and the assurances he gave had before and have since been frequently and in similar terms repeated to other Powers by Russia.

By far the most illuminating part of M. Cassini’s conversation was its practical confirmation of the truth of one of the reported demands of Russia which were considered the most objectionable, and which Count Lamsdorff specifically denied, characterizing them “as on the face of them ridiculous,” namely, that no new ports should be opened in Manchuria for the world’s trade. “Of the opening of new treaty ports in Manchuria,” said M. Cassini, “it is impossible for me to speak at present, but it is the earnest conviction of those best acquainted with the state of affairs there that such a move will not be to the best interest of the territory. Were the question solely a commercial one, it would be different. But open a treaty port in Manchuria, and close upon the heels of commerce will follow political complications of all kinds, which will increase the threats to peace.” In this statement Count Cassini not only virtually contradicted Count Lamsdorff, but also, as we shall soon see, was subsequently contradicted by the latter.

A careful reader of these words uttered by one of Russia’s greatest diplomatic agents abroad will feel satisfied that, despite Count Lamsdorff’s elastic statement to the contrary, Russia was actually proposing some terms to China, and that one of those terms probably was that Manchuria should have no more treaty ports. When diplomacy relies, even to a slight extent, upon subterfuges, it risks a certain lack of consistent unity among its exponents, and the rule could hardly have for exceptions even such highly trained diplomats as Lamsdorff and Cassini.

Count Lamsdorff’s disclaimer was uttered on April 28, and Count Cassini’s statement was dated April 29 and appeared in the press on May 1. In the mean time, the Foreign Office of Peking had refused the Russian conditions in an official note. Yet, on April 29, M. Plançon suggested that each condition might be answered separately, and the suggestion was verbally refused by Prince Ching. Thereupon the Russian Chargé presented a note intimating that his Government wished to be assured on the first three of the original demands, namely, whether a territorial cession to another power in the Liao Valley was contemplated by China; whether there was an intention to assimilate the administration of Mongolia to that of China proper; and whether China would permit the appointment of foreign Consuls in Manchuria in other places than Niu-chwang. In reply, Prince Ching stated, naturally, that there had never been any question of ceding territory in the Liao Valley to a foreign Power; that the question of altering the administrative system of Mongolia had been discussed, but it had been disapproved by the Throne, and was not under consideration for the present; and that, in regard to the appointment of new Consuls in Manchuria, it depended upon the opening of new ports, which would be decided only by the extent of the commercial development of Manchuria.[[477]] On the next day, or, as the late Sir M. Herbert rather inaccurately wrote to Lord Lansdowne, “two days after the Russian Government had categorically denied that the demands had been made,” M. Plançon reiterated to Prince Ching, not three, but all, of the seven conditions, and, consequently, the Chinese treaty commissioners at Shanghai were instructed, for the present, to refuse to their American colleagues the opening of treaty ports in Manchuria, which the latter had been demanding. The United States Government, however, taking little heed of M. Cassini’s argument, instructed its commissioners at Shanghai, on the strength of Count Lamsdorff’s denial, to insist upon the opening of new Manchurian ports.[[478]] Against this demand, M. Plançon seems to have renewed his pressure upon the Chinese Government several times during May,[[479]] saying that he had received no instructions from St. Petersburg to revoke his opposition.[[480]] At last, Secretary Hay instructed Mr. Conger to suggest to M. Lessar, on the latter’s arrival at Peking, that a simultaneous communication should be made by them to the Peking Foreign Office to the effect that the Russian Government had, as Count Lamsdorff had said, no objection to the opening of the treaty ports.[[481]] The Russian Minister returned to Peking toward the end of May, and telegraphed to his Government the suggestion made by the American Government.[[482]] He, as well as M. Cassini, renewed the assurance that Russia was not opposed to the opening of the ports, and Mr. MacCormick, who returned on leave to Washington, confirmed the assurance.[[483]] Secretary Hay now hoped that the only possible opposition to be met would come from none but the Chinese Government, and requested the support in the matter[[484]] of the British and Japanese Ministers at Peking, which was willingly given. So late as on June 5, however, M. Cassini addressed a note to Mr. Hay, inquiring what was the meaning attached by the United States Government to the term “treaty port,” and what action it wished Russia to take. Mr. Hay could only refer, in answer to the first query, to the correspondence which passed between the Russian and the United States Governments in 1899,[[485]] and request, in reply to the second, that Russia should inform China that it was untrue that the former was, as had been stated by China, preventing the opening of the treaty ports.[[486]] Secretary Hay was so urgent about this matter that he considered it indifferent whether the opening was granted in a treaty or, as a compromise, by a special Imperial edict.[[487]] M. Lessar had the first interview after his return with Prince Ching on June 10,[[488]] and, according to the Japanese press, renewed the original seven conditions,[[489]] including the refusal of ports. The Prince was believed to have refused to discuss any of the conditions except those regarding the establishment of a sanitary board and the payment of customs duties into the Russo-Chinese Bank at Niu-chwang, which might be reconsidered. The Prince was then granted another five days’ sick leave, returned to the summer palace, and declined to see any foreign Minister.[[490]] Rumors were then afloat which would have one believe that the Prince, in spite of the earnest protests of the British and Japanese Representatives, was gradually yielding to Russian influence. It is at least significant that at this critical point he informed Mr. Townley, the British Chargé d’Affaires, on June 19, that an agreement would soon be arrived at with Russia whereby Manchuria would be preserved to China without any loss of sovereign rights. He added that China would open treaty ports in Manchuria, if she saw fit, after the Russian evacuation.[[491]] The significance of these remarks could easily be read between the lines. Not only was the Russian evacuation uncertain, but also it was no less patent to Russia than to China that, in the marts, the opening of which was under discussion, namely, Mukden and perhaps Harbin, as well as An-tung and Tatung-kao near the Korean boundary, the immediate trade prospects were not considered so great as the political danger which their opening might to some degree avert. Had the evacuation been certain, and had the commercial consideration been the sole question involved, it would have been unnecessary either to hasten their opening or even to select those very places. Nor would MM. Cassini, Lessar, and Plançon have been so strongly opposed to the proposition. Seen in the light of these considerations, Prince Ching’s new position appeared plainly to indicate the gaining of Russian influence upon the helpless Foreign Office of Peking.

M. LESSAR
Russian Minister at Peking